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* kvm-arm64/gicv3-tdir-fixes:
: .
: Address two trapping-related issues when running legacy (i.e. GICv3)
: guests on GICv5 hosts, courtesy of Sascha Bischoff.
: .
KVM: arm64: Correct test for ICH_HCR_EL2_TDIR cap for GICv5 hosts
KVM: arm64: gic: Enable GICv3 CPUIF trapping on GICv5 hosts if required
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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* kvm-arm64/fwb-for-all:
: .
: Allow pKVM's host stage-2 mappings to use the Force Write Back version
: of the memory attributes by using the "pass-through' encoding.
:
: This avoids having two separate encodings for S2 on a given platform.
: .
KVM: arm64: Simplify PAGE_S2_MEMATTR
KVM: arm64: Kill KVM_PGTABLE_S2_NOFWB
KVM: arm64: Switch pKVM host S2 over to KVM_PGTABLE_S2_AS_S1
KVM: arm64: Add KVM_PGTABLE_S2_AS_S1 flag
arm64: Add MT_S2{,_FWB}_AS_S1 encodings
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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* kvm-arm64/pkvm-no-mte:
: .
: pKVM updates preventing the host from using MTE-related system
: sysrem registers when the feature is disabled from the kernel
: command-line (arm64.nomte), courtesy of Fuad Taba.
:
: From the cover letter:
:
: "If MTE is supported by the hardware (and is enabled at EL3), it remains
: available to lower exception levels by default. Disabling it in the host
: kernel (e.g., via 'arm64.nomte') only stops the kernel from advertising
: the feature; it does not physically disable MTE in the hardware.
:
: The ability to disable MTE in the host kernel is used by some systems,
: such as Android, so that the physical memory otherwise used as tag
: storage can be used for other things (i.e. treated just like the rest of
: memory). In this scenario, a malicious host could still access tags in
: pages donated to a guest using MTE instructions (e.g., STG and LDG),
: bypassing the kernel's configuration."
: .
KVM: arm64: Use kvm_has_mte() in pKVM trap initialization
KVM: arm64: Inject UNDEF when accessing MTE sysregs with MTE disabled
KVM: arm64: Trap MTE access and discovery when MTE is disabled
KVM: arm64: Remove dead code resetting HCR_EL2 for pKVM
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The original order of checks in the ICH_HCR_EL2_TDIR test returned
with false early in the case where the native GICv3 CPUIF was not
present. The result was that on GICv5 hosts with legacy support -
which do not have the GICv3 CPUIF - the test always returned false.
Reshuffle the checks such that support for GICv5 legacy is checked
prior to checking for the native GICv3 CPUIF.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Bischoff <sascha.bischoff@arm.com>
Fixes: 2a28810cbb8b2 ("KVM: arm64: GICv3: Detect and work around the lack of ICV_DIR_EL1 trapping")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251208152724.3637157-4-sascha.bischoff@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Factor out the enable (and printing of) the GICv3 CPUIF traps from the
main GICv3 probe into a separate function. Call said function from the
GICv5 probe for legacy support, ensuring that any required GICv3 CPUIF
traps on GICv5 hosts will be correctly handled, rather than injecting
an undef into the guest.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Bischoff <sascha.bischoff@arm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251208152724.3637157-3-sascha.bischoff@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Restore PAGE_S2_MEMATTR() to its former glory, keeping the use of
FWB as an implementation detail.
Reviewed-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260123191637.715429-6-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Nobody is using this flag anymore, so remove it. This allows
some cleanup by removing stage2_has_fwb(), which is can be replaced
by a direct check on the capability.
Reviewed-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260123191637.715429-5-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Since we have the basics to use the S1 memory attributes as the
final ones with FWB, flip the host over to that when FWB is present.
Reviewed-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260123191637.715429-4-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Plumb the MT_S2{,_FWB}_AS_S1 memory types into the KVM_S2_MEMATTR()
macro with a new KVM_PGTABLE_S2_AS_S1 flag.
Nobody selects it yet.
Reviewed-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260123191637.715429-3-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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pKVM usage of S2 translation on the host is purely for isolation
purposes, not translation. To that effect, the memory attributes
being used must be that of S1.
With FWB=0, this is easily achieved by using the Normal Cacheable
type (which is the weakest possible memory type) at S2, and let S1
pick something stronger as required.
With FWB=1, the attributes are combined in a different way, and we
cannot arbitrarily use Normal Cacheable. We can, however, use a
memattr encoding that indicates that the final attributes are that
of Stage-1.
Add these encoding and a few pointers to the relevant parts of the
specification. It might come handy some day.
Reviewed-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260123191637.715429-2-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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When initializing HCR traps in protected mode, use kvm_has_mte() to
check for MTE support rather than kvm_has_feat(kvm, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1,
MTE, IMP).
kvm_has_mte() provides a more comprehensive check:
- kvm_has_feat() only checks if MTE is in the guest's ID register view
(i.e., what we advertise to the guest)
- kvm_has_mte() checks both system_supports_mte() AND whether
KVM_ARCH_FLAG_MTE_ENABLED is set for this VM instance
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260122112218.531948-5-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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When MTE hardware is present but disabled via software (`arm64.nomte` or
`CONFIG_ARM64_MTE=n`), the kernel clears `HCR_EL2.ATA` and sets
`HCR_EL2.TID5`, to prevent the use of MTE instructions.
Additionally, accesses to certain MTE system registers trap to EL2 with
exception class ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64. To emulate hardware without MTE (where
such accesses would cause an Undefined Instruction exception), inject
UNDEF into the host.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260122112218.531948-4-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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If MTE is not supported by the hardware, or is disabled in the kernel
configuration (`CONFIG_ARM64_MTE=n`) or command line (`arm64.nomte`),
the kernel stops advertising MTE to userspace and avoids using MTE
instructions. However, this is a software-level disable only.
When MTE hardware is present and enabled by EL3 firmware, leaving
`HCR_EL2.ATA` set allows the host to execute MTE instructions (STG, LDG,
etc.) and access allocation tags in physical memory.
Prevent this by clearing `HCR_EL2.ATA` when MTE is disabled. Remove it
from the `HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS` default, and conditionally set it in
`cpu_prepare_hyp_mode()` only when `system_supports_mte()` returns true.
This causes MTE instructions to trap to EL2 when `HCR_EL2.ATA` is
cleared.
Additionally, set `HCR_EL2.TID5` when MTE is disabled. This traps reads
of `GMID_EL1` (Multiple tag transfer ID register) to EL2, preventing the
discovery of MTE parameters (such as tag block size) when the feature is
suppressed.
Early boot code in `head.S` temporarily keeps `HCR_ATA` set to avoid
special-casing initialization paths. This is safe because this code
executes before untrusted code runs and will clear `HCR_ATA` if MTE is
disabled.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260122112218.531948-3-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The pKVM lifecycle does not support tearing down the hypervisor and
returning to the hyp stub once initialized. The transition to protected
mode is one-way.
Consequently, the code path in hyp-init.S responsible for resetting
EL2 registers (triggered by kexec or hibernation) is unreachable in
protected mode.
Remove the dead code handling HCR_EL2 reset for
ARM64_KVM_PROTECTED_MODE.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260122112218.531948-2-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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* kvm-arm64/pkvm-features-6.20:
: .
: pKVM guest feature trapping fixes, courtesy of Fuad Tabba.
: .
KVM: arm64: Prevent host from managing timer offsets for protected VMs
KVM: arm64: Check whether a VM IOCTL is allowed in pKVM
KVM: arm64: Track KVM IOCTLs and their associated KVM caps
KVM: arm64: Do not allow KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE for any guest in pKVM
KVM: arm64: Include VM type when checking VM capabilities in pKVM
KVM: arm64: Introduce helper to calculate fault IPA offset
KVM: arm64: Fix MTE flag initialization for protected VMs
KVM: arm64: Fix Trace Buffer trap polarity for protected VMs
KVM: arm64: Fix Trace Buffer trapping for protected VMs
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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* kvm-arm64/feat_idst:
: .
: Add support for FEAT_IDST, allowing ID registers that are not implemented
: to be reported as a normal trap rather than as an UNDEF exception.
: .
KVM: arm64: selftests: Add a test for FEAT_IDST
KVM: arm64: pkvm: Report optional ID register traps with a 0x18 syndrome
KVM: arm64: pkvm: Add a generic synchronous exception injection primitive
KVM: arm64: Force trap of GMID_EL1 when the guest doesn't have MTE
KVM: arm64: Handle CSSIDR2_EL1 and SMIDR_EL1 in a generic way
KVM: arm64: Handle FEAT_IDST for sysregs without specific handlers
KVM: arm64: Add a generic synchronous exception injection primitive
KVM: arm64: Add trap routing for GMID_EL1
arm64: Repaint ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1.IDS description
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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* kvm-arm64/selftests-6.20:
: .
: Some selftest fixes addressing page alignment issues as well as
: a bad MMU setup bug, courtesy of Fuad Tabba.
: .
KVM: selftests: Fix typos and stale comments in kvm_util
KVM: selftests: Move page_align() to shared header
KVM: riscv: selftests: Fix incorrect rounding in page_align()
KVM: arm64: selftests: Fix incorrect rounding in page_align()
KVM: arm64: selftests: Disable unused TTBR1_EL1 translations
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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* kvm-arm64/vtcr:
: .
: VTCR_EL2 conversion to the configuration-driven RESx framework,
: fixing a couple of UXN/PXN/XN bugs in the process.
: .
KVM: arm64: nv: Return correct RES0 bits for FGT registers
KVM: arm64: Always populate FGT masks at boot time
KVM: arm64: Honor UX/PX attributes for EL2 S1 mappings
KVM: arm64: Convert VTCR_EL2 to config-driven sanitisation
KVM: arm64: Account for RES1 bits in DECLARE_FEAT_MAP() and co
arm64: Convert VTCR_EL2 to sysreg infratructure
arm64: Convert ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1.TGRAN{4,16,64}_2 to UnsignedEnum
KVM: arm64: Invert KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_HANDLE_FAULT to fix pKVM walkers
KVM: arm64: Don't blindly set set PSTATE.PAN on guest exit
KVM: arm64: nv: Respect stage-2 write permssion when setting stage-1 AF
KVM: arm64: Remove unused vcpu_{clear,set}_wfx_traps()
KVM: arm64: Remove unused parameter in synchronize_vcpu_pstate()
KVM: arm64: Remove extra argument for __pvkm_host_{share,unshare}_hyp()
KVM: arm64: Inject UNDEF for a register trap without accessor
KVM: arm64: Copy FGT traps to unprotected pKVM VCPU on VCPU load
KVM: arm64: Fix EL2 S1 XN handling for hVHE setups
KVM: arm64: gic: Check for vGICv3 when clearing TWI
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Merge arm64/for-next/cpufeature in to resolve conflicts resulting from
the removal of CONFIG_PAN.
* arm64/for-next/cpufeature:
arm64: Add support for FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V}
KVM: arm64: Enable FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V} in the supported guest
arm64: Provide basic EL2 setup for FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V} usage at EL0/1
KVM: arm64: Handle DABT caused by LS64* instructions on unsupported memory
KVM: arm64: Add documentation for KVM_EXIT_ARM_LDST64B
KVM: arm64: Add exit to userspace on {LD,ST}64B* outside of memslots
arm64: Unconditionally enable PAN support
arm64: Unconditionally enable LSE support
arm64: Add support for TSV110 Spectre-BHB mitigation
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Armv8.7 introduces single-copy atomic 64-byte loads and stores
instructions and its variants named under FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V}.
These features are identified by ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1.LS64 and the
use of such instructions in userspace (EL0) can be trapped.
As st64bv (FEAT_LS64_V) and st64bv0 (FEAT_LS64_ACCDATA) can not be tell
apart, FEAT_LS64 and FEAT_LS64_ACCDATA which will be supported in later
patch will be exported to userspace, FEAT_LS64_V will be enabled only
in kernel.
In order to support the use of corresponding instructions in userspace:
- Make ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1.LS64 visbile to userspace
- Add identifying and enabling in the cpufeature list
- Expose these support of these features to userspace through HWCAP3
and cpuinfo
ld64b/st64b (FEAT_LS64) and st64bv (FEAT_LS64_V) is intended for
special memory (device memory) so requires support by the CPU, system
and target memory location (device that support these instructions).
The HWCAP3_LS64, implies the support of CPU and system (since no
identification method from system, so SoC vendors should advertise
support in the CPU if system also support them).
Otherwise for ld64b/st64b the atomicity may not be guaranteed or a
DABT will be generated, so users (probably userspace driver developer)
should make sure the target memory (device) also have the support.
For st64bv 0xffffffffffffffff will be returned as status result for
unsupported memory so user should check it.
Document the restrictions along with HWCAP3_LS64.
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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Using FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V} instructions in a guest is also controlled
by HCRX_EL2.{EnALS, EnASR}. Enable it if guest has related feature.
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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Instructions introduced by FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V} is controlled by
HCRX_EL2.{EnALS, EnASR}. Configure all of these to allow usage
at EL0/1.
This doesn't mean these instructions are always available in
EL0/1 if provided. The hypervisor still have the control at
runtime.
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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If FEAT_LS64WB not supported, FEAT_LS64* instructions only support
to access Device/Uncacheable memory, otherwise a data abort for
unsupported Exclusive or atomic access (0x35, UAoEF) is generated
per spec. It's implementation defined whether the target exception
level is routed and is possible to implemented as route to EL2 on a
VHE VM according to DDI0487L.b Section C3.2.6 Single-copy atomic
64-byte load/store.
If it's implemented as generate the DABT to the final enabled stage
(stage-2), inject the UAoEF back to the guest after checking the
memslot is valid.
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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Add a bit of documentation for KVM_EXIT_ARM_LDST64B so that userspace
knows what to expect.
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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The main use of {LD,ST}64B* is to talk to a device, which is hopefully
directly assigned to the guest and requires no additional handling.
However, this does not preclude a VMM from exposing a virtual device
to the guest, and to allow 64 byte accesses as part of the programming
interface. A direct consequence of this is that we need to be able
to forward such access to userspace.
Given that such a contraption is very unlikely to ever exist, we choose
to offer a limited service: userspace gets (as part of a new exit reason)
the ESR, the IPA, and that's it. It is fully expected to handle the full
semantics of the instructions, deal with ACCDATA, the return values and
increment PC. Much fun.
A canonical implementation can also simply inject an abort and be done
with it. Frankly, don't try to do anything else unless you have time
to waste.
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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FEAT_PAN has been around since ARMv8.1 (over 11 years ago), has no compiler
dependency (we have our own accessors), and is a great security benefit.
Drop CONFIG_ARM64_PAN, and make the support unconditionnal.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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LSE atomics have been in the architecture since ARMv8.1 (released in
2014), and are hopefully supported by all modern toolchains.
Drop the optional nature of LSE support in the kernel, and always
compile the support in, as this really is very little code. LL/SC
still is the default, and the switch to LSE is done dynamically.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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We had extended the sysreg masking infrastructure to more general
registers, instead of restricting it to VNCR-backed registers, since
commit a0162020095e ("KVM: arm64: Extend masking facility to arbitrary
registers"). Fix kvm_get_sysreg_res0() to reflect this fact.
Note that we're sure that we only deal with FGT registers in
kvm_get_sysreg_res0(), the
if (sr < __VNCR_START__)
is actually a never false, which should probably be removed later.
Fixes: 69c19e047dfe ("KVM: arm64: Add TCR2_EL2 to the sysreg arrays")
Signed-off-by: Zenghui Yu (Huawei) <zenghui.yu@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260121101631.41037-1-zenghui.yu@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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We currently only populate the FGT masks if the underlying HW does
support FEAT_FGT. However, with the addition of the RES1 support for
system registers, this results in a lot of noise at boot time, as
reported by Nathan.
That's because even if FGT isn't supported, we still check for the
attribution of the bits to particular features, and not keeping the
masks up-to-date leads to (fairly harmess) warnings.
Given that we want these checks to be enforced even if the HW doesn't
support FGT, enable the generation of FGT masks unconditionally (this
is rather cheap anyway). Only the storage of the FGT configuration is
avoided, which will save a tiny bit of memory on these machines.
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Fixes: c259d763e6b09 ("KVM: arm64: Account for RES1 bits in DECLARE_FEAT_MAP() and co")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260120211558.GA834868@ax162
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260122085153.535538-1-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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For protected VMs, the guest's timer offset state should not be
controlled by the host and must always run with a virtual counter offset
of 0. The existing timer logic allowed the host to set and manage the
timer counter offsets for protected VMs in certain cases.
Disable all host-side management of timer offsets for protected VMs by
adding checks in the relevant code paths.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251211104710.151771-10-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Certain VM IOCTLs are tied to specific VM features. Since pKVM does not
support all features, restrict which IOCTLs are allowed depending on
whether the associated feature is supported.
Use the existing VM capability check as the source of truth to whether
an IOCTL is allowed for a particular VM by mapping the IOCTLs with their
associated capabilities.
Suggested-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251211104710.151771-9-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Track KVM IOCTLs (VM IOCTLs for now), and the associated KVM capability
that enables that IOCTL. Add a function that performs the lookup.
This will be used by CoCo VM Hypervisors (e.g., pKVM) to determine
whether a particular KVM IOCTL is allowed for its VMs.
Suggested-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
[maz: don't expose KVM_CAP_BASIC to userspace, and rely on NR_VCPUS
as a proxy for this]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251211104710.151771-8-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Supporting MTE in pKVM introduces significant complexity to the
hypervisor at EL2, even for non-protected VMs, since it would require
EL2 to handle tag management.
For now, do not allow KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE for any VM type in protected mode.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251211104710.151771-7-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Certain features and capabilities are restricted in protected mode. Most
of these features are restricted only for protected VMs, but some
are restricted for ALL VMs in protected mode.
Extend the pKVM capability check to pass the VM (kvm), and use that when
determining supported features.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251211104710.151771-6-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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This 12-bit FAR fault IPA offset mask is hard-coded as 'GENMASK(11, 0)'
in several places to reconstruct the full fault IPA.
Introduce FAR_TO_FIPA_OFFSET() to calculate this value in a shared
header and replace all open-coded instances to improve readability.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251211104710.151771-5-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The function pkvm_init_features_from_host() initializes guest
features, propagating them from the host. The logic to propagate
KVM_ARCH_FLAG_MTE_ENABLED (Memory Tagging Extension)
has a couple of issues.
First, the check was in the common path, before the divergence for
protected and non-protected VMs. For non-protected VMs, this was
unnecessary, as 'kvm->arch.flags' is completely overwritten by
host_arch_flags immediately after, which already contains the MTE flag.
For protected VMs, this was setting the flag even if the feature is not
allowed.
Second, the check was reading 'host_kvm->arch.flags' instead of using
the local 'host_arch_flags', which is read once from the host flags.
Fix these by moving the MTE flag check inside the protected-VM-only
path, checking if the feature is allowed, and changing it to use the
correct host_arch_flags local variable. This ensures non-protected VMs
get the flag via the bulk copy, and protected VMs get it via an explicit
check.
Fixes: b7f345fbc32a ("KVM: arm64: Fix FEAT_MTE in pKVM")
Reviewed-by: Ben Horgan <ben.horgan@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251211104710.151771-4-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The E2TB bits in MDCR_EL2 control trapping of Trace Buffer system
register accesses. These accesses are trapped to EL2 when the bits are
clear.
The trap initialization logic for protected VMs in pvm_init_traps_mdcr()
had the polarity inverted. When a guest did not support the Trace Buffer
feature, the code was setting E2TB. This incorrectly disabled the trap,
potentially allowing a protected guest to access registers for a feature
it was not given.
Fix this by inverting the operation.
Fixes: f50758260bff ("KVM: arm64: Group setting traps for protected VMs by control register")
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251211104710.151771-3-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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For protected VMs in pKVM, the hypervisor should trap accesses to trace
buffer system registers if Trace Buffer isn't supported by the VM.
However, the current code only traps if Trace Buffer External Mode isn't
supported.
Fix this by checking for FEAT_TRBE (Trace Buffer) rather than
FEAT_TRBE_EXT.
Fixes: 9d5261269098 ("KVM: arm64: Trap external trace for protected VMs")
Reported-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251211104710.151771-2-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Fix minor documentation errors in `kvm_util.h` and `kvm_util.c`.
- Correct the argument description for `vcpu_args_set` in `kvm_util.h`,
which incorrectly listed `vm` instead of `vcpu`.
- Fix a typo in the comment for `kvm_selftest_arch_init` ("exeucting" ->
"executing").
- Correct the return value description for `vm_vaddr_unused_gap` in
`kvm_util.c` to match the implementation, which returns an address "at
or above" `vaddr_min`, not "at or below".
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260109082218.3236580-6-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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To avoid code duplication, move page_align() to the shared `kvm_util.h`
header file. Rename it to vm_page_align(), to make it clear that the
alignment is done with respect to the guest's base page size.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260109082218.3236580-5-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The implementation of `page_align()` in `processor.c` calculates
alignment incorrectly for values that are already aligned. Specifically,
`(v + vm->page_size) & ~(vm->page_size - 1)` aligns to the *next* page
boundary even if `v` is already page-aligned, potentially wasting a page
of memory.
Fix the calculation to use standard alignment logic: `(v + vm->page_size
- 1) & ~(vm->page_size - 1)`.
Fixes: 3e06cdf10520 ("KVM: selftests: Add initial support for RISC-V 64-bit")
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260109082218.3236580-4-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The implementation of `page_align()` in `processor.c` calculates
alignment incorrectly for values that are already aligned. Specifically,
`(v + vm->page_size) & ~(vm->page_size - 1)` aligns to the *next* page
boundary even if `v` is already page-aligned, potentially wasting a page
of memory.
Fix the calculation to use standard alignment logic: `(v + vm->page_size
- 1) & ~(vm->page_size - 1)`.
Fixes: 7a6629ef746d ("kvm: selftests: add virt mem support for aarch64")
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260109082218.3236580-3-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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KVM selftests map all guest code and data into the lower virtual address
range (0x0000...) managed by TTBR0_EL1. The upper range (0xFFFF...)
managed by TTBR1_EL1 is unused and uninitialized.
If a guest accesses the upper range, the MMU attempts a translation
table walk using uninitialized registers, leading to unpredictable
behavior.
Set `TCR_EL1.EPD1` to disable translation table walks for TTBR1_EL1,
ensuring that any access to the upper range generates an immediate
Translation Fault. Additionally, set `TCR_EL1.TBI1` (Top Byte Ignore) to
ensure that tagged pointers in the upper range also deterministically
trigger a Translation Fault via EPD1.
Define `TCR_EPD1_MASK`, `TCR_EPD1_SHIFT`, and `TCR_TBI1` in
`processor.h` to support this configuration. These are based on their
definitions in `arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h`.
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Itaru Kitayama <itaru.kitayama@fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260109082218.3236580-2-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Add a very basic test checking that FEAT_IDST actually works for
the {GMID,SMIDR,CSSIDR2}_EL1 registers.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108173233.2911955-10-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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With FEAT_IDST, unimplemented system registers in the feature ID space
must be reported using EC=0x18 at the closest handling EL, rather than
with an UNDEF.
Most of these system registers are always implemented thanks to their
dependency on FEAT_AA64, except for a set of (currently) three registers:
GMID_EL1 (depending on MTE2), CCSIDR2_EL1 (depending on FEAT_CCIDX),
and SMIDR_EL1 (depending on SME).
For these three registers, report their trap as EC=0x18 if they
end-up trapping into KVM and that FEAT_IDST is implemented in the guest.
Otherwise, just make them UNDEF.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108173233.2911955-9-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Similarly to the "classic" KVM code, pKVM doesn't have an "anything
goes" synchronous exception injection primitive.
Carve one out of the UNDEF injection code.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108173233.2911955-8-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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If our host has MTE, but the guest doesn't, make sure we set HCR_EL2.TID5
to force GMID_EL1 being trapped. Such trap will be handled by the
FEAT_IDST handling.
Reviewed-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yaoyuan@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108173233.2911955-7-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Now that we can handle ID registers using the FEAT_IDST infrastrcuture,
get rid of the handling of CSSIDR2_EL1 and SMIDR_EL1.
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yaoyuan@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108173233.2911955-6-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Add a bit of infrastrtcture to triage_sysreg_trap() to handle the
case of registers falling into the Feature ID space that do not
have a local handler.
For these, we can directly apply the FEAT_IDST semantics and inject
an EC=0x18 exception. Otherwise, an UNDEF will do.
Reviewed-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yaoyuan@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108173233.2911955-5-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Maybe in a surprising way, we don't currently have a generic way
to inject a synchronous exception at the EL the vcpu is currently
running at.
Extract such primitive from the UNDEF injection code.
Reviewed-by: Ben Horgan <ben.horgan@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yaoyuan@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108173233.2911955-4-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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