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path: root/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
AgeCommit message (Expand)AuthorFilesLines
2022-07-29x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB at firmware entry when IBPB is not availableThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo1-0/+1
2022-07-20x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS partsPawan Gupta1-0/+3
2022-07-18x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware callsPeter Zijlstra1-1/+10
2022-07-16x86/bugs: Remove apostrophe typoKim Phillips1-1/+1
2022-07-14x86/bugs: Mark retbleed_strings staticJiapeng Chong1-1/+1
2022-07-09x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behaviorPawan Gupta1-0/+26
2022-07-08x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supportedThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo1-2/+5
2022-06-29x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobsPeter Zijlstra1-15/+27
2022-06-27KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenterJosh Poimboeuf1-2/+2
2022-06-27x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRSJosh Poimboeuf1-5/+58
2022-06-27KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRSJosh Poimboeuf1-0/+4
2022-06-27x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_maskJosh Poimboeuf1-30/+1
2022-06-27x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exitJosh Poimboeuf1-11/+1
2022-06-27x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state changeJosh Poimboeuf1-1/+2
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only onceJosh Poimboeuf1-10/+5
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpbPeter Zijlstra1-9/+34
2022-06-27intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idlePeter Zijlstra1-0/+6
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerabilityPeter Zijlstra1-6/+33
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mit...Peter Zijlstra1-8/+17
2022-06-27x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRSPawan Gupta1-14/+52
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writesPeter Zijlstra1-6/+12
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL valuePeter Zijlstra1-5/+23
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RETKim Phillips1-12/+46
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameterAlexandre Chartre1-1/+107
2022-06-27x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerabilityAlexandre Chartre1-0/+13
2022-06-14Merge tag 'x86-bugs-2022-06-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/...Linus Torvalds1-36/+199
2022-06-01x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warningJosh Poimboeuf1-0/+11
2022-05-21x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selectionPawan Gupta1-3/+5
2022-05-21x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale DataPawan Gupta1-0/+22
2022-05-21x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idlePawan Gupta1-2/+14
2022-05-21x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigationsPawan Gupta1-10/+16
2022-05-21x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale DataPawan Gupta1-4/+107
2022-05-21x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation updatePawan Gupta1-26/+33
2022-04-05x86/speculation/srbds: Do not try to turn mitigation off when not supportedRicardo Cañuelo1-0/+7
2022-03-05x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMTJosh Poimboeuf1-2/+25
2022-03-05x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigationJosh Poimboeuf1-0/+5
2022-02-28x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMDKim Phillips1-9/+0
2022-02-21x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation re...Josh Poimboeuf1-6/+29
2022-02-21x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline optionsPeter Zijlstra1-37/+96
2022-02-21x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCEPeter Zijlstra (Intel)1-11/+18
2021-11-02Merge tag 'seccomp-v5.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/gi...Linus Torvalds1-2/+2
2021-11-02Merge tag 'x86-fpu-2021-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/g...Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
2021-10-29x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amdPeter Zijlstra1-7/+0
2021-10-20x86/fpu: Replace the includes of fpu/internal.hThomas Gleixner1-1/+1
2021-10-04x86: change default to spec_store_bypass_disable=prctl spectre_v2_user=prctlAndrea Arcangeli1-2/+2
2021-07-28x86, prctl: Hook L1D flushing in via prctlBalbir Singh1-0/+33
2021-07-28x86/mm: Prepare for opt-in based L1D flush in switch_mm()Balbir Singh1-0/+37
2020-11-25x86/speculation: Fix prctl() when spectre_v2_user={seccomp,prctl},ibpbAnand K Mistry1-2/+2
2020-11-05x86/speculation: Allow IBPB to be conditionally enabled on CPUs with always-o...Anand K Mistry1-18/+33
2020-08-07x86/bugs/multihit: Fix mitigation reporting when VMX is not in usePawan Gupta1-1/+7
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