summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt98
1 files changed, 98 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
index 57d3ee9e4bde..792fa8717d13 100644
--- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ registers, find a list below:
PPC | KVM_REG_PPC_DBSR | 32
PPC | KVM_REG_PPC_TIDR | 64
PPC | KVM_REG_PPC_PSSCR | 64
+ PPC | KVM_REG_PPC_DEC_EXPIRY | 64
PPC | KVM_REG_PPC_TM_GPR0 | 64
...
PPC | KVM_REG_PPC_TM_GPR31 | 64
@@ -3403,6 +3404,103 @@ invalid, if invalid pages are written to (e.g. after the end of memory)
or if no page table is present for the addresses (e.g. when using
hugepages).
+4.109 KVM_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR
+
+Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR
+Architectures: powerpc
+Type: vm ioctl
+Parameters: struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char (out)
+Returns: 0 on successful completion
+ -EFAULT if struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char cannot be written
+
+This ioctl gives userspace information about certain characteristics
+of the CPU relating to speculative execution of instructions and
+possible information leakage resulting from speculative execution (see
+CVE-2017-5715, CVE-2017-5753 and CVE-2017-5754). The information is
+returned in struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char, which looks like this:
+
+struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char {
+ __u64 character; /* characteristics of the CPU */
+ __u64 behaviour; /* recommended software behaviour */
+ __u64 character_mask; /* valid bits in character */
+ __u64 behaviour_mask; /* valid bits in behaviour */
+};
+
+For extensibility, the character_mask and behaviour_mask fields
+indicate which bits of character and behaviour have been filled in by
+the kernel. If the set of defined bits is extended in future then
+userspace will be able to tell whether it is running on a kernel that
+knows about the new bits.
+
+The character field describes attributes of the CPU which can help
+with preventing inadvertent information disclosure - specifically,
+whether there is an instruction to flash-invalidate the L1 data cache
+(ori 30,30,0 or mtspr SPRN_TRIG2,rN), whether the L1 data cache is set
+to a mode where entries can only be used by the thread that created
+them, whether the bcctr[l] instruction prevents speculation, and
+whether a speculation barrier instruction (ori 31,31,0) is provided.
+
+The behaviour field describes actions that software should take to
+prevent inadvertent information disclosure, and thus describes which
+vulnerabilities the hardware is subject to; specifically whether the
+L1 data cache should be flushed when returning to user mode from the
+kernel, and whether a speculation barrier should be placed between an
+array bounds check and the array access.
+
+These fields use the same bit definitions as the new
+H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS hypercall.
+
+4.110 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
+
+Capability: basic
+Architectures: x86
+Type: system
+Parameters: an opaque platform specific structure (in/out)
+Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+If the platform supports creating encrypted VMs then this ioctl can be used
+for issuing platform-specific memory encryption commands to manage those
+encrypted VMs.
+
+Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Secure Encrypted Virtualization
+(SEV) commands on AMD Processors. The SEV commands are defined in
+Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.txt.
+
+4.111 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION
+
+Capability: basic
+Architectures: x86
+Type: system
+Parameters: struct kvm_enc_region (in)
+Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This ioctl can be used to register a guest memory region which may
+contain encrypted data (e.g. guest RAM, SMRAM etc).
+
+It is used in the SEV-enabled guest. When encryption is enabled, a guest
+memory region may contain encrypted data. The SEV memory encryption
+engine uses a tweak such that two identical plaintext pages, each at
+different locations will have differing ciphertexts. So swapping or
+moving ciphertext of those pages will not result in plaintext being
+swapped. So relocating (or migrating) physical backing pages for the SEV
+guest will require some additional steps.
+
+Note: The current SEV key management spec does not provide commands to
+swap or migrate (move) ciphertext pages. Hence, for now we pin the guest
+memory region registered with the ioctl.
+
+4.112 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION
+
+Capability: basic
+Architectures: x86
+Type: system
+Parameters: struct kvm_enc_region (in)
+Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This ioctl can be used to unregister the guest memory region registered
+with KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION ioctl above.
+
+
5. The kvm_run structure
------------------------