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-rw-r--r--Documentation/filesystems/fuse.rst29
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fuse.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fuse.rst
index 8120c3c0cb4e..1e31e87aee68 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/fuse.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fuse.rst
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ How are requirements fulfilled?
the filesystem or not.
Note that the *ptrace* check is not strictly necessary to
- prevent B/2/i, it is enough to check if mount owner has enough
+ prevent C/2/i, it is enough to check if mount owner has enough
privilege to send signal to the process accessing the
filesystem, since *SIGSTOP* can be used to get a similar effect.
@@ -288,10 +288,29 @@ I think these limitations are unacceptable?
If a sysadmin trusts the users enough, or can ensure through other
measures, that system processes will never enter non-privileged
-mounts, it can relax the last limitation with a 'user_allow_other'
-config option. If this config option is set, the mounting user can
-add the 'allow_other' mount option which disables the check for other
-users' processes.
+mounts, it can relax the last limitation in several ways:
+
+ - With the 'user_allow_other' config option. If this config option is
+ set, the mounting user can add the 'allow_other' mount option which
+ disables the check for other users' processes.
+
+ User namespaces have an unintuitive interaction with 'allow_other':
+ an unprivileged user - normally restricted from mounting with
+ 'allow_other' - could do so in a user namespace where they're
+ privileged. If any process could access such an 'allow_other' mount
+ this would give the mounting user the ability to manipulate
+ processes in user namespaces where they're unprivileged. For this
+ reason 'allow_other' restricts access to users in the same userns
+ or a descendant.
+
+ - With the 'allow_sys_admin_access' module option. If this option is
+ set, super user's processes have unrestricted access to mounts
+ irrespective of allow_other setting or user namespace of the
+ mounting user.
+
+Note that both of these relaxations expose the system to potential
+information leak or *DoS* as described in points B and C/2/i-ii in the
+preceding section.
Kernel - userspace interface
============================