diff options
author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2024-06-13 04:38:15 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2024-06-14 22:52:40 +0300 |
commit | dedf56d775c0bebbc3003bfb988dddaf0a583c28 (patch) | |
tree | 9b5db9431d4b9630956715796a7e1d7f9bfb255c /tools | |
parent | 6870bdb3f4f2991193449f9de57109b3e263f55c (diff) | |
download | linux-dedf56d775c0bebbc3003bfb988dddaf0a583c28.tar.xz |
selftests/bpf: Add tests for add_const
Improve arena based tests and add several C and asm tests
with specific pattern.
These tests would have failed without add_const verifier support.
Also add several loop_inside_iter*() tests that are not related to add_const,
but nice to have.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240613013815.953-5-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Diffstat (limited to 'tools')
-rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/arena_htab.c | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c | 236 |
2 files changed, 249 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/arena_htab.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/arena_htab.c index cf938cf8c11e..81eaa94afeb0 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/arena_htab.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/arena_htab.c @@ -19,25 +19,35 @@ void __arena *htab_for_user; bool skip = false; int zero = 0; +char __arena arr1[100000]; +char arr2[1000]; SEC("syscall") int arena_htab_llvm(void *ctx) { #if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST) || defined(BPF_ARENA_FORCE_ASM) struct htab __arena *htab; + char __arena *arr = arr1; __u64 i; htab = bpf_alloc(sizeof(*htab)); cast_kern(htab); htab_init(htab); + cast_kern(arr); + /* first run. No old elems in the table */ - for (i = zero; i < 1000; i++) + for (i = zero; i < 100000 && can_loop; i++) { htab_update_elem(htab, i, i); + arr[i] = i; + } - /* should replace all elems with new ones */ - for (i = zero; i < 1000; i++) + /* should replace some elems with new ones */ + for (i = zero; i < 1000 && can_loop; i++) { htab_update_elem(htab, i, i); + /* Access mem to make the verifier use bounded loop logic */ + arr2[i] = i; + } cast_user(htab); htab_for_user = htab; #else diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c index bd676d7e615f..53679252e8a1 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c @@ -405,4 +405,240 @@ int cond_break5(const void *ctx) return cnt1 > 1 && cnt2 > 1 ? 1 : 0; } +#define ARR2_SZ 1000 +SEC(".data.arr2") +char arr2[ARR2_SZ]; + +SEC("socket") +__success __flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ) +int loop_inside_iter(const void *ctx) +{ + struct bpf_iter_num it; + int *v, sum = 0; + __u64 i = 0; + + bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, ARR2_SZ); + while ((v = bpf_iter_num_next(&it))) { + if (i < ARR2_SZ) + sum += arr2[i++]; + } + bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it); + return sum; +} + +SEC("socket") +__success __flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ) +int loop_inside_iter_signed(const void *ctx) +{ + struct bpf_iter_num it; + int *v, sum = 0; + long i = 0; + + bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, ARR2_SZ); + while ((v = bpf_iter_num_next(&it))) { + if (i < ARR2_SZ && i >= 0) + sum += arr2[i++]; + } + bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it); + return sum; +} + +volatile const int limit = ARR2_SZ; + +SEC("socket") +__success __flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ) +int loop_inside_iter_volatile_limit(const void *ctx) +{ + struct bpf_iter_num it; + int *v, sum = 0; + __u64 i = 0; + + bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, ARR2_SZ); + while ((v = bpf_iter_num_next(&it))) { + if (i < limit) + sum += arr2[i++]; + } + bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it); + return sum; +} + +#define ARR_LONG_SZ 1000 + +SEC(".data.arr_long") +long arr_long[ARR_LONG_SZ]; + +SEC("socket") +__success +int test1(const void *ctx) +{ + long i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARR_LONG_SZ && can_loop; i++) + arr_long[i] = i; + return 0; +} + +SEC("socket") +__success +int test2(const void *ctx) +{ + __u64 i; + + for (i = zero; i < ARR_LONG_SZ && can_loop; i++) { + barrier_var(i); + arr_long[i] = i; + } + return 0; +} + +SEC(".data.arr_foo") +struct { + int a; + int b; +} arr_foo[ARR_LONG_SZ]; + +SEC("socket") +__success +int test3(const void *ctx) +{ + __u64 i; + + for (i = zero; i < ARR_LONG_SZ && can_loop; i++) { + barrier_var(i); + arr_foo[i].a = i; + arr_foo[i].b = i; + } + return 0; +} + +SEC("socket") +__success +int test4(const void *ctx) +{ + long i; + + for (i = zero + ARR_LONG_SZ - 1; i < ARR_LONG_SZ && i >= 0 && can_loop; i--) { + barrier_var(i); + arr_foo[i].a = i; + arr_foo[i].b = i; + } + return 0; +} + +char buf[10] SEC(".data.buf"); + +SEC("socket") +__description("check add const") +__success +__naked void check_add_const(void) +{ + /* typical LLVM generated loop with may_goto */ + asm volatile (" \ + call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns]; \ + if r0 > 9 goto l1_%=; \ +l0_%=: r1 = %[buf]; \ + r2 = r0; \ + r1 += r2; \ + r3 = *(u8 *)(r1 +0); \ + .byte 0xe5; /* may_goto */ \ + .byte 0; /* regs */ \ + .short 4; /* off of l1_%=: */ \ + .long 0; /* imm */ \ + r0 = r2; \ + r0 += 1; \ + if r2 < 9 goto l0_%=; \ + exit; \ +l1_%=: r0 = 0; \ + exit; \ +" : + : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns), + __imm_ptr(buf) + : __clobber_common); +} + +SEC("socket") +__failure +__msg("*(u8 *)(r7 +0) = r0") +__msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=10 off=10 size=1") +__naked void check_add_const_3regs(void) +{ + asm volatile ( + "r6 = %[buf];" + "r7 = %[buf];" + "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];" + "r1 = r0;" /* link r0.id == r1.id == r2.id */ + "r2 = r0;" + "r1 += 1;" /* r1 == r0+1 */ + "r2 += 2;" /* r2 == r0+2 */ + "if r0 > 8 goto 1f;" /* r0 range [0, 8] */ + "r6 += r1;" /* r1 range [1, 9] */ + "r7 += r2;" /* r2 range [2, 10] */ + "*(u8 *)(r6 +0) = r0;" /* safe, within bounds */ + "*(u8 *)(r7 +0) = r0;" /* unsafe, out of bounds */ + "1: exit;" + : + : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns), + __imm_ptr(buf) + : __clobber_common); +} + +SEC("socket") +__failure +__msg("*(u8 *)(r8 -1) = r0") +__msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=10 off=10 size=1") +__naked void check_add_const_3regs_2if(void) +{ + asm volatile ( + "r6 = %[buf];" + "r7 = %[buf];" + "r8 = %[buf];" + "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];" + "if r0 < 2 goto 1f;" + "r1 = r0;" /* link r0.id == r1.id == r2.id */ + "r2 = r0;" + "r1 += 1;" /* r1 == r0+1 */ + "r2 += 2;" /* r2 == r0+2 */ + "if r2 > 11 goto 1f;" /* r2 range [0, 11] -> r0 range [-2, 9]; r1 range [-1, 10] */ + "if r0 s< 0 goto 1f;" /* r0 range [0, 9] -> r1 range [1, 10]; r2 range [2, 11]; */ + "r6 += r0;" /* r0 range [0, 9] */ + "r7 += r1;" /* r1 range [1, 10] */ + "r8 += r2;" /* r2 range [2, 11] */ + "*(u8 *)(r6 +0) = r0;" /* safe, within bounds */ + "*(u8 *)(r7 -1) = r0;" /* safe */ + "*(u8 *)(r8 -1) = r0;" /* unsafe */ + "1: exit;" + : + : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns), + __imm_ptr(buf) + : __clobber_common); +} + +SEC("socket") +__failure +__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ) +__naked void check_add_const_regsafe_off(void) +{ + asm volatile ( + "r8 = %[buf];" + "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];" + "r6 = r0;" + "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];" + "r7 = r0;" + "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];" + "r1 = r0;" /* same ids for r1 and r0 */ + "if r6 > r7 goto 1f;" /* this jump can't be predicted */ + "r1 += 1;" /* r1.off == +1 */ + "goto 2f;" + "1: r1 += 100;" /* r1.off == +100 */ + "goto +0;" /* verify r1.off in regsafe() after this insn */ + "2: if r0 > 8 goto 3f;" /* r0 range [0,8], r1 range either [1,9] or [100,108]*/ + "r8 += r1;" + "*(u8 *)(r8 +0) = r0;" /* potentially unsafe, buf size is 10 */ + "3: exit;" + : + : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns), + __imm_ptr(buf) + : __clobber_common); +} + char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; |