Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "New notable features:
   - The seccomp work from Will Drewry
   - PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS from Andy Lutomirski
   - Longer security labels for Smack from Casey Schaufler
   - Additional ptrace restriction modes for Yama by Kees Cook"

Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/Kconfig and include/linux/filter.h

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
  apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected path
  apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined
  ima: fix filename hint to reflect script interpreter name
  KEYS: Don't check for NULL key pointer in key_validate()
  Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4
  gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()?
  Smack: recursive tramsmute
  Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable()
  TOMOYO: Accept manager programs which do not start with / .
  KEYS: Add invalidation support
  KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings
  KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring list
  KEYS: Perform RCU synchronisation on keys prior to key destruction
  KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration
  KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile
  KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig
  KEYS: Use the compat keyctl() syscall wrapper on Sparc64 for Sparc32 compat
  Yama: remove an unused variable
  samples/seccomp: fix dependencies on arch macros
  Yama: add additional ptrace scopes
  ...

13 files changed, 383 insertions, 306 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 8ee42b2a5f19..68d82daed257 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -65,14 +65,8 @@ struct avc_cache {
 };
 
 struct avc_callback_node {
-	int (*callback) (u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			 u16 tclass, u32 perms,
-			 u32 *out_retained);
+	int (*callback) (u32 event);
 	u32 events;
-	u32 ssid;
-	u32 tsid;
-	u16 tclass;
-	u32 perms;
 	struct avc_callback_node *next;
 };
 
@@ -436,9 +430,9 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
 	audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ",
-			 ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
-	avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->tclass,
-			ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->audited);
+			 ad->selinux_audit_data->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+	avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass,
+			ad->selinux_audit_data->audited);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
 }
 
@@ -452,25 +446,23 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
 	audit_log_format(ab, " ");
-	avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->ssid,
-			   ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->tsid,
-			   ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->tclass);
+	avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
+			   ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
+			   ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
 }
 
 /* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
-static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 		u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
 		struct common_audit_data *a,
 		unsigned flags)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data stack_data;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
-	struct selinux_late_audit_data slad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad;
 
 	if (!a) {
 		a = &stack_data;
-		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
-		a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+		a->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -484,104 +476,34 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 	    (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK))
 		return -ECHILD;
 
-	slad.tclass = tclass;
-	slad.requested = requested;
-	slad.ssid = ssid;
-	slad.tsid = tsid;
-	slad.audited = audited;
-	slad.denied = denied;
+	sad.tclass = tclass;
+	sad.requested = requested;
+	sad.ssid = ssid;
+	sad.tsid = tsid;
+	sad.audited = audited;
+	sad.denied = denied;
+
+	a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 
-	a->selinux_audit_data->slad = &slad;
 	common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback);
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
- * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
- * @ssid: source security identifier
- * @tsid: target security identifier
- * @tclass: target security class
- * @requested: requested permissions
- * @avd: access vector decisions
- * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
- * @a:  auxiliary audit data
- * @flags: VFS walk flags
- *
- * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
- * with the policy.  This function is typically called by
- * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be
- * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()
- * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.
- * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must
- * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
- * before calling the auditing code.
- */
-inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-	       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-	       struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a,
-	       unsigned flags)
-{
-	u32 denied, audited;
-	denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
-	if (unlikely(denied)) {
-		audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
-		/*
-		 * a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny is TRICKY!  Setting a bit in
-		 * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
-		 * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
-		 * permission.  Take notice that this is unrelated to the
-		 * actual permissions that were denied.  As an example lets
-		 * assume:
-		 *
-		 * denied == READ
-		 * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
-		 * selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
-		 *
-		 * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
-		 * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
-		 * ACCESS
-		 */
-		if (a &&
-		    a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny &&
-		    !(a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
-			audited = 0;
-	} else if (result)
-		audited = denied = requested;
-	else
-		audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
-	if (likely(!audited))
-		return 0;
-
-	return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
-		requested, audited, denied,
-		a, flags);
-}
-
-/**
  * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events.
  * @callback: callback function
  * @events: security events
- * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD
- * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD
- * @tclass: target security class
- * @perms: permissions
  *
- * Register a callback function for events in the set @events
- * related to the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) 
- * and the permissions @perms, interpreting
- * @perms based on @tclass.  Returns %0 on success or
- * -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory exists to add the callback.
+ * Register a callback function for events in the set @events.
+ * Returns %0 on success or -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory
+ * exists to add the callback.
  */
-int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-				     u16 tclass, u32 perms,
-				     u32 *out_retained),
-		     u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-		     u16 tclass, u32 perms)
+int __init avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events)
 {
 	struct avc_callback_node *c;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!c) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
@@ -589,9 +511,6 @@ int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
 	c->callback = callback;
 	c->events = events;
-	c->ssid = ssid;
-	c->tsid = tsid;
-	c->perms = perms;
 	c->next = avc_callbacks;
 	avc_callbacks = c;
 out:
@@ -731,8 +650,7 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
 
 	for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
 		if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
-			tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
-					    0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+			tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
 			/* save the first error encountered for the return
 			   value and continue processing the callbacks */
 			if (!rc)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d85b793c9321..fa2341b68331 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1420,16 +1420,13 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
 			       int cap, int audit)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	u16 sclass;
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
 	int rc;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
-	ad.tsk = current;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
 	ad.u.cap = cap;
 
 	switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
@@ -1488,20 +1485,6 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
 }
 
-static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
-				struct inode *inode,
-				u32 perms,
-				unsigned flags)
-{
-	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
-
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
-	ad.u.inode = inode;
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
-	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
-}
-
 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
    pathname if needed. */
@@ -1511,11 +1494,9 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
 }
 
@@ -1528,11 +1509,9 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 {
 	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
 	ad.u.path = *path;
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
 }
 
@@ -1551,13 +1530,11 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	int rc;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
 	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
 		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
@@ -1587,7 +1564,6 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	u32 sid, newsid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	int rc;
 
 	dsec = dir->i_security;
@@ -1596,9 +1572,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	sid = tsec->sid;
 	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
 			  DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
@@ -1643,7 +1618,6 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	u32 av;
 	int rc;
@@ -1651,9 +1625,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 	dsec = dir->i_security;
 	isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 
 	av = DIR__SEARCH;
 	av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
@@ -1688,7 +1661,6 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	u32 av;
 	int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
@@ -1699,8 +1671,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 	old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
 	new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 
 	ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@@ -1986,7 +1957,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -2016,6 +1986,13 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
 		/* Reset exec SID on execve. */
 		new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
+		 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
+		 */
+		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
+			return -EPERM;
 	} else {
 		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
 		rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
@@ -2025,11 +2002,11 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
 	ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
 
-	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+	if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
+	    (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS))
 		new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
 
 	if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
@@ -2115,8 +2092,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 					    struct files_struct *files)
 {
-	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
 	struct tty_struct *tty;
 	struct fdtable *fdt;
@@ -2128,21 +2103,17 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 		spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
 		if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
 			struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
-			struct inode *inode;
 
 			/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
-			   Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
+			   Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
 			   than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
 			   file may belong to another process and we are only
 			   interested in the inode-based check here. */
 			file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
 						struct tty_file_private, list);
 			file = file_priv->file;
-			inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-			if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
-					   FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
+			if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
 				drop_tty = 1;
-			}
 		}
 		spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
 		tty_kref_put(tty);
@@ -2152,10 +2123,6 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 		no_tty();
 
 	/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
-
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
-
 	spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
 	for (;;) {
 		unsigned long set, i;
@@ -2492,7 +2459,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
@@ -2503,8 +2469,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 	if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
 		return 0;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 	ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
 }
@@ -2513,10 +2478,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
 }
@@ -2676,14 +2639,35 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
 	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
 }
 
+static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
+					   u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+					   unsigned flags)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	int rc;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
+	ad.u.inode = inode;
+
+	rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
+			    audited, denied, &ad, flags);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 perms;
 	bool from_access;
 	unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sid;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int rc, rc2;
+	u32 audited, denied;
 
 	from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
 	mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
@@ -2692,22 +2676,34 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	if (!mask)
 		return 0;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
-	ad.u.inode = inode;
+	validate_creds(cred);
 
-	if (from_access)
-		ad.selinux_audit_data->auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
 
 	perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
 
-	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
+	sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
+	audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
+				     from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
+				     &denied);
+	if (likely(!audited))
+		return rc;
+
+	rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
+	if (rc2)
+		return rc2;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
+	__u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
 
 	/* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
@@ -2721,7 +2717,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
 		return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
+	if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
+		av |= FILE__OPEN;
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
@@ -2763,7 +2762,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
 	int rc = 0;
 
@@ -2777,8 +2775,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
@@ -2788,8 +2785,25 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 
 	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
 	if (rc == -EINVAL) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+			struct audit_buffer *ab;
+			size_t audit_size;
+			const char *str;
+
+			/* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
+			 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
+			str = value;
+			if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
+				audit_size = size - 1;
+			else
+				audit_size = size;
+			ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+			audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
+			audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
+			audit_log_end(ab);
+
 			return rc;
+		}
 		rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
 	}
 	if (rc)
@@ -2969,7 +2983,7 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 
 	if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
 	    fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
-		/* No change since dentry_open check. */
+		/* No change since file_open check. */
 		return 0;
 
 	return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
@@ -3228,15 +3242,13 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
 	return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
 }
 
-static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
+static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
-	struct inode *inode;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
-	inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	fsec = file->f_security;
-	isec = inode->i_security;
+	isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 	/*
 	 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
 	 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
@@ -3254,7 +3266,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 	 * new inode label or new policy.
 	 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
 	 */
-	return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
+	return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
 }
 
 /* task security operations */
@@ -3373,12 +3385,10 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
 	u32 sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 
 	sid = task_sid(current);
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
 	ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
@@ -3751,15 +3761,13 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
 {
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 	u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
 
 	if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
 		return 0;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->sk = sk;
 
@@ -3839,7 +3847,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		char *addrp;
 		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 		struct common_audit_data ad;
-		struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
@@ -3866,8 +3873,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 						      snum, &sid);
 				if (err)
 					goto out;
-				COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-				ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+				ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 				ad.u.net = &net;
 				ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
 				ad.u.net->family = family;
@@ -3901,8 +3907,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 
-		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-		ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 		ad.u.net = &net;
 		ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net->family = family;
@@ -3937,7 +3942,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
 	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
 		struct common_audit_data ad;
-		struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
@@ -3963,8 +3967,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
 		       TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
 
-		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-		ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 		ad.u.net = &net;
 		ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
@@ -4056,12 +4059,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 	int err;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->sk = other;
 
@@ -4090,11 +4091,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
 
@@ -4132,12 +4131,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 	char *addrp;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
 	ad.u.net->family = family;
@@ -4167,7 +4164,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 	char *addrp;
 	u8 secmark_active;
@@ -4192,8 +4188,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
 		return 0;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
 	ad.u.net->family = family;
@@ -4531,7 +4526,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	char *addrp;
 	u32 peer_sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 	u8 secmark_active;
 	u8 netlbl_active;
@@ -4549,8 +4543,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
 		return NF_DROP;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
 	ad.u.net->family = family;
@@ -4640,7 +4633,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 	char *addrp;
 	u8 proto;
@@ -4649,8 +4641,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 	sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
 	ad.u.net->family = family;
@@ -4675,7 +4666,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	u32 peer_sid;
 	struct sock *sk;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 	char *addrp;
 	u8 secmark_active;
@@ -4722,8 +4712,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 		secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
 	}
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
 	ad.u.net->family = family;
@@ -4841,13 +4830,11 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = ipc_perms->security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
@@ -4868,7 +4855,6 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4878,8 +4864,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 
 	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4900,13 +4885,11 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4946,7 +4929,6 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4967,8 +4949,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	/* Can this process write to the queue? */
@@ -4993,15 +4974,13 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = task_sid(target);
 	int rc;
 
 	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 	msec = msg->security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
@@ -5017,7 +4996,6 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -5027,8 +5005,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 
 	isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -5049,13 +5026,11 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -5113,7 +5088,6 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -5123,8 +5097,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 
 	isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -5145,13 +5118,11 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
-	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -5331,8 +5302,23 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 		}
 		error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
 		if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
-			if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+			if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+				struct audit_buffer *ab;
+				size_t audit_size;
+
+				/* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
+				 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
+				if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
+					audit_size = size - 1;
+				else
+					audit_size = size;
+				ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+				audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
+				audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
+				audit_log_end(ab);
+
 				return error;
+			}
 			error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
 							      &sid);
 		}
@@ -5592,7 +5578,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.file_send_sigiotask =		selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
 	.file_receive =			selinux_file_receive,
 
-	.dentry_open =			selinux_dentry_open,
+	.file_open =			selinux_file_open,
 
 	.task_create =			selinux_task_create,
 	.cred_alloc_blank =		selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 1931370233d7..92d0ab561db8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ struct avc_cache_stats {
 /*
  * We only need this data after we have decided to send an audit message.
  */
-struct selinux_late_audit_data {
+struct selinux_audit_data {
 	u32 ssid;
 	u32 tsid;
 	u16 tclass;
@@ -60,28 +60,86 @@ struct selinux_late_audit_data {
 };
 
 /*
- * We collect this at the beginning or during an selinux security operation
- */
-struct selinux_audit_data {
-	/*
-	 * auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive.  See the
-	 * comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage.
-	 */
-	u32 auditdeny;
-	struct selinux_late_audit_data *slad;
-};
-
-/*
  * AVC operations
  */
 
 void __init avc_init(void);
 
-int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-	       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-	       struct av_decision *avd,
-	       int result,
-	      struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags);
+static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested,
+			      struct av_decision *avd,
+			      int result,
+			      u32 auditdeny,
+			      u32 *deniedp)
+{
+	u32 denied, audited;
+	denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
+	if (unlikely(denied)) {
+		audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
+		/*
+		 * auditdeny is TRICKY!  Setting a bit in
+		 * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
+		 * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
+		 * permission.  Take notice that this is unrelated to the
+		 * actual permissions that were denied.  As an example lets
+		 * assume:
+		 *
+		 * denied == READ
+		 * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
+		 * auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
+		 *
+		 * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
+		 * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
+		 * ACCESS
+		 */
+		if (auditdeny && !(auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
+			audited = 0;
+	} else if (result)
+		audited = denied = requested;
+	else
+		audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
+	*deniedp = denied;
+	return audited;
+}
+
+int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+		   u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+		   struct common_audit_data *a,
+		   unsigned flags);
+
+/**
+ * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
+ * @a:  auxiliary audit data
+ * @flags: VFS walk flags
+ *
+ * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
+ * with the policy.  This function is typically called by
+ * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be
+ * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()
+ * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.
+ * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must
+ * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
+ * before calling the auditing code.
+ */
+static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			    u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			    struct av_decision *avd,
+			    int result,
+			    struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags)
+{
+	u32 audited, denied;
+	audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied);
+	if (likely(!audited))
+		return 0;
+	return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+			      requested, audited, denied,
+			      a, flags);
+}
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
@@ -112,11 +170,7 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE	64
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE	128
 
-int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-				     u16 tclass, u32 perms,
-				     u32 *out_retained),
-		     u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-		     u16 tclass, u32 perms);
+int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);
 
 /* Exported to selinuxfs */
 int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index d871e8ad2103..dde2005407aa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -31,13 +31,15 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY	24
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS	25
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS	26
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS	27
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE	28
 
 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 #else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE
 #endif
 
 /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
index 326f22cbe405..47a49d1a6f6a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netif.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -252,8 +252,7 @@ static void sel_netif_flush(void)
 	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
 }
 
-static int sel_netif_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-				  u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
+static int sel_netif_avc_callback(u32 event)
 {
 	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
 		sel_netif_flush();
@@ -292,8 +291,7 @@ static __init int sel_netif_init(void)
 
 	register_netdevice_notifier(&sel_netif_netdev_notifier);
 
-	err = avc_add_callback(sel_netif_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
-			       SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+	err = avc_add_callback(sel_netif_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
 	if (err)
 		panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
index 86365857c088..28f911cdd7c7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netnode.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -297,8 +297,7 @@ static void sel_netnode_flush(void)
 	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
 }
 
-static int sel_netnode_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-				    u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
+static int sel_netnode_avc_callback(u32 event)
 {
 	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
 		sel_netnode_flush();
@@ -320,8 +319,7 @@ static __init int sel_netnode_init(void)
 		sel_netnode_hash[iter].size = 0;
 	}
 
-	ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netnode_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
-			       SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+	ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netnode_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c
index 7b9eb1faf68b..d35379781c2c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netport.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netport.c
@@ -234,8 +234,7 @@ static void sel_netport_flush(void)
 	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
 }
 
-static int sel_netport_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-				    u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
+static int sel_netport_avc_callback(u32 event)
 {
 	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
 		sel_netport_flush();
@@ -257,8 +256,7 @@ static __init int sel_netport_init(void)
 		sel_netport_hash[iter].size = 0;
 	}
 
-	ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netport_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
-			       SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+	ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netport_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index d7018bfa1f00..4e93f9ef970b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_policy,
 	.mmap		= sel_mmap_policy,
 	.release	= sel_release_policy,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
@@ -1232,6 +1233,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 		kfree(bool_pending_names[i]);
 	kfree(bool_pending_names);
 	kfree(bool_pending_values);
+	bool_num = 0;
 	bool_pending_names = NULL;
 	bool_pending_values = NULL;
 
@@ -1532,11 +1534,6 @@ static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline unsigned int sel_div(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
-{
-	return a / b - (a % b < 0);
-}
-
 static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class)
 {
 	return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1)) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
@@ -1544,7 +1541,7 @@ static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class)
 
 static inline u16 sel_ino_to_class(unsigned long ino)
 {
-	return sel_div(ino & SEL_INO_MASK, SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
+	return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) / (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long sel_perm_to_ino(u16 class, u32 perm)
@@ -1831,7 +1828,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 		[SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
 		[SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
 		[SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO},
-		[SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUSR},
+		[SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO},
 		/* last one */ {""}
 	};
 	ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
index 45e8fb0515f8..212e3479a0d9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -74,6 +74,26 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the high level of 'src'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_context_cpy_high(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
 {
 	return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index fbf9c5816c71..40de8d3f208e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -517,6 +517,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 {
 	struct range_trans rtr;
 	struct mls_range *r;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	int default_range = 0;
 
 	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
@@ -530,6 +532,28 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 		r = hashtab_search(policydb.range_tr, &rtr);
 		if (r)
 			return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
+
+		if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
+			cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+			if (cladatum)
+				default_range = cladatum->default_range;
+		}
+
+		switch (default_range) {
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW:
+			return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH:
+			return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, scontext);
+		case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH:
+			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW:
+			return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, tcontext);
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH:
+			return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, tcontext);
+		case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
+			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext);
+		}
+
 		/* Fallthrough */
 	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
 		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index a7f61d52f05c..9cd9b7c661ec 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -133,6 +133,16 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
 		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
 		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
 	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+	},
 };
 
 static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
@@ -1306,6 +1316,23 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
 			goto bad;
 	}
 
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+
+		cladatum->default_user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		cladatum->default_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		cladatum->default_range = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 1);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+		cladatum->default_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	}
+
 	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, cladatum);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
@@ -2832,6 +2859,23 @@ static int class_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_user);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_role);
+		buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_range);
+
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 3, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_type);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index b846c0387180..da637471d4ce 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -60,6 +60,20 @@ struct class_datum {
 	struct symtab permissions;	/* class-specific permission symbol table */
 	struct constraint_node *constraints;	/* constraints on class permissions */
 	struct constraint_node *validatetrans;	/* special transition rules */
+/* Options how a new object user, role, and type should be decided */
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE         1
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET         2
+	char default_user;
+	char default_role;
+	char default_type;
+/* Options how a new object range should be decided */
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW     1
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH    2
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH        3
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW     4
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH    5
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH        6
+	char default_range;
 };
 
 /* Role attributes */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 185f849a26f6..4321b8fc8863 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1018,9 +1018,11 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
 
 	if (context->len) {
 		*scontext_len = context->len;
-		*scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
-		if (!(*scontext))
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (scontext) {
+			*scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!(*scontext))
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -1389,6 +1391,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 				u32 *out_sid,
 				bool kern)
 {
+	struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
 	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
 	struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
 	struct avtab_key avkey;
@@ -1437,12 +1440,20 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
+	if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim)
+		cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
 	/* Set the user identity. */
 	switch (specified) {
 	case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
 	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
-		/* Use the process user identity. */
-		newcontext.user = scontext->user;
+		if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+			newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+		} else {
+			/* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
+			/* Use the process user identity. */
+			newcontext.user = scontext->user;
+		}
 		break;
 	case AVTAB_MEMBER:
 		/* Use the related object owner. */
@@ -1450,16 +1461,31 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 		break;
 	}
 
-	/* Set the role and type to default values. */
-	if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
-		/* Use the current role and type of process. */
+	/* Set the role to default values. */
+	if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
 		newcontext.role = scontext->role;
-		newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+		newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
 	} else {
-		/* Use the well-defined object role. */
-		newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
-		/* Use the type of the related object. */
+		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
+			newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+		else
+			newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the type to default values. */
+	if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
+		newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
 		newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+	} else {
+		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
+			/* Use the type of process. */
+			newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+		} else {
+			/* Use the type of the related object. */
+			newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
@@ -3018,8 +3044,7 @@ out:
 
 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
 
-static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			       u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
+static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 
@@ -3032,8 +3057,7 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void)
 {
 	int err;
 
-	err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
-			       SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+	err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
 	if (err)
 		panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);