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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-10-13 21:00:44 +0400
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-10-13 21:00:44 +0400
commit8d71ff0bef9cf4e70108a9a2762f2361e607abde (patch)
treea79487fceb6ec18e956373a3019416a43b269f1d /security/selinux
parent244dc4e54b73567fae7f8fd9ba56584be9375442 (diff)
parent92562927826fceb2f8e69c89e28161b8c1e0b125 (diff)
downloadlinux-8d71ff0bef9cf4e70108a9a2762f2361e607abde.tar.xz
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (24 commits) integrity: special fs magic As pointed out by Jonathan Corbet, the timer must be deleted before ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible The tpm_dev_release function is only called for platform devices, not pnp Protect tpm_chip_list when transversing it. Renames num_open to is_open, as only one process can open the file at a time. Remove the BKL calls from the TPM driver, which were added in the overall netlabel: Add configuration support for local labeling cipso: Add support for native local labeling and fixup mapping names netlabel: Changes to the NetLabel security attributes to allow LSMs to pass full contexts selinux: Cache NetLabel secattrs in the socket's security struct selinux: Set socket NetLabel based on connection endpoint netlabel: Add functionality to set the security attributes of a packet netlabel: Add network address selectors to the NetLabel/LSM domain mapping netlabel: Add a generic way to create ordered linked lists of network addrs netlabel: Replace protocol/NetLabel linking with refrerence counts smack: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err() selinux: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err() selinux: Fix a problem in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() selinux: Better local/forward check in selinux_ip_postroute() ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c229
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/netlabel.h44
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h9
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c280
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c13
5 files changed, 465 insertions, 110 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 48881394fbd4..88f19536efad 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
sk->sk_security = NULL;
+ selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
kfree(ssec);
}
@@ -3800,6 +3801,7 @@ out:
static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
int err;
@@ -3813,7 +3815,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
- struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
@@ -3847,6 +3848,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
goto out;
}
+ err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
+
out:
return err;
}
@@ -4076,20 +4079,28 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
}
static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad,
- u16 family, char *addrp)
+ u16 family)
{
int err;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
u32 peer_sid;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ char *addrp;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
+ ad.u.net.family = family;
+ err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
if (selinux_compat_net)
- err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
+ err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
family, addrp);
else
err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
- PACKET__RECV, ad);
+ PACKET__RECV, &ad);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -4098,12 +4109,14 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (err)
return err;
err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
- SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
+ SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
} else {
- err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
+ err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
if (err)
return err;
- err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
}
return err;
@@ -4117,6 +4130,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
char *addrp;
+ u8 secmark_active;
+ u8 peerlbl_active;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
return 0;
@@ -4125,6 +4140,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
family = PF_INET;
+ /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
+ * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
+ * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
+ * as fast and as clean as possible. */
+ if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+ return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
+
+ secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+ peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
+ if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+ return 0;
+
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
ad.u.net.family = family;
@@ -4132,15 +4159,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return err;
- /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
- * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
- * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
- * as fast and as clean as possible. */
- if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
- return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
- family, addrp);
-
- if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
+ if (peerlbl_active) {
u32 peer_sid;
err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
@@ -4148,13 +4167,17 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
peer_sid, &ad);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
return err;
+ }
err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
PEER__RECV, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
}
- if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
+ if (secmark_active) {
err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
PACKET__RECV, &ad);
if (err)
@@ -4213,10 +4236,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
u16 family;
- if (sock)
+ if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
+ else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
+ family = PF_INET6;
+ else if (sock)
family = sock->sk->sk_family;
- else if (skb && skb->sk)
- family = skb->sk->sk_family;
else
goto out;
@@ -4274,8 +4299,6 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
isec->sid = sksec->sid;
sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
-
- selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
}
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -4283,10 +4306,15 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
int err;
+ u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 newsid;
u32 peersid;
- err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
+ /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
+
+ err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
if (err)
return err;
if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
@@ -4321,12 +4349,18 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
}
-static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
- struct sk_buff *skb)
+static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ u16 family = sk->sk_family;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
+ /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
+
+ selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
+
+ selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
}
static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
@@ -4376,39 +4410,54 @@ out:
static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
u16 family)
{
+ int err;
char *addrp;
u32 peer_sid;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
u8 secmark_active;
+ u8 netlbl_active;
u8 peerlbl_active;
if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
return NF_ACCEPT;
secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
- peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
+ netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
+ peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
return NF_ACCEPT;
+ if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
+ return NF_DROP;
+
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
ad.u.net.family = family;
if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
return NF_DROP;
- if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
- return NF_DROP;
-
- if (peerlbl_active)
- if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
- peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
+ if (peerlbl_active) {
+ err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
+ peer_sid, &ad);
+ if (err) {
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
return NF_DROP;
+ }
+ }
if (secmark_active)
if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
return NF_DROP;
+ if (netlbl_active)
+ /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
+ * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
+ * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
+ * protection */
+ if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
+ return NF_DROP;
+
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
@@ -4432,6 +4481,37 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
}
#endif /* IPV6 */
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family)
+{
+ u32 sid;
+
+ if (!netlbl_enabled())
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
+ * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
+ * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
+ if (skb->sk) {
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
+ sid = sksec->sid;
+ } else
+ sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
+ return NF_DROP;
+
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct net_device *in,
+ const struct net_device *out,
+ int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+{
+ return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
+}
+
static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
int ifindex,
struct avc_audit_data *ad,
@@ -4499,30 +4579,36 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
int ifindex,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad,
- u16 family,
- char *addrp,
- u8 proto)
+ u16 family)
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ char *addrp;
+ u8 proto;
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
+ ad.u.net.family = family;
+ if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
+ return NF_DROP;
+
if (selinux_compat_net) {
if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
- ad, family, addrp))
+ &ad, family, addrp))
return NF_DROP;
} else {
if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
- SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
+ SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
return NF_DROP;
}
if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
- if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
+ if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
return NF_DROP;
return NF_ACCEPT;
@@ -4536,23 +4622,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
struct sock *sk;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
char *addrp;
- u8 proto;
u8 secmark_active;
u8 peerlbl_active;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
- ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
- ad.u.net.family = family;
- if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
- return NF_DROP;
-
/* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
* to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
* special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
* as fast and as clean as possible. */
if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
- return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
- family, addrp, proto);
+ return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
/* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
* packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
@@ -4568,21 +4646,45 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
- * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
- * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
- * directly from the packet */
+ /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
+ * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
+ * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
+ * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
sk = skb->sk;
- if (sk) {
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ switch (family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
+ else
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
+ else
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return NF_DROP;
+ }
+ if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
+ if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
+ return NF_DROP;
+ } else
+ peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ } else {
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
- } else {
- if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
- return NF_DROP;
- secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
}
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
+ ad.u.net.family = family;
+ if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
+ return NF_DROP;
+
if (secmark_active)
if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
@@ -5656,6 +5758,13 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
.pf = PF_INET,
.hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
+ {
+ .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .pf = PF_INET,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+ .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
}
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index 487a7d81fe20..b913c8d06038 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void);
+void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway);
+
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *ssec);
void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
int family);
@@ -46,8 +49,11 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
u32 *type,
u32 *sid);
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ u32 sid);
-void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock);
+void selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock);
int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
@@ -57,12 +63,27 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
int level,
int optname);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr);
+
#else
static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
{
return;
}
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ int error,
+ int gateway)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(
struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
int family)
@@ -79,9 +100,21 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
return 0;
}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ u32 sid)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
-static inline void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk,
- struct socket *sock)
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_conn_setsid(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
+ u16 family)
{
return;
}
@@ -107,6 +140,11 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
{
return 0;
}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 91070ab874ce..f8be8d7fa26d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -109,16 +109,19 @@ struct netport_security_struct {
};
struct sk_security_struct {
- u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
- u32 peer_sid; /* SID of peer */
- u16 sclass; /* sock security class */
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
enum { /* NetLabel state */
NLBL_UNSET = 0,
NLBL_REQUIRE,
NLBL_LABELED,
+ NLBL_REQSKB,
+ NLBL_CONNLABELED,
} nlbl_state;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlbl_secattr; /* NetLabel sec attributes */
#endif
+ u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
+ u32 peer_sid; /* SID of peer */
+ u16 sclass; /* sock security class */
};
struct key_security_struct {
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 89b418392f11..f58701a7b728 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
*/
/*
- * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007, 2008
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -29,8 +29,12 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include "objsec.h"
#include "security.h"
@@ -64,32 +68,69 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
}
/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr - Generate the NetLabel socket secattr
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Generate the NetLabel security attributes for a socket, making full use of
+ * the socket's attribute cache. Returns a pointer to the security attributes
+ * on success, NULL on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
+
+ if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
+ return sksec->nlbl_secattr;
+
+ secattr = netlbl_secattr_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (secattr == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sksec->sid, secattr);
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ netlbl_secattr_free(secattr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sksec->nlbl_secattr = secattr;
+
+ return secattr;
+}
+
+/**
* selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid - Label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism
* @sk: the socket to label
- * @sid: the SID to use
*
* Description:
- * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given
- * SID. Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism. Returns zero values
+ * on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
-static int selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(struct sock *sk, u32 sid)
+static int selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
- netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+ if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE)
+ return 0;
- rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sid, &secattr);
- if (rc != 0)
- goto sock_setsid_return;
- rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, &secattr);
- if (rc == 0)
+ secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
+ if (secattr == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, secattr);
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 0:
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+ break;
+ case -EDESTADDRREQ:
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+ }
-sock_setsid_return:
- netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
return rc;
}
@@ -106,6 +147,38 @@ void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
}
/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_err - Handle a NetLabel packet error
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @error: the error code
+ * @gateway: true if host is acting as a gateway, false otherwise
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * When a packet is dropped due to a call to avc_has_perm() pass the error
+ * code to the NetLabel subsystem so any protocol specific processing can be
+ * done. This is safe to call even if you are unsure if NetLabel labeling is
+ * present on the packet, NetLabel is smart enough to only act when it should.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway)
+{
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, error, gateway);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free - Free the NetLabel fields
+ * @sssec: the sk_security_struct
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Free all of the memory in the NetLabel fields of a sk_security_struct.
+ *
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
+{
+ if (ssec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
+ netlbl_secattr_free(ssec->nlbl_secattr);
+}
+
+/**
* selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields
* @ssec: the sk_security_struct
* @family: the socket family
@@ -163,35 +236,118 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
}
/**
- * selinux_netlbl_sock_graft - Netlabel the new socket
+ * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid - Set the NetLabel on a packet given a sid
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description
+ * Call the NetLabel mechanism to set the label of a packet using @sid.
+ * Returns zero on auccess, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
+ u32 sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr_storage;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = NULL;
+ struct sock *sk;
+
+ /* if this is a locally generated packet check to see if it is already
+ * being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
+ sk = skb->sk;
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
+ return 0;
+ secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
+ }
+ if (secattr == NULL) {
+ secattr = &secattr_storage;
+ netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
+ rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sid, secattr);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ goto skbuff_setsid_return;
+ }
+
+ rc = netlbl_skbuff_setattr(skb, family, secattr);
+
+skbuff_setsid_return:
+ if (secattr == &secattr_storage)
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(secattr);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established - Netlabel the newly accepted connection
* @sk: the new connection
- * @sock: the new socket
*
* Description:
- * The connection represented by @sk is being grafted onto @sock so set the
- * socket's NetLabel to match the SID of @sk.
+ * A new connection has been established on @sk so make sure it is labeled
+ * correctly with the NetLabel susbsystem.
*
*/
-void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
+void selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
+ int rc;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- u32 nlbl_peer_sid;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
+ struct inet_sock *sk_inet = inet_sk(sk);
+ struct sockaddr_in addr;
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE)
return;
- netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
- if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
- secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE &&
- security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
- sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
- netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+ secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
+ if (secattr == NULL)
+ return;
- /* Try to set the NetLabel on the socket to save time later, if we fail
- * here we will pick up the pieces in later calls to
- * selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(). */
- selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid);
+ rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, secattr);
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 0:
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+ break;
+ case -EDESTADDRREQ:
+ /* no PF_INET6 support yet because we don't support any IPv6
+ * labeling protocols */
+ if (family != PF_INET) {
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ addr.sin_family = family;
+ addr.sin_addr.s_addr = sk_inet->daddr;
+ if (netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+ secattr) != 0) {
+ /* we failed to label the connected socket (could be
+ * for a variety of reasons, the actual "why" isn't
+ * important here) so we have to go to our backup plan,
+ * labeling the packets individually in the netfilter
+ * local output hook. this is okay but we need to
+ * adjust the MSS of the connection to take into
+ * account any labeling overhead, since we don't know
+ * the exact overhead at this point we'll use the worst
+ * case value which is 40 bytes for IPv4 */
+ struct inet_connection_sock *sk_conn = inet_csk(sk);
+ sk_conn->icsk_ext_hdr_len += 40 -
+ (sk_inet->opt ? sk_inet->opt->optlen : 0);
+ sk_conn->icsk_sync_mss(sk, sk_conn->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
+
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
+ } else
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* note that we are failing to label the socket which could be
+ * a bad thing since it means traffic could leave the system
+ * without the desired labeling, however, all is not lost as
+ * we have a check in selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() to
+ * pick up the pieces that we might drop here because we can't
+ * return an error code */
+ break;
+ }
}
/**
@@ -205,13 +361,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
*/
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock)
{
- struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-
- if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE)
- return 0;
-
- return selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid);
+ return selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sock->sk);
}
/**
@@ -246,7 +396,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
local_bh_disable();
bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
if (likely(sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_REQUIRE))
- rc = selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid);
+ rc = selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk);
else
rc = 0;
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
@@ -307,7 +457,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
return 0;
if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
- netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
return rc;
}
@@ -334,7 +484,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS &&
- sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED) {
+ (sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED ||
+ sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_CONNLABELED)) {
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
lock_sock(sk);
rc = netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr);
@@ -346,3 +497,50 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
return rc;
}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
+
+ if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
+ sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
+ return 0;
+
+ local_bh_disable();
+ bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+
+ /* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
+ * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
+ * the socket */
+ if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
+ netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
+ rc = 0;
+ goto socket_connect_return;
+ }
+ secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
+ if (secattr == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto socket_connect_return;
+ }
+ rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
+
+socket_connect_return:
+ bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+ local_bh_enable();
+ return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ab0cc0c7b944..343c8ab14af0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2955,7 +2955,7 @@ netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup:
*/
int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- int rc = -ENOENT;
+ int rc;
struct context *ctx;
if (!ss_initialized)
@@ -2963,11 +2963,18 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
- if (ctx == NULL)
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOENT;
goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
+ }
secattr->domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1],
GFP_ATOMIC);
- secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY;
+ if (secattr->domain == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
+ }
+ secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
if (rc != 0)