diff options
| author | Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> | 2007-06-07 23:34:10 +0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2007-07-12 06:52:25 +0400 |
| commit | 2c3c05dbcbc7b9d71549fe0e2b249f10f5a66518 (patch) | |
| tree | bab75df9fafc435f3370a6d773d3284716347249 /security/selinux/avc.c | |
| parent | 9dc9978084ea2a96b9f42752753d9e38a9f9d7b2 (diff) | |
| download | linux-2c3c05dbcbc7b9d71549fe0e2b249f10f5a66518.tar.xz | |
SELinux: allow preemption between transition permission checks
In security_get_user_sids, move the transition permission checks
outside of the section holding the policy rdlock, and use the AVC to
perform the checks, calling cond_resched after each one. These
changes should allow preemption between the individual checks and
enable caching of the results. It may however increase the overall
time spent in the function in some cases, particularly in the cache
miss case.
The long term fix will be to take much of this logic to userspace by
exporting additional state via selinuxfs, and ultimately deprecating
and eliminating this interface from the kernel.
Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/avc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/avc.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index e4396a89edc6..cc5fcef9e226 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -832,6 +832,7 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass + * @flags: AVC_STRICT or 0 * @avd: access vector decisions * * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted @@ -846,8 +847,9 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) * should be released for the auditing. */ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct av_decision *avd) + u16 tclass, u32 requested, + unsigned flags, + struct av_decision *avd) { struct avc_node *node; struct avc_entry entry, *p_ae; @@ -874,7 +876,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, denied = requested & ~(p_ae->avd.allowed); if (!requested || denied) { - if (selinux_enforcing) + if (selinux_enforcing || (flags & AVC_STRICT)) rc = -EACCES; else if (node) @@ -909,7 +911,7 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision avd; int rc; - rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd); + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd); avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata); return rc; } |