diff options
| author | Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> | 2019-04-10 19:55:58 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> | 2019-07-15 18:07:19 +0300 |
| commit | 71a98971b932174e121bc19056475c601598132f (patch) | |
| tree | fb3a1ee4a8b7cdec81b2f0671524a25af4b5b016 /security/safesetid | |
| parent | 78ae7df96d647627ceae0b65eea9e4f83a0a4b66 (diff) | |
| download | linux-71a98971b932174e121bc19056475c601598132f.tar.xz | |
LSM: SafeSetID: fix userns handling in securityfs
Looking at current_cred() in write handlers is bad form, stop doing that.
Also, let's just require that the write is coming from the initial user
namespace. Especially SAFESETID_WHITELIST_FLUSH requires privilege over all
namespaces, and SAFESETID_WHITELIST_ADD should probably require it as well.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/safesetid')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/safesetid/securityfs.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c index 90784a8d950a..77d301f0ff7a 100644 --- a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c +++ b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c @@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ static int parse_policy_line( if (ret) return ret; - *parent = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), parsed_parent); - *child = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), parsed_child); + *parent = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent); + *child = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child); if (!uid_valid(*parent) || !uid_valid(*child)) return -EINVAL; @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static ssize_t safesetid_file_write(struct file *file, kuid_t child; int ret; - if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (*ppos != 0) |