diff options
| author | Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> | 2012-06-08 14:58:49 +0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2013-01-23 01:10:31 +0400 |
| commit | 0e5a247cb37a97d843ef76d09d5f80deb7893ba3 (patch) | |
| tree | 7206abaf6d20e69a89584046ed7dc9970ba2da12 /security/integrity/ima | |
| parent | a175b8bb29ebbad380ab4788f307fbfc47997b19 (diff) | |
| download | linux-0e5a247cb37a97d843ef76d09d5f80deb7893ba3.tar.xz | |
ima: added policy support for 'security.ima' type
The 'security.ima' extended attribute may contain either the file data's
hash or a digital signature. This patch adds support for requiring a
specific extended attribute type. It extends the IMA policy with a new
keyword 'appraise_type=imasig'. (Default is hash.)
Changelog v2:
- Fixed Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy option syntax
Changelog v1:
- Differentiate between 'required' vs. 'actual' extended attribute
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 18 |
3 files changed, 23 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index fa675c907e0f..8004332ccb8f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -102,6 +102,11 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, switch (xattr_value->type) { case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: + if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { + cause = "IMA signature required"; + status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + break; + } rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); if (rc) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index cd00ba39e8e0..3cdd78768c29 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename, * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_APPRAISED, * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED) */ iint->flags |= action; + action &= IMA_DO_MASK; action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1); /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 95194539d75e..1a2543a8ee53 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -245,6 +245,8 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask)) continue; + action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS; + action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK; if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK) actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1); @@ -318,7 +320,8 @@ enum { Opt_audit, Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, - Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner + Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner, + Opt_appraise_type }; static match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -338,6 +341,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"}, {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"}, {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"}, + {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -560,6 +564,18 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) LSM_SUBJ_TYPE, AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE); break; + case Opt_appraise_type: + if (entry->action != APPRAISE) { + result = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from); + if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0) + entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED; + else + result = -EINVAL; + break; case Opt_err: ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p); result = -EINVAL; |