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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-01-30 06:08:02 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-01-30 06:08:02 +0300
commit6304672b7f0a5c010002e63a075160856dc4f88d (patch)
tree3f2d7fbaa9fe998787fa474c63fb1e6aa98090ab /scripts/mod/modpost.c
parent942633523cde99c5bfa0329996dd839ca66a87aa (diff)
parent64e16720ea0879f8ab4547e3b9758936d483909b (diff)
downloadlinux-6304672b7f0a5c010002e63a075160856dc4f88d.tar.xz
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86/pti updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Another set of melted spectrum related changes: - Code simplifications and cleanups for RSB and retpolines. - Make the indirect calls in KVM speculation safe. - Whitelist CPUs which are known not to speculate from Meltdown and prepare for the new CPUID flag which tells the kernel that a CPU is not affected. - A less rigorous variant of the module retpoline check which merily warns when a non-retpoline protected module is loaded and reflects that fact in the sysfs file. - Prepare for Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier support. - Prepare for exposure of the Speculation Control MSRs to guests, so guest OSes which depend on those "features" can use them. Includes a blacklist of the broken microcodes. The actual exposure of the MSRs through KVM is still being worked on" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg x86/nospec: Fix header guards names x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/mod/modpost.c')
-rw-r--r--scripts/mod/modpost.c9
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
index f51cf977c65b..6510536c06df 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -2165,6 +2165,14 @@ static void add_intree_flag(struct buffer *b, int is_intree)
buf_printf(b, "\nMODULE_INFO(intree, \"Y\");\n");
}
+/* Cannot check for assembler */
+static void add_retpoline(struct buffer *b)
+{
+ buf_printf(b, "\n#ifdef RETPOLINE\n");
+ buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n");
+ buf_printf(b, "#endif\n");
+}
+
static void add_staging_flag(struct buffer *b, const char *name)
{
static const char *staging_dir = "drivers/staging";
@@ -2506,6 +2514,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
err |= check_modname_len(mod);
add_header(&buf, mod);
add_intree_flag(&buf, !external_module);
+ add_retpoline(&buf);
add_staging_flag(&buf, mod->name);
err |= add_versions(&buf, mod);
add_depends(&buf, mod, modules);