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| author | Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> | 2023-07-23 10:41:10 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2023-08-23 18:52:32 +0300 |
| commit | a442cd17019385c53bbddf3bb92d91474081916b (patch) | |
| tree | 51a5442c225d861d5498046a574fb759bb2e5260 /net/xfrm | |
| parent | 87b655f4936b6fc01f3658aa88a22c923b379ebd (diff) | |
| download | linux-a442cd17019385c53bbddf3bb92d91474081916b.tar.xz | |
xfrm: add forgotten nla_policy for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH
[ Upstream commit 5e2424708da7207087934c5c75211e8584d553a0 ]
The previous commit 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change
message to user space") added one additional attribute named
XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH and described its type at compat_policy
(net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c).
However, the author forgot to also describe the nla_policy at
xfrma_policy (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c). Hence, this suppose NLA_U32 (4
bytes) value can be faked as empty (0 bytes) by a malicious user, which
leads to 4 bytes overflow read and heap information leak when parsing
nlattrs.
To exploit this, one malicious user can spray the SLUB objects and then
leverage this 4 bytes OOB read to leak the heap data into
x->mapping_maxage (see xfrm_update_ae_params(...)), and leak it to
userspace via copy_to_user_state_extra(...).
The above bug is assigned CVE-2023-3773. To fix it, this commit just
completes the nla_policy description for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH, which
enforces the length check and avoids such OOB read.
Fixes: 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/xfrm')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 9fc1da47d02e..d042ca01211f 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -2989,6 +2989,7 @@ const struct nla_policy xfrma_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = { [XFRMA_SET_MARK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [XFRMA_IF_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrma_policy); |