diff options
author | Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> | 2016-09-21 14:45:55 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2016-09-22 10:13:26 +0300 |
commit | e2f036a97271cf5811ee754bf321a29a814577f9 (patch) | |
tree | c8a53f43b53beaa61a994f5b3a8d31645e1bac27 /net/sctp | |
parent | b80b8d7a974ea4888a0a598cec217a6c500a0cdb (diff) | |
download | linux-e2f036a97271cf5811ee754bf321a29a814577f9.tar.xz |
sctp: rename WORD_TRUNC/ROUND macros
To something more meaningful these days, specially because this is
working on packet headers or lengths and which are not tied to any CPU
arch but to the protocol itself.
So, WORD_TRUNC becomes SCTP_TRUNC4 and WORD_ROUND becomes SCTP_PAD4.
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Reported-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sctp')
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/associola.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/chunk.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/input.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/inqueue.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/output.c | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 28 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/transport.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/ulpevent.c | 4 |
9 files changed, 36 insertions, 36 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c index 1c23060c41a6..f10d3397f917 100644 --- a/net/sctp/associola.c +++ b/net/sctp/associola.c @@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ void sctp_assoc_sync_pmtu(struct sock *sk, struct sctp_association *asoc) transports) { if (t->pmtu_pending && t->dst) { sctp_transport_update_pmtu(sk, t, - WORD_TRUNC(dst_mtu(t->dst))); + SCTP_TRUNC4(dst_mtu(t->dst))); t->pmtu_pending = 0; } if (!pmtu || (t->pathmtu < pmtu)) diff --git a/net/sctp/chunk.c b/net/sctp/chunk.c index af9cc8055465..76eae828ec89 100644 --- a/net/sctp/chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/chunk.c @@ -208,8 +208,8 @@ struct sctp_datamsg *sctp_datamsg_from_user(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_hmac *hmac_desc = sctp_auth_asoc_get_hmac(asoc); if (hmac_desc) - max_data -= WORD_ROUND(sizeof(sctp_auth_chunk_t) + - hmac_desc->hmac_len); + max_data -= SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(sctp_auth_chunk_t) + + hmac_desc->hmac_len); } /* Now, check if we need to reduce our max */ @@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ struct sctp_datamsg *sctp_datamsg_from_user(struct sctp_association *asoc, asoc->outqueue.out_qlen == 0 && list_empty(&asoc->outqueue.retransmit) && msg_len > max) - max_data -= WORD_ROUND(sizeof(sctp_sack_chunk_t)); + max_data -= SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(sctp_sack_chunk_t)); /* Encourage Cookie-ECHO bundling. */ if (asoc->state < SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED) diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c index 69444d32ecda..a1d85065bfc0 100644 --- a/net/sctp/input.c +++ b/net/sctp/input.c @@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ void sctp_v4_err(struct sk_buff *skb, __u32 info) /* PMTU discovery (RFC1191) */ if (ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED == code) { sctp_icmp_frag_needed(sk, asoc, transport, - WORD_TRUNC(info)); + SCTP_TRUNC4(info)); goto out_unlock; } else { if (ICMP_PROT_UNREACH == code) { @@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ static int sctp_rcv_ootb(struct sk_buff *skb) if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)) break; - ch_end = offset + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length)); + ch_end = offset + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); if (ch_end > skb->len) break; @@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_walk_lookup(struct net *net, if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)) break; - ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length)); + ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb)) break; @@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_lookup_harder(struct net *net, * that the chunk length doesn't cause overflow. Otherwise, we'll * walk off the end. */ - if (WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length)) > skb->len) + if (SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)) > skb->len) return NULL; /* If this is INIT/INIT-ACK look inside the chunk too. */ diff --git a/net/sctp/inqueue.c b/net/sctp/inqueue.c index 6437aa97cfd7..f731de3e8428 100644 --- a/net/sctp/inqueue.c +++ b/net/sctp/inqueue.c @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ new_skb: } chunk->chunk_hdr = ch; - chunk->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length)); + chunk->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid. */ diff --git a/net/sctp/output.c b/net/sctp/output.c index 0c605ec74dc4..2a5c1896d18f 100644 --- a/net/sctp/output.c +++ b/net/sctp/output.c @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static sctp_xmit_t __sctp_packet_append_chunk(struct sctp_packet *packet, struct sctp_chunk *chunk) { sctp_xmit_t retval = SCTP_XMIT_OK; - __u16 chunk_len = WORD_ROUND(ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length)); + __u16 chunk_len = SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length)); /* Check to see if this chunk will fit into the packet */ retval = sctp_packet_will_fit(packet, chunk, chunk_len); @@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet, gfp_t gfp) if (gso) { pkt_size = packet->overhead; list_for_each_entry(chunk, &packet->chunk_list, list) { - int padded = WORD_ROUND(chunk->skb->len); + int padded = SCTP_PAD4(chunk->skb->len); if (pkt_size + padded > tp->pathmtu) break; @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet, gfp_t gfp) * included in the chunk length field. The sender should * never pad with more than 3 bytes. * - * [This whole comment explains WORD_ROUND() below.] + * [This whole comment explains SCTP_PAD4() below.] */ pkt_size -= packet->overhead; @@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet, gfp_t gfp) has_data = 1; } - padding = WORD_ROUND(chunk->skb->len) - chunk->skb->len; + padding = SCTP_PAD4(chunk->skb->len) - chunk->skb->len; if (padding) memset(skb_put(chunk->skb, padding), 0, padding); @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet, gfp_t gfp) * acknowledged or have failed. * Re-queue auth chunks if needed. */ - pkt_size -= WORD_ROUND(chunk->skb->len); + pkt_size -= SCTP_PAD4(chunk->skb->len); if (!sctp_chunk_is_data(chunk) && chunk != packet->auth) sctp_chunk_free(chunk); @@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ static sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_will_fit(struct sctp_packet *packet, */ maxsize = pmtu - packet->overhead; if (packet->auth) - maxsize -= WORD_ROUND(packet->auth->skb->len); + maxsize -= SCTP_PAD4(packet->auth->skb->len); if (chunk_len > maxsize) retval = SCTP_XMIT_PMTU_FULL; diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 8c77b87a8565..79dd66079dd7 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc, num_types = sp->pf->supported_addrs(sp, types); chunksize = sizeof(init) + addrs_len; - chunksize += WORD_ROUND(SCTP_SAT_LEN(num_types)); + chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(SCTP_SAT_LEN(num_types)); chunksize += sizeof(ecap_param); if (asoc->prsctp_enable) @@ -283,14 +283,14 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc, /* Add HMACS parameter length if any were defined */ auth_hmacs = (sctp_paramhdr_t *)asoc->c.auth_hmacs; if (auth_hmacs->length) - chunksize += WORD_ROUND(ntohs(auth_hmacs->length)); + chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(auth_hmacs->length)); else auth_hmacs = NULL; /* Add CHUNKS parameter length */ auth_chunks = (sctp_paramhdr_t *)asoc->c.auth_chunks; if (auth_chunks->length) - chunksize += WORD_ROUND(ntohs(auth_chunks->length)); + chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(auth_chunks->length)); else auth_chunks = NULL; @@ -300,8 +300,8 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc, /* If we have any extensions to report, account for that */ if (num_ext) - chunksize += WORD_ROUND(sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) + - num_ext); + chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) + + num_ext); /* RFC 2960 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1) * @@ -443,13 +443,13 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init_ack(const struct sctp_association *asoc, auth_hmacs = (sctp_paramhdr_t *)asoc->c.auth_hmacs; if (auth_hmacs->length) - chunksize += WORD_ROUND(ntohs(auth_hmacs->length)); + chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(auth_hmacs->length)); else auth_hmacs = NULL; auth_chunks = (sctp_paramhdr_t *)asoc->c.auth_chunks; if (auth_chunks->length) - chunksize += WORD_ROUND(ntohs(auth_chunks->length)); + chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(auth_chunks->length)); else auth_chunks = NULL; @@ -458,8 +458,8 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init_ack(const struct sctp_association *asoc, } if (num_ext) - chunksize += WORD_ROUND(sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) + - num_ext); + chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) + + num_ext); /* Now allocate and fill out the chunk. */ retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK, 0, chunksize, gfp); @@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ static struct sctp_chunk *_sctp_make_chunk(const struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk; /* No need to allocate LL here, as this is only a chunk. */ - skb = alloc_skb(WORD_ROUND(sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) + paylen), gfp); + skb = alloc_skb(SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) + paylen), gfp); if (!skb) goto nodata; @@ -1482,7 +1482,7 @@ void *sctp_addto_chunk(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, int len, const void *data) void *target; void *padding; int chunklen = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length); - int padlen = WORD_ROUND(chunklen) - chunklen; + int padlen = SCTP_PAD4(chunklen) - chunklen; padding = skb_put(chunk->skb, padlen); target = skb_put(chunk->skb, len); @@ -1900,7 +1900,7 @@ static int sctp_process_missing_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc, struct __sctp_missing report; __u16 len; - len = WORD_ROUND(sizeof(report)); + len = SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(report)); /* Make an ERROR chunk, preparing enough room for * returning multiple unknown parameters. @@ -2098,9 +2098,9 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc, if (*errp) { if (!sctp_init_cause_fixed(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM, - WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)))) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(param.p->length)))) sctp_addto_chunk_fixed(*errp, - WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)), + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(param.p->length)), param.v); } else { /* If there is no memory for generating the ERROR diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index d88bb2b0b699..026e3bca4a94 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -3454,7 +3454,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, } /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */ - ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length)); + ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb)) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -4185,7 +4185,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_unk_chunk(struct net *net, hdr = unk_chunk->chunk_hdr; err_chunk = sctp_make_op_error(asoc, unk_chunk, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CHUNK, hdr, - WORD_ROUND(ntohs(hdr->length)), + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(hdr->length)), 0); if (err_chunk) { sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, @@ -4203,7 +4203,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_unk_chunk(struct net *net, hdr = unk_chunk->chunk_hdr; err_chunk = sctp_make_op_error(asoc, unk_chunk, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CHUNK, hdr, - WORD_ROUND(ntohs(hdr->length)), + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(hdr->length)), 0); if (err_chunk) { sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, diff --git a/net/sctp/transport.c b/net/sctp/transport.c index 81b86678be4d..ce54dce13ddb 100644 --- a/net/sctp/transport.c +++ b/net/sctp/transport.c @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ void sctp_transport_pmtu(struct sctp_transport *transport, struct sock *sk) } if (transport->dst) { - transport->pathmtu = WORD_TRUNC(dst_mtu(transport->dst)); + transport->pathmtu = SCTP_TRUNC4(dst_mtu(transport->dst)); } else transport->pathmtu = SCTP_DEFAULT_MAXSEGMENT; } @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ void sctp_transport_route(struct sctp_transport *transport, return; } if (transport->dst) { - transport->pathmtu = WORD_TRUNC(dst_mtu(transport->dst)); + transport->pathmtu = SCTP_TRUNC4(dst_mtu(transport->dst)); /* Initialize sk->sk_rcv_saddr, if the transport is the * association's active path for getsockname(). diff --git a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c index d85b803da11d..bea00058ce35 100644 --- a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c +++ b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c @@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ sctp_ulpevent_make_remote_error(const struct sctp_association *asoc, ch = (sctp_errhdr_t *)(chunk->skb->data); cause = ch->cause; - elen = WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length)) - sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t); + elen = SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)) - sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t); /* Pull off the ERROR header. */ skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)); @@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ struct sctp_ulpevent *sctp_ulpevent_make_rcvmsg(struct sctp_association *asoc, * MUST ignore the padding bytes. */ len = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length); - padding = WORD_ROUND(len) - len; + padding = SCTP_PAD4(len) - len; /* Fixup cloned skb with just this chunks data. */ skb_trim(skb, chunk->chunk_end - padding - skb->data); |