summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/net/ipv4
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>2017-05-05 16:56:54 +0300
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2017-05-05 19:00:11 +0300
commit84b114b98452c431299d99c135f751659e517acb (patch)
tree53778bfd4964bed65ac40a9c1c57a73f21cb9664 /net/ipv4
parent9051247dcf9ecee156d2ddac39a4f1ca591f8428 (diff)
downloadlinux-84b114b98452c431299d99c135f751659e517acb.tar.xz
tcp: randomize timestamps on syncookies
Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps, directly revealing server jiffies value. Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS drops for innocent clients. Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies. Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not used from a module. In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to tcp_get_cookie_sock(). v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted. Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/syncookies.c12
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/tcp_input.c8
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c32
3 files changed, 32 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
index 496b97e17aaf..0257d965f111 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/siphash.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include <net/route.h>
@@ -203,7 +204,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_check);
struct sock *tcp_get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
- struct dst_entry *dst)
+ struct dst_entry *dst, u32 tsoff)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct sock *child;
@@ -213,6 +214,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
NULL, &own_req);
if (child) {
atomic_set(&req->rsk_refcnt, 1);
+ tcp_sk(child)->tsoffset = tsoff;
sock_rps_save_rxhash(child, skb);
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, child);
} else {
@@ -292,6 +294,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct rtable *rt;
__u8 rcv_wscale;
struct flowi4 fl4;
+ u32 tsoff = 0;
if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst)
goto out;
@@ -311,6 +314,11 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL);
+ if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp && tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr) {
+ tsoff = secure_tcp_ts_off(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
+ tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tsoff;
+ }
+
if (!cookie_timestamp_decode(&tcp_opt))
goto out;
@@ -381,7 +389,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
ireq->ecn_ok = cookie_ecn_ok(&tcp_opt, sock_net(sk), &rt->dst);
- ret = tcp_get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst);
+ ret = tcp_get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst, tsoff);
/* ip_queue_xmit() depends on our flow being setup
* Normal sockets get it right from inet_csk_route_child_sock()
*/
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 9739962bfb3f..5a3ad09e2786 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ int sysctl_tcp_dsack __read_mostly = 1;
int sysctl_tcp_app_win __read_mostly = 31;
int sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale __read_mostly = 1;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_timestamps);
/* rfc5961 challenge ack rate limiting */
int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 1000;
@@ -6347,8 +6346,8 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops,
if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req))
goto drop_and_free;
- if (isn && tmp_opt.tstamp_ok)
- af_ops->init_seq_tsoff(skb, &tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off);
+ if (tmp_opt.tstamp_ok)
+ tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off = af_ops->init_ts_off(skb);
if (!want_cookie && !isn) {
/* Kill the following clause, if you dislike this way. */
@@ -6368,7 +6367,7 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops,
goto drop_and_release;
}
- isn = af_ops->init_seq_tsoff(skb, &tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off);
+ isn = af_ops->init_seq(skb);
}
if (!dst) {
dst = af_ops->route_req(sk, &fl, req);
@@ -6380,7 +6379,6 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops,
if (want_cookie) {
isn = cookie_init_sequence(af_ops, sk, skb, &req->mss);
- tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off = 0;
req->cookie_ts = tmp_opt.tstamp_ok;
if (!tmp_opt.tstamp_ok)
inet_rsk(req)->ecn_ok = 0;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index cbbafe546c0f..3a51582bef55 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -94,12 +94,18 @@ static int tcp_v4_md5_hash_hdr(char *md5_hash, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key,
struct inet_hashinfo tcp_hashinfo;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_hashinfo);
-static u32 tcp_v4_init_seq_and_tsoff(const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *tsoff)
+static u32 tcp_v4_init_seq(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return secure_tcp_seq_and_tsoff(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
- ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
- tcp_hdr(skb)->dest,
- tcp_hdr(skb)->source, tsoff);
+ return secure_tcp_seq(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
+ ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
+ tcp_hdr(skb)->dest,
+ tcp_hdr(skb)->source);
+}
+
+static u32 tcp_v4_init_ts_off(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return secure_tcp_ts_off(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
+ ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
}
int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sktw, void *twp)
@@ -145,7 +151,6 @@ int tcp_v4_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
struct flowi4 *fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
int err;
- u32 seq;
struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
struct inet_timewait_death_row *tcp_death_row = &sock_net(sk)->ipv4.tcp_death_row;
@@ -232,13 +237,13 @@ int tcp_v4_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
rt = NULL;
if (likely(!tp->repair)) {
- seq = secure_tcp_seq_and_tsoff(inet->inet_saddr,
- inet->inet_daddr,
- inet->inet_sport,
- usin->sin_port,
- &tp->tsoffset);
if (!tp->write_seq)
- tp->write_seq = seq;
+ tp->write_seq = secure_tcp_seq(inet->inet_saddr,
+ inet->inet_daddr,
+ inet->inet_sport,
+ usin->sin_port);
+ tp->tsoffset = secure_tcp_ts_off(inet->inet_saddr,
+ inet->inet_daddr);
}
inet->inet_id = tp->write_seq ^ jiffies;
@@ -1239,7 +1244,8 @@ static const struct tcp_request_sock_ops tcp_request_sock_ipv4_ops = {
.cookie_init_seq = cookie_v4_init_sequence,
#endif
.route_req = tcp_v4_route_req,
- .init_seq_tsoff = tcp_v4_init_seq_and_tsoff,
+ .init_seq = tcp_v4_init_seq,
+ .init_ts_off = tcp_v4_init_ts_off,
.send_synack = tcp_v4_send_synack,
};