Merge tag 'net-6.10-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

Pull networking fixes from Paolo Abeni:
 "Including fixes from can, bpf and netfilter.

  There are a bunch of regressions addressed here, but hopefully nothing
  spectacular. We are still waiting the driver fix from Intel, mentioned
  by Jakub in the previous networking pull.

  Current release - regressions:

   - core: add softirq safety to netdev_rename_lock

   - tcp: fix tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() to enter TCP_CA_Loss for failed
     TFO

   - batman-adv: fix RCU race at module unload time

  Previous releases - regressions:

   - openvswitch: get related ct labels from its master if it is not
     confirmed

   - eth: bonding: fix incorrect software timestamping report

   - eth: mlxsw: fix memory corruptions on spectrum-4 systems

   - eth: ionic: use dev_consume_skb_any outside of napi

  Previous releases - always broken:

   - netfilter: fully validate NFT_DATA_VALUE on store to data registers

   - unix: several fixes for OoB data

   - tcp: fix race for duplicate reqsk on identical SYN

   - bpf:
       - fix may_goto with negative offset
       - fix the corner case with may_goto and jump to the 1st insn
       - fix overrunning reservations in ringbuf

   - can:
       - j1939: recover socket queue on CAN bus error during BAM
         transmission
       - mcp251xfd: fix infinite loop when xmit fails

   - dsa: microchip: monitor potential faults in half-duplex mode

   - eth: vxlan: pull inner IP header in vxlan_xmit_one()

   - eth: ionic: fix kernel panic due to multi-buffer handling

  Misc:

   - selftest: unix tests refactor and a lot of new cases added"

* tag 'net-6.10-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (61 commits)
  net: mana: Fix possible double free in error handling path
  selftest: af_unix: Check SIOCATMARK after every send()/recv() in msg_oob.c.
  af_unix: Fix wrong ioctl(SIOCATMARK) when consumed OOB skb is at the head.
  selftest: af_unix: Check EPOLLPRI after every send()/recv() in msg_oob.c
  selftest: af_unix: Check SIGURG after every send() in msg_oob.c
  selftest: af_unix: Add SO_OOBINLINE test cases in msg_oob.c
  af_unix: Don't stop recv() at consumed ex-OOB skb.
  selftest: af_unix: Add non-TCP-compliant test cases in msg_oob.c.
  af_unix: Don't stop recv(MSG_DONTWAIT) if consumed OOB skb is at the head.
  af_unix: Stop recv(MSG_PEEK) at consumed OOB skb.
  selftest: af_unix: Add msg_oob.c.
  selftest: af_unix: Remove test_unix_oob.c.
  tracing/net_sched: NULL pointer dereference in perf_trace_qdisc_reset()
  netfilter: nf_tables: fully validate NFT_DATA_VALUE on store to data registers
  net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit FN912 compositions
  tcp: fix tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() to enter TCP_CA_Loss for failed TFO
  ionic: use dev_consume_skb_any outside of napi
  net: dsa: microchip: fix wrong register write when masking interrupt
  Fix race for duplicate reqsk on identical SYN
  ibmvnic: Add tx check to prevent skb leak
  ...

3 files changed, 97 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arena.c b/kernel/bpf/arena.c
index 583ee4fe48ef..e52b3ad231b9 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/arena.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arena.c
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ static u64 arena_map_mem_usage(const struct bpf_map *map)
 struct vma_list {
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 	struct list_head head;
+	atomic_t mmap_count;
 };
 
 static int remember_vma(struct bpf_arena *arena, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
@@ -221,20 +222,30 @@ static int remember_vma(struct bpf_arena *arena, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	vml = kmalloc(sizeof(*vml), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!vml)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	atomic_set(&vml->mmap_count, 1);
 	vma->vm_private_data = vml;
 	vml->vma = vma;
 	list_add(&vml->head, &arena->vma_list);
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void arena_vm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	struct vma_list *vml = vma->vm_private_data;
+
+	atomic_inc(&vml->mmap_count);
+}
+
 static void arena_vm_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	struct bpf_map *map = vma->vm_file->private_data;
 	struct bpf_arena *arena = container_of(map, struct bpf_arena, map);
-	struct vma_list *vml;
+	struct vma_list *vml = vma->vm_private_data;
 
+	if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&vml->mmap_count))
+		return;
 	guard(mutex)(&arena->lock);
-	vml = vma->vm_private_data;
+	/* update link list under lock */
 	list_del(&vml->head);
 	vma->vm_private_data = NULL;
 	kfree(vml);
@@ -287,6 +298,7 @@ out:
 }
 
 static const struct vm_operations_struct arena_vm_ops = {
+	.open		= arena_vm_open,
 	.close		= arena_vm_close,
 	.fault          = arena_vm_fault,
 };
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/ringbuf.c b/kernel/bpf/ringbuf.c
index 0ee653a936ea..e20b90c36131 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/ringbuf.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/ringbuf.c
@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ struct bpf_ringbuf {
 	 * This prevents a user-space application from modifying the
 	 * position and ruining in-kernel tracking. The permissions of the
 	 * pages depend on who is producing samples: user-space or the
-	 * kernel.
+	 * kernel. Note that the pending counter is placed in the same
+	 * page as the producer, so that it shares the same cache line.
 	 *
 	 * Kernel-producer
 	 * ---------------
@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ struct bpf_ringbuf {
 	 */
 	unsigned long consumer_pos __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
 	unsigned long producer_pos __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+	unsigned long pending_pos;
 	char data[] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
 };
 
@@ -179,6 +181,7 @@ static struct bpf_ringbuf *bpf_ringbuf_alloc(size_t data_sz, int numa_node)
 	rb->mask = data_sz - 1;
 	rb->consumer_pos = 0;
 	rb->producer_pos = 0;
+	rb->pending_pos = 0;
 
 	return rb;
 }
@@ -404,9 +407,9 @@ bpf_ringbuf_restore_from_rec(struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr *hdr)
 
 static void *__bpf_ringbuf_reserve(struct bpf_ringbuf *rb, u64 size)
 {
-	unsigned long cons_pos, prod_pos, new_prod_pos, flags;
-	u32 len, pg_off;
+	unsigned long cons_pos, prod_pos, new_prod_pos, pend_pos, flags;
 	struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr *hdr;
+	u32 len, pg_off, tmp_size, hdr_len;
 
 	if (unlikely(size > RINGBUF_MAX_RECORD_SZ))
 		return NULL;
@@ -424,13 +427,29 @@ static void *__bpf_ringbuf_reserve(struct bpf_ringbuf *rb, u64 size)
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&rb->spinlock, flags);
 	}
 
+	pend_pos = rb->pending_pos;
 	prod_pos = rb->producer_pos;
 	new_prod_pos = prod_pos + len;
 
-	/* check for out of ringbuf space by ensuring producer position
-	 * doesn't advance more than (ringbuf_size - 1) ahead
+	while (pend_pos < prod_pos) {
+		hdr = (void *)rb->data + (pend_pos & rb->mask);
+		hdr_len = READ_ONCE(hdr->len);
+		if (hdr_len & BPF_RINGBUF_BUSY_BIT)
+			break;
+		tmp_size = hdr_len & ~BPF_RINGBUF_DISCARD_BIT;
+		tmp_size = round_up(tmp_size + BPF_RINGBUF_HDR_SZ, 8);
+		pend_pos += tmp_size;
+	}
+	rb->pending_pos = pend_pos;
+
+	/* check for out of ringbuf space:
+	 * - by ensuring producer position doesn't advance more than
+	 *   (ringbuf_size - 1) ahead
+	 * - by ensuring oldest not yet committed record until newest
+	 *   record does not span more than (ringbuf_size - 1)
 	 */
-	if (new_prod_pos - cons_pos > rb->mask) {
+	if (new_prod_pos - cons_pos > rb->mask ||
+	    new_prod_pos - pend_pos > rb->mask) {
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rb->spinlock, flags);
 		return NULL;
 	}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 010cfee7ffe9..214a9fa8c6fb 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -6236,6 +6236,7 @@ static void set_sext32_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
 	}
 	reg->u32_min_value = 0;
 	reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
+	reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_unknown);
 }
 
 static void coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
@@ -6280,6 +6281,7 @@ static void coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
 		reg->s32_max_value = s32_max;
 		reg->u32_min_value = (u32)s32_min;
 		reg->u32_max_value = (u32)s32_max;
+		reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_range(s32_min, s32_max));
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -12719,6 +12721,16 @@ static bool signed_add32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b)
 	return res < a;
 }
 
+static bool signed_add16_overflows(s16 a, s16 b)
+{
+	/* Do the add in u16, where overflow is well-defined */
+	s16 res = (s16)((u16)a + (u16)b);
+
+	if (b < 0)
+		return res > a;
+	return res < a;
+}
+
 static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
 {
 	/* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
@@ -17448,11 +17460,11 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
 				goto skip_inf_loop_check;
 			}
 			if (is_may_goto_insn_at(env, insn_idx)) {
-				if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, RANGE_WITHIN)) {
+				if (sl->state.may_goto_depth != cur->may_goto_depth &&
+				    states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, RANGE_WITHIN)) {
 					update_loop_entry(cur, &sl->state);
 					goto hit;
 				}
-				goto skip_inf_loop_check;
 			}
 			if (calls_callback(env, insn_idx)) {
 				if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, RANGE_WITHIN))
@@ -18730,6 +18742,39 @@ static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 of
 	return new_prog;
 }
 
+/*
+ * For all jmp insns in a given 'prog' that point to 'tgt_idx' insn adjust the
+ * jump offset by 'delta'.
+ */
+static int adjust_jmp_off(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 tgt_idx, u32 delta)
+{
+	struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
+	u32 insn_cnt = prog->len, i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
+		u8 code = insn->code;
+
+		if ((BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) ||
+		    BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT)
+			continue;
+
+		if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA)) {
+			if (i + 1 + insn->imm != tgt_idx)
+				continue;
+			if (signed_add32_overflows(insn->imm, delta))
+				return -ERANGE;
+			insn->imm += delta;
+		} else {
+			if (i + 1 + insn->off != tgt_idx)
+				continue;
+			if (signed_add16_overflows(insn->imm, delta))
+				return -ERANGE;
+			insn->off += delta;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 					      u32 off, u32 cnt)
 {
@@ -20004,7 +20049,10 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 
 			stack_depth_extra = 8;
 			insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_AX, BPF_REG_10, stack_off);
-			insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off + 2);
+			if (insn->off >= 0)
+				insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off + 2);
+			else
+				insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off - 1);
 			insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, 1);
 			insn_buf[3] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_AX, stack_off);
 			cnt = 4;
@@ -20546,6 +20594,13 @@ next_insn:
 		if (!new_prog)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		env->prog = prog = new_prog;
+		/*
+		 * If may_goto is a first insn of a prog there could be a jmp
+		 * insn that points to it, hence adjust all such jmps to point
+		 * to insn after BPF_ST that inits may_goto count.
+		 * Adjustment will succeed because bpf_patch_insn_data() didn't fail.
+		 */
+		WARN_ON(adjust_jmp_off(env->prog, subprog_start, 1));
 	}
 
 	/* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */