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authorDaniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>2020-11-17 23:05:45 +0300
committerAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2020-11-19 22:56:16 +0300
commit6fa6d28051e9fcaa1570e69648ea13a353a5d218 (patch)
tree1fd6809c9d91663c9bf31062dcf6d58ef49d374b /kernel/trace
parent1fd6cee127e2ddff36d648573d7566aafb0d0b77 (diff)
downloadlinux-6fa6d28051e9fcaa1570e69648ea13a353a5d218.tar.xz
lib/strncpy_from_user.c: Mask out bytes after NUL terminator.
do_strncpy_from_user() may copy some extra bytes after the NUL terminator into the destination buffer. This usually does not matter for normal string operations. However, when BPF programs key BPF maps with strings, this matters a lot. A BPF program may read strings from user memory by calling the bpf_probe_read_user_str() helper which eventually calls do_strncpy_from_user(). The program can then key a map with the destination buffer. BPF map keys are fixed-width and string-agnostic, meaning that map keys are treated as a set of bytes. The issue is when do_strncpy_from_user() overcopies bytes after the NUL terminator, it can result in seemingly identical strings occupying multiple slots in a BPF map. This behavior is subtle and totally unexpected by the user. This commit masks out the bytes following the NUL while preserving long-sized stride in the fast path. Fixes: 6ae08ae3dea2 ("bpf: Add probe_read_{user, kernel} and probe_read_{user, kernel}_str helpers") Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/21efc982b3e9f2f7b0379eed642294caaa0c27a7.1605642949.git.dxu@dxuuu.xyz
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/trace')
-rw-r--r--kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c10
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index 5113fd423cdf..048c655315f1 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -181,6 +181,16 @@ bpf_probe_read_user_str_common(void *dst, u32 size,
{
int ret;
+ /*
+ * NB: We rely on strncpy_from_user() not copying junk past the NUL
+ * terminator into `dst`.
+ *
+ * strncpy_from_user() does long-sized strides in the fast path. If the
+ * strncpy does not mask out the bytes after the NUL in `unsafe_ptr`,
+ * then there could be junk after the NUL in `dst`. If user takes `dst`
+ * and keys a hash map with it, then semantically identical strings can
+ * occupy multiple entries in the map.
+ */
ret = strncpy_from_user_nofault(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
memset(dst, 0, size);