Merge tag 'locking-debug-2021-09-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull memory model updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "LKMM updates:

   - Update documentation and code example

  KCSAN updates:

   - Introduce CONFIG_KCSAN_STRICT (which RCU uses)

   - Optimize use of get_ctx() by kcsan_found_watchpoint()

   - Rework atomic.h into permissive.h

   - Add the ability to ignore writes that change only one bit of a
     given data-racy variable.

   - Improve comments"

* tag 'locking-debug-2021-09-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  tools/memory-model: Document data_race(READ_ONCE())
  tools/memory-model: Heuristics using data_race() must handle all values
  tools/memory-model: Add example for heuristic lockless reads
  tools/memory-model: Make read_foo_diagnostic() more clearly diagnostic
  kcsan: Make strict mode imply interruptible watchers
  kcsan: permissive: Ignore data-racy 1-bit value changes
  kcsan: Print if strict or non-strict during init
  kcsan: Rework atomic.h into permissive.h
  kcsan: Reduce get_ctx() uses in kcsan_found_watchpoint()
  kcsan: Introduce CONFIG_KCSAN_STRICT
  kcsan: Remove CONFIG_KCSAN_DEBUG
  kcsan: Improve some Kconfig comments

4 files changed, 175 insertions, 51 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/atomic.h b/kernel/kcsan/atomic.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 530ae1bda8e7..000000000000
--- a/kernel/kcsan/atomic.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-/*
- * Rules for implicitly atomic memory accesses.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2019, Google LLC.
- */
-
-#ifndef _KERNEL_KCSAN_ATOMIC_H
-#define _KERNEL_KCSAN_ATOMIC_H
-
-#include <linux/types.h>
-
-/*
- * Special rules for certain memory where concurrent conflicting accesses are
- * common, however, the current convention is to not mark them; returns true if
- * access to @ptr should be considered atomic. Called from slow-path.
- */
-static bool kcsan_is_atomic_special(const volatile void *ptr)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-
-#endif /* _KERNEL_KCSAN_ATOMIC_H */
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/core.c b/kernel/kcsan/core.c
index 26709ea65c71..76e67d1e02d4 100644
--- a/kernel/kcsan/core.c
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/core.c
@@ -20,9 +20,9 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
-#include "atomic.h"
 #include "encoding.h"
 #include "kcsan.h"
+#include "permissive.h"
 
 static bool kcsan_early_enable = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_EARLY_ENABLE);
 unsigned int kcsan_udelay_task = CONFIG_KCSAN_UDELAY_TASK;
@@ -301,9 +301,9 @@ static inline void reset_kcsan_skip(void)
 	this_cpu_write(kcsan_skip, skip_count);
 }
 
-static __always_inline bool kcsan_is_enabled(void)
+static __always_inline bool kcsan_is_enabled(struct kcsan_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	return READ_ONCE(kcsan_enabled) && get_ctx()->disable_count == 0;
+	return READ_ONCE(kcsan_enabled) && !ctx->disable_count;
 }
 
 /* Introduce delay depending on context and configuration. */
@@ -353,10 +353,18 @@ static noinline void kcsan_found_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr,
 					    atomic_long_t *watchpoint,
 					    long encoded_watchpoint)
 {
+	const bool is_assert = (type & KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) != 0;
+	struct kcsan_ctx *ctx = get_ctx();
 	unsigned long flags;
 	bool consumed;
 
-	if (!kcsan_is_enabled())
+	/*
+	 * We know a watchpoint exists. Let's try to keep the race-window
+	 * between here and finally consuming the watchpoint below as small as
+	 * possible -- avoid unneccessarily complex code until consumed.
+	 */
+
+	if (!kcsan_is_enabled(ctx))
 		return;
 
 	/*
@@ -364,14 +372,22 @@ static noinline void kcsan_found_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr,
 	 * reporting a race where e.g. the writer set up the watchpoint, but the
 	 * reader has access_mask!=0, we have to ignore the found watchpoint.
 	 */
-	if (get_ctx()->access_mask != 0)
+	if (ctx->access_mask)
 		return;
 
 	/*
-	 * Consume the watchpoint as soon as possible, to minimize the chances
-	 * of !consumed. Consuming the watchpoint must always be guarded by
-	 * kcsan_is_enabled() check, as otherwise we might erroneously
-	 * triggering reports when disabled.
+	 * If the other thread does not want to ignore the access, and there was
+	 * a value change as a result of this thread's operation, we will still
+	 * generate a report of unknown origin.
+	 *
+	 * Use CONFIG_KCSAN_REPORT_RACE_UNKNOWN_ORIGIN=n to filter.
+	 */
+	if (!is_assert && kcsan_ignore_address(ptr))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Consuming the watchpoint must be guarded by kcsan_is_enabled() to
+	 * avoid erroneously triggering reports if the context is disabled.
 	 */
 	consumed = try_consume_watchpoint(watchpoint, encoded_watchpoint);
 
@@ -391,7 +407,7 @@ static noinline void kcsan_found_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr,
 		atomic_long_inc(&kcsan_counters[KCSAN_COUNTER_REPORT_RACES]);
 	}
 
-	if ((type & KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) != 0)
+	if (is_assert)
 		atomic_long_inc(&kcsan_counters[KCSAN_COUNTER_ASSERT_FAILURES]);
 	else
 		atomic_long_inc(&kcsan_counters[KCSAN_COUNTER_DATA_RACES]);
@@ -409,6 +425,7 @@ kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type)
 	unsigned long access_mask;
 	enum kcsan_value_change value_change = KCSAN_VALUE_CHANGE_MAYBE;
 	unsigned long ua_flags = user_access_save();
+	struct kcsan_ctx *ctx = get_ctx();
 	unsigned long irq_flags = 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -417,16 +434,14 @@ kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type)
 	 */
 	reset_kcsan_skip();
 
-	if (!kcsan_is_enabled())
+	if (!kcsan_is_enabled(ctx))
 		goto out;
 
 	/*
-	 * Special atomic rules: unlikely to be true, so we check them here in
-	 * the slow-path, and not in the fast-path in is_atomic(). Call after
-	 * kcsan_is_enabled(), as we may access memory that is not yet
-	 * initialized during early boot.
+	 * Check to-ignore addresses after kcsan_is_enabled(), as we may access
+	 * memory that is not yet initialized during early boot.
 	 */
-	if (!is_assert && kcsan_is_atomic_special(ptr))
+	if (!is_assert && kcsan_ignore_address(ptr))
 		goto out;
 
 	if (!check_encodable((unsigned long)ptr, size)) {
@@ -479,15 +494,6 @@ kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type)
 		break; /* ignore; we do not diff the values */
 	}
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_DEBUG)) {
-		kcsan_disable_current();
-		pr_err("watching %s, size: %zu, addr: %px [slot: %d, encoded: %lx]\n",
-		       is_write ? "write" : "read", size, ptr,
-		       watchpoint_slot((unsigned long)ptr),
-		       encode_watchpoint((unsigned long)ptr, size, is_write));
-		kcsan_enable_current();
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * Delay this thread, to increase probability of observing a racy
 	 * conflicting access.
@@ -498,7 +504,7 @@ kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type)
 	 * Re-read value, and check if it is as expected; if not, we infer a
 	 * racy access.
 	 */
-	access_mask = get_ctx()->access_mask;
+	access_mask = ctx->access_mask;
 	new = 0;
 	switch (size) {
 	case 1:
@@ -521,8 +527,14 @@ kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type)
 	if (access_mask)
 		diff &= access_mask;
 
-	/* Were we able to observe a value-change? */
-	if (diff != 0)
+	/*
+	 * Check if we observed a value change.
+	 *
+	 * Also check if the data race should be ignored (the rules depend on
+	 * non-zero diff); if it is to be ignored, the below rules for
+	 * KCSAN_VALUE_CHANGE_MAYBE apply.
+	 */
+	if (diff && !kcsan_ignore_data_race(size, type, old, new, diff))
 		value_change = KCSAN_VALUE_CHANGE_TRUE;
 
 	/* Check if this access raced with another. */
@@ -644,6 +656,15 @@ void __init kcsan_init(void)
 		pr_info("enabled early\n");
 		WRITE_ONCE(kcsan_enabled, true);
 	}
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY) ||
+	    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_ASSUME_PLAIN_WRITES_ATOMIC) ||
+	    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE) ||
+	    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_IGNORE_ATOMICS)) {
+		pr_warn("non-strict mode configured - use CONFIG_KCSAN_STRICT=y to see all data races\n");
+	} else {
+		pr_info("strict mode configured\n");
+	}
 }
 
 /* === Exported interface =================================================== */
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/kcsan_test.c b/kernel/kcsan/kcsan_test.c
index 8bcffbdef3d3..dc55fd5a36fc 100644
--- a/kernel/kcsan/kcsan_test.c
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/kcsan_test.c
@@ -414,6 +414,14 @@ static noinline void test_kernel_atomic_builtins(void)
 	__atomic_load_n(&test_var, __ATOMIC_RELAXED);
 }
 
+static noinline void test_kernel_xor_1bit(void)
+{
+	/* Do not report data races between the read-writes. */
+	kcsan_nestable_atomic_begin();
+	test_var ^= 0x10000;
+	kcsan_nestable_atomic_end();
+}
+
 /* ===== Test cases ===== */
 
 /* Simple test with normal data race. */
@@ -952,6 +960,29 @@ static void test_atomic_builtins(struct kunit *test)
 	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, match_never);
 }
 
+__no_kcsan
+static void test_1bit_value_change(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const struct expect_report expect = {
+		.access = {
+			{ test_kernel_read, &test_var, sizeof(test_var), 0 },
+			{ test_kernel_xor_1bit, &test_var, sizeof(test_var), __KCSAN_ACCESS_RW(KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE) },
+		},
+	};
+	bool match = false;
+
+	begin_test_checks(test_kernel_read, test_kernel_xor_1bit);
+	do {
+		match = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE)
+				? report_available()
+				: report_matches(&expect);
+	} while (!end_test_checks(match));
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE))
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, match);
+	else
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, match);
+}
+
 /*
  * Generate thread counts for all test cases. Values generated are in interval
  * [2, 5] followed by exponentially increasing thread counts from 8 to 32.
@@ -1024,6 +1055,7 @@ static struct kunit_case kcsan_test_cases[] = {
 	KCSAN_KUNIT_CASE(test_jiffies_noreport),
 	KCSAN_KUNIT_CASE(test_seqlock_noreport),
 	KCSAN_KUNIT_CASE(test_atomic_builtins),
+	KCSAN_KUNIT_CASE(test_1bit_value_change),
 	{},
 };
 
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/permissive.h b/kernel/kcsan/permissive.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2c01fe4a59ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/permissive.h
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Special rules for ignoring entire classes of data-racy memory accesses. None
+ * of the rules here imply that such data races are generally safe!
+ *
+ * All rules in this file can be configured via CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE. Keep
+ * them separate from core code to make it easier to audit.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019, Google LLC.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KERNEL_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE_H
+#define _KERNEL_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE_H
+
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * Access ignore rules based on address.
+ */
+static __always_inline bool kcsan_ignore_address(const volatile void *ptr)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Data-racy bitops on current->flags are too common, ignore completely
+	 * for now.
+	 */
+	return ptr == &current->flags;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Data race ignore rules based on access type and value change patterns.
+ */
+static bool
+kcsan_ignore_data_race(size_t size, int type, u64 old, u64 new, u64 diff)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Rules here are only for plain read accesses, so that we still report
+	 * data races between plain read-write accesses.
+	 */
+	if (type || size > sizeof(long))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * A common pattern is checking/setting just 1 bit in a variable; for
+	 * example:
+	 *
+	 *	if (flags & SOME_FLAG) { ... }
+	 *
+	 * and elsewhere flags is updated concurrently:
+	 *
+	 *	flags |= SOME_OTHER_FLAG; // just 1 bit
+	 *
+	 * While it is still recommended that such accesses be marked
+	 * appropriately, in many cases these types of data races are so common
+	 * that marking them all is often unrealistic and left to maintainer
+	 * preference.
+	 *
+	 * The assumption in all cases is that with all known compiler
+	 * optimizations (including those that tear accesses), because no more
+	 * than 1 bit changed, the plain accesses are safe despite the presence
+	 * of data races.
+	 *
+	 * The rules here will ignore the data races if we observe no more than
+	 * 1 bit changed.
+	 *
+	 * Of course many operations can effecively change just 1 bit, but the
+	 * general assuption that data races involving 1-bit changes can be
+	 * tolerated still applies.
+	 *
+	 * And in case a true bug is missed, the bug likely manifests as a
+	 * reportable data race elsewhere.
+	 */
+	if (hweight64(diff) == 1) {
+		/*
+		 * Exception: Report data races where the values look like
+		 * ordinary booleans (one of them was 0 and the 0th bit was
+		 * changed) More often than not, they come with interesting
+		 * memory ordering requirements, so let's report them.
+		 */
+		if (!((!old || !new) && diff == 1))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+#endif /* _KERNEL_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE_H */