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author | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-10-08 16:40:42 +0300 |
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committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-10-08 16:40:42 +0300 |
commit | 8aff4eaa1de7a0ba70af8447ed08127ef0e8e45d (patch) | |
tree | 8fff0fab5c3ac5ba1774ce1706e8ec4f50ad0377 /fs/proc/base.c | |
parent | e7a2c3fa28576684d744e259a2fdb245f8bab0d7 (diff) | |
parent | 0238df646e6224016a45505d2c111a24669ebe21 (diff) | |
download | linux-8aff4eaa1de7a0ba70af8447ed08127ef0e8e45d.tar.xz |
Merge 4.19-rc7 into usb-next
We want the USB fixes in here as well.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/base.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/base.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index ccf86f16d9f0..7e9f07bf260d 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -407,6 +407,20 @@ static int proc_pid_stack(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, unsigned long *entries; int err; + /* + * The ability to racily run the kernel stack unwinder on a running task + * and then observe the unwinder output is scary; while it is useful for + * debugging kernel issues, it can also allow an attacker to leak kernel + * stack contents. + * Doing this in a manner that is at least safe from races would require + * some work to ensure that the remote task can not be scheduled; and + * even then, this would still expose the unwinder as local attack + * surface. + * Therefore, this interface is restricted to root. + */ + if (!file_ns_capable(m->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EACCES; + entries = kmalloc_array(MAX_STACK_TRACE_DEPTH, sizeof(*entries), GFP_KERNEL); if (!entries) |