diff options
| author | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> | 2007-07-28 00:10:37 +0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> | 2007-10-10 02:31:56 +0400 |
| commit | 2fdada03b3876ab9f84ede160f187e888cafefb4 (patch) | |
| tree | 4fb687764c83d63083261f079695627003c22dd9 /fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | |
| parent | 599e0a2290b22d959c7748bda83da3614187a299 (diff) | |
| download | linux-2fdada03b3876ab9f84ede160f187e888cafefb4.tar.xz | |
knfsd: demote some printk()s to dprintk()s
To quote a recent mail from Andrew Morton:
Look: if there's a way in which an unprivileged user can trigger
a printk we fix it, end of story.
OK. I assume that goes double for printk()s that might be triggered by
random hosts on the internet. So, disable some printk()s that look like
they could be triggered by malfunctioning or malicious clients. For
now, just downgrade them to dprintk()s.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Acked-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 20 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index 578d809e85ec..2b20eb8589a0 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ check_name(struct xdr_netobj name) { if (name.len == 0) return 0; if (name.len > NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT) { - printk("NFSD: check_name: name too long(%d)!\n", name.len); + dprintk("NFSD: check_name: name too long(%d)!\n", name.len); return 0; } return 1; @@ -1742,7 +1742,7 @@ out: if (open->op_claim_type == NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_PREVIOUS && flag == NFS4_OPEN_DELEGATE_NONE && open->op_delegate_type != NFS4_OPEN_DELEGATE_NONE) - printk("NFSD: WARNING: refusing delegation reclaim\n"); + dprintk("NFSD: WARNING: refusing delegation reclaim\n"); open->op_delegate_type = flag; } @@ -2151,7 +2151,7 @@ nfs4_preprocess_seqid_op(struct svc_fh *current_fh, u32 seqid, stateid_t *statei *sopp = NULL; if (ZERO_STATEID(stateid) || ONE_STATEID(stateid)) { - printk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: magic stateid!\n"); + dprintk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: magic stateid!\n"); return nfserr_bad_stateid; } @@ -2202,7 +2202,7 @@ nfs4_preprocess_seqid_op(struct svc_fh *current_fh, u32 seqid, stateid_t *statei } if ((flags & CHECK_FH) && nfs4_check_fh(current_fh, stp)) { - printk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: fh-stateid mismatch!\n"); + dprintk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: fh-stateid mismatch!\n"); return nfserr_bad_stateid; } @@ -2218,22 +2218,22 @@ nfs4_preprocess_seqid_op(struct svc_fh *current_fh, u32 seqid, stateid_t *statei goto check_replay; if (sop->so_confirmed && flags & CONFIRM) { - printk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: expected" + dprintk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: expected" " unconfirmed stateowner!\n"); return nfserr_bad_stateid; } if (!sop->so_confirmed && !(flags & CONFIRM)) { - printk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: stateowner not" + dprintk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: stateowner not" " confirmed yet!\n"); return nfserr_bad_stateid; } if (stateid->si_generation > stp->st_stateid.si_generation) { - printk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: future stateid?!\n"); + dprintk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: future stateid?!\n"); return nfserr_bad_stateid; } if (stateid->si_generation < stp->st_stateid.si_generation) { - printk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: old stateid!\n"); + dprintk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: old stateid!\n"); return nfserr_old_stateid; } renew_client(sop->so_client); @@ -2245,7 +2245,7 @@ check_replay: /* indicate replay to calling function */ return nfserr_replay_me; } - printk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: bad seqid (expected %d, got %d)\n", + dprintk("NFSD: preprocess_seqid_op: bad seqid (expected %d, got %d)\n", sop->so_seqid, seqid); *sopp = NULL; return nfserr_bad_seqid; @@ -2858,7 +2858,7 @@ nfsd4_lockt(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, file_lock.fl_type = F_WRLCK; break; default: - printk("NFSD: nfs4_lockt: bad lock type!\n"); + dprintk("NFSD: nfs4_lockt: bad lock type!\n"); status = nfserr_inval; goto out; } |