diff options
| author | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> | 2015-07-20 23:16:26 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> | 2015-08-07 18:26:13 +0300 |
| commit | 4573b64a31cd8cb4cfeb1d1b95536cfe71980cf4 (patch) | |
| tree | 0c019ea809c625e90a5f4b34f48831ed64c9565a /crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | |
| parent | b92e6570a992c7d793a209db282f68159368201c (diff) | |
| download | linux-4573b64a31cd8cb4cfeb1d1b95536cfe71980cf4.tar.xz | |
X.509: Support X.509 lookup by Issuer+Serial form AuthorityKeyIdentifier
If an X.509 certificate has an AuthorityKeyIdentifier extension that provides
an issuer and serialNumber, then make it so that these are used in preference
to the keyIdentifier field also held therein for searching for the signing
certificate.
If both the issuer+serialNumber and the keyIdentifier are supplied, then the
certificate is looked up by the former but the latter is checked as well. If
the latter doesn't match the subjectKeyIdentifier of the parent certificate,
EKEYREJECTED is returned.
This makes it possible to chain X.509 certificates based on the issuer and
serialNumber fields rather than on subjectKeyIdentifier. This is necessary as
we are having to deal with keys that are represented by X.509 certificates
that lack a subjectKeyIdentifier.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c index 0f6463b6692b..90d6d47965b0 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c @@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted * keys. */ - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id, + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, + x509->id, x509->skid, false); if (!IS_ERR(key)) { /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message @@ -85,8 +86,10 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, /* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the * trusted keys. */ - if (last && last->akid_skid) { - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->akid_skid, + if (last && (last->akid_id || last->akid_skid)) { + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, + last->akid_id, + last->akid_skid, false); if (!IS_ERR(key)) { x509 = last; @@ -103,6 +106,7 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, */ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, sinfo->signing_cert_id, + NULL, false); if (!IS_ERR(key)) { pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n", |