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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-07-30 21:05:35 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-07-30 21:05:35 +0300
commitd410b62e45ed9702593fb3ddc45cde3d3f277c9b (patch)
tree4948c0748fe9bee20c3564caf1d9430e198b4346 /arch
parenteb9fe1791ba87ec95a0408b7074f2400459aa1e4 (diff)
parentfd470a8beed88440b160d690344fbae05a0b9b1b (diff)
downloadlinux-d410b62e45ed9702593fb3ddc45cde3d3f277c9b.tar.xz
Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.5_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: - AMD's automatic IBRS doesn't enable cross-thread branch target injection protection (STIBP) for user processes. Enable STIBP on such systems. - Do not delete (but put the ref instead) of AMD MCE error thresholding sysfs kobjects when destroying them in order not to delete the kernfs pointer prematurely - Restore annotation in ret_from_fork_asm() in order to fix kthread stack unwinding from being marked as unreliable and thus breaking livepatching * tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.5_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/cpu: Enable STIBP on AMD if Automatic IBRS is enabled x86/MCE/AMD: Decrement threshold_bank refcount when removing threshold blocks x86: Fix kthread unwind
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S16
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c4
3 files changed, 26 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 91f6818884fa..43606de22511 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -285,7 +285,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__switch_to_asm)
*/
.pushsection .text, "ax"
SYM_CODE_START(ret_from_fork_asm)
- UNWIND_HINT_REGS
+ /*
+ * This is the start of the kernel stack; even through there's a
+ * register set at the top, the regset isn't necessarily coherent
+ * (consider kthreads) and one cannot unwind further.
+ *
+ * This ensures stack unwinds of kernel threads terminate in a known
+ * good state.
+ */
+ UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR // copy_thread
CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT
@@ -295,6 +303,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(ret_from_fork_asm)
movq %r12, %rcx /* fn_arg */
call ret_from_fork
+ /*
+ * Set the stack state to what is expected for the target function
+ * -- at this point the register set should be a valid user set
+ * and unwind should work normally.
+ */
+ UNWIND_HINT_REGS
jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork_asm)
.popsection
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 9e2a91830f72..95507448e781 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1150,19 +1150,21 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
}
/*
- * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP
+ * If no STIBP, Intel enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP
* is not required.
*
- * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target
+ * Intel's Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target
* injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which
* implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS
* mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return
- * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection,
- * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case.
+ * to userspace. AMD Automatic IBRS also does not protect userspace.
+ * These modes therefore disable the implicit cross-thread protection,
+ * so allow for STIBP to be selected in those cases.
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
!smt_possible ||
- spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)))
return;
/*
@@ -2294,7 +2296,8 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
- if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))
return "";
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c
index 5e74610b39e7..c4ec4ca47e11 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c
@@ -1261,10 +1261,10 @@ static void __threshold_remove_blocks(struct threshold_bank *b)
struct threshold_block *pos = NULL;
struct threshold_block *tmp = NULL;
- kobject_del(b->kobj);
+ kobject_put(b->kobj);
list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, tmp, &b->blocks->miscj, miscj)
- kobject_del(&pos->kobj);
+ kobject_put(b->kobj);
}
static void threshold_remove_bank(struct threshold_bank *bank)