diff options
author | Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> | 2021-10-01 00:49:21 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> | 2021-10-01 00:49:21 +0300 |
commit | dd9a887b35b01d7027f974f5e7936f1410ab51ca (patch) | |
tree | 4a827b3e88fd896de1408c26ebebc2535b14750a /arch/x86 | |
parent | b05173028cc52384be42dcf81abdb4133caccfa5 (diff) | |
parent | 4de593fb965fc2bd11a0b767e0c65ff43540a6e4 (diff) | |
download | linux-dd9a887b35b01d7027f974f5e7936f1410ab51ca.tar.xz |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
drivers/net/phy/bcm7xxx.c
d88fd1b546ff ("net: phy: bcm7xxx: Fixed indirect MMD operations")
f68d08c437f9 ("net: phy: bcm7xxx: Add EPHY entry for 72165")
net/sched/sch_api.c
b193e15ac69d ("net: prevent user from passing illegal stab size")
69508d43334e ("net_sched: Use struct_size() and flex_array_size() helpers")
Both cases trivial - adjacent code additions.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
29 files changed, 365 insertions, 234 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index dad7f85dcdea..ab83c22d274e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2610,7 +2610,6 @@ config PCI_OLPC config PCI_XEN def_bool y depends on PCI && XEN - select SWIOTLB_XEN config MMCONF_FAM10H def_bool y diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sm4-aesni-avx-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sm4-aesni-avx-asm_64.S index fa2c3f50aecb..18d2f5199194 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sm4-aesni-avx-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sm4-aesni-avx-asm_64.S @@ -367,10 +367,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sm4_aesni_avx_crypt8) * %rdx: src (1..8 blocks) * %rcx: num blocks (1..8) */ - FRAME_BEGIN - cmpq $5, %rcx; jb sm4_aesni_avx_crypt4; + + FRAME_BEGIN + vmovdqu (0 * 16)(%rdx), RA0; vmovdqu (1 * 16)(%rdx), RA1; vmovdqu (2 * 16)(%rdx), RA2; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_page_track.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_page_track.h index 87bd6025d91d..6a5f3acf2b33 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_page_track.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_page_track.h @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node { struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *node); }; -void kvm_page_track_init(struct kvm *kvm); +int kvm_page_track_init(struct kvm *kvm); void kvm_page_track_cleanup(struct kvm *kvm); void kvm_page_track_free_memslot(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h index 5c7bcaa79623..1d5f14aff5f6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h @@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H #define _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H -#define ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY 0 - /* * If more than 16 keys are ever supported, a thorough audit * will be necessary to ensure that the types that store key diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h index f3fbb84ff8a7..68c257a3de0d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static inline int enqcmds(void __iomem *dst, const void *src) { const struct { char _[64]; } *__src = src; struct { char _[64]; } __iomem *__dst = dst; - int zf; + bool zf; /* * ENQCMDS %(rdx), rax diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/swiotlb-xen.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/swiotlb-xen.h index 6b56d0d45d15..66b4ddde7743 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/swiotlb-xen.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/swiotlb-xen.h @@ -3,14 +3,10 @@ #define _ASM_X86_SWIOTLB_XEN_H #ifdef CONFIG_SWIOTLB_XEN -extern int xen_swiotlb; extern int __init pci_xen_swiotlb_detect(void); -extern void __init pci_xen_swiotlb_init(void); extern int pci_xen_swiotlb_init_late(void); #else -#define xen_swiotlb (0) -static inline int __init pci_xen_swiotlb_detect(void) { return 0; } -static inline void __init pci_xen_swiotlb_init(void) { } +#define pci_xen_swiotlb_detect NULL static inline int pci_xen_swiotlb_init_late(void) { return -ENXIO; } #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index 79f164141116..40ed44ead063 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -830,6 +830,20 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) x86_init.oem.arch_setup(); + /* + * Do some memory reservations *before* memory is added to memblock, so + * memblock allocations won't overwrite it. + * + * After this point, everything still needed from the boot loader or + * firmware or kernel text should be early reserved or marked not RAM in + * e820. All other memory is free game. + * + * This call needs to happen before e820__memory_setup() which calls the + * xen_memory_setup() on Xen dom0 which relies on the fact that those + * early reservations have happened already. + */ + early_reserve_memory(); + iomem_resource.end = (1ULL << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits) - 1; e820__memory_setup(); parse_setup_data(); @@ -876,18 +890,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) parse_early_param(); - /* - * Do some memory reservations *before* memory is added to - * memblock, so memblock allocations won't overwrite it. - * Do it after early param, so we could get (unlikely) panic from - * serial. - * - * After this point everything still needed from the boot loader or - * firmware or kernel text should be early reserved or marked not - * RAM in e820. All other memory is free game. - */ - early_reserve_memory(); - #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG /* * Memory used by the kernel cannot be hot-removed because Linux diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index 2837110e66ed..c589ac832265 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -4206,7 +4206,7 @@ static int check_rdtsc(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) u64 cr4 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4); if (cr4 & X86_CR4_TSD && ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt)) - return emulate_ud(ctxt); + return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c index 232a86a6faaf..d5124b520f76 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c @@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ static int kvm_hv_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hv_vcpu->stimer); i++) stimer_init(&hv_vcpu->stimer[i], i); - hv_vcpu->vp_index = kvm_vcpu_get_idx(vcpu); + hv_vcpu->vp_index = vcpu->vcpu_idx; return 0; } @@ -1444,7 +1444,6 @@ static int kvm_hv_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data, bool host) switch (msr) { case HV_X64_MSR_VP_INDEX: { struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(vcpu->kvm); - int vcpu_idx = kvm_vcpu_get_idx(vcpu); u32 new_vp_index = (u32)data; if (!host || new_vp_index >= KVM_MAX_VCPUS) @@ -1459,9 +1458,9 @@ static int kvm_hv_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data, bool host) * VP index is changing, adjust num_mismatched_vp_indexes if * it now matches or no longer matches vcpu_idx. */ - if (hv_vcpu->vp_index == vcpu_idx) + if (hv_vcpu->vp_index == vcpu->vcpu_idx) atomic_inc(&hv->num_mismatched_vp_indexes); - else if (new_vp_index == vcpu_idx) + else if (new_vp_index == vcpu->vcpu_idx) atomic_dec(&hv->num_mismatched_vp_indexes); hv_vcpu->vp_index = new_vp_index; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h index 730da8537d05..ed1c4e546d04 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static inline u32 kvm_hv_get_vpindex(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu); - return hv_vcpu ? hv_vcpu->vp_index : kvm_vcpu_get_idx(vcpu); + return hv_vcpu ? hv_vcpu->vp_index : vcpu->vcpu_idx; } int kvm_hv_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data, bool host); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c index ff005fe738a4..8c065da73f8e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c @@ -319,8 +319,8 @@ static void ioapic_write_indirect(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, u32 val) unsigned index; bool mask_before, mask_after; union kvm_ioapic_redirect_entry *e; - unsigned long vcpu_bitmap; int old_remote_irr, old_delivery_status, old_dest_id, old_dest_mode; + DECLARE_BITMAP(vcpu_bitmap, KVM_MAX_VCPUS); switch (ioapic->ioregsel) { case IOAPIC_REG_VERSION: @@ -384,9 +384,9 @@ static void ioapic_write_indirect(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, u32 val) irq.shorthand = APIC_DEST_NOSHORT; irq.dest_id = e->fields.dest_id; irq.msi_redir_hint = false; - bitmap_zero(&vcpu_bitmap, 16); + bitmap_zero(vcpu_bitmap, KVM_MAX_VCPUS); kvm_bitmap_or_dest_vcpus(ioapic->kvm, &irq, - &vcpu_bitmap); + vcpu_bitmap); if (old_dest_mode != e->fields.dest_mode || old_dest_id != e->fields.dest_id) { /* @@ -399,10 +399,10 @@ static void ioapic_write_indirect(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, u32 val) kvm_lapic_irq_dest_mode( !!e->fields.dest_mode); kvm_bitmap_or_dest_vcpus(ioapic->kvm, &irq, - &vcpu_bitmap); + vcpu_bitmap); } kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request_mask(ioapic->kvm, - &vcpu_bitmap); + vcpu_bitmap); } else { kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request(ioapic->kvm); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index 2d7e61122af8..1a64ba5b9437 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c @@ -2027,8 +2027,8 @@ static void mmu_pages_clear_parents(struct mmu_page_path *parents) } while (!sp->unsync_children); } -static void mmu_sync_children(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, - struct kvm_mmu_page *parent) +static int mmu_sync_children(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct kvm_mmu_page *parent, bool can_yield) { int i; struct kvm_mmu_page *sp; @@ -2055,12 +2055,18 @@ static void mmu_sync_children(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, } if (need_resched() || rwlock_needbreak(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock)) { kvm_mmu_flush_or_zap(vcpu, &invalid_list, false, flush); + if (!can_yield) { + kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC, vcpu); + return -EINTR; + } + cond_resched_rwlock_write(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); flush = false; } } kvm_mmu_flush_or_zap(vcpu, &invalid_list, false, flush); + return 0; } static void __clear_sp_write_flooding_count(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) @@ -2146,9 +2152,6 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *kvm_mmu_get_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu); } - if (sp->unsync_children) - kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC, vcpu); - __clear_sp_write_flooding_count(sp); trace_get_page: @@ -3684,7 +3687,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_sync_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); kvm_mmu_audit(vcpu, AUDIT_PRE_SYNC); - mmu_sync_children(vcpu, sp); + mmu_sync_children(vcpu, sp, true); kvm_mmu_audit(vcpu, AUDIT_POST_SYNC); write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); @@ -3700,7 +3703,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_sync_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (IS_VALID_PAE_ROOT(root)) { root &= PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK; sp = to_shadow_page(root); - mmu_sync_children(vcpu, sp); + mmu_sync_children(vcpu, sp, true); } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c index 269f11f92fd0..21427e84a82e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c @@ -164,13 +164,13 @@ void kvm_page_track_cleanup(struct kvm *kvm) cleanup_srcu_struct(&head->track_srcu); } -void kvm_page_track_init(struct kvm *kvm) +int kvm_page_track_init(struct kvm *kvm) { struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head *head; head = &kvm->arch.track_notifier_head; - init_srcu_struct(&head->track_srcu); INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&head->track_notifier_list); + return init_srcu_struct(&head->track_srcu); } /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h index 7d03e9b7ccfa..913d52a7923e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h @@ -707,8 +707,27 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, if (!is_shadow_present_pte(*it.sptep)) { table_gfn = gw->table_gfn[it.level - 2]; access = gw->pt_access[it.level - 2]; - sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, table_gfn, addr, it.level-1, - false, access); + sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, table_gfn, addr, + it.level-1, false, access); + /* + * We must synchronize the pagetable before linking it + * because the guest doesn't need to flush tlb when + * the gpte is changed from non-present to present. + * Otherwise, the guest may use the wrong mapping. + * + * For PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm_mmu_get_page() has already + * synchronized it transiently via kvm_sync_page(). + * + * For higher level pagetable, we synchronize it via + * the slower mmu_sync_children(). If it needs to + * break, some progress has been made; return + * RET_PF_RETRY and retry on the next #PF. + * KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC is not necessary but it + * expedites the process. + */ + if (sp->unsync_children && + mmu_sync_children(vcpu, sp, false)) + return RET_PF_RETRY; } /* @@ -1047,14 +1066,6 @@ static gpa_t FNAME(gva_to_gpa_nested)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t vaddr, * Using the cached information from sp->gfns is safe because: * - The spte has a reference to the struct page, so the pfn for a given gfn * can't change unless all sptes pointing to it are nuked first. - * - * Note: - * We should flush all tlbs if spte is dropped even though guest is - * responsible for it. Since if we don't, kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_page - * and kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start detect the mapping page isn't - * used by guest then tlbs are not flushed, so guest is allowed to access the - * freed pages. - * And we increase kvm->tlbs_dirty to delay tlbs flush in this case. */ static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) { @@ -1107,13 +1118,7 @@ static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) return 0; if (FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(vcpu, sp, &sp->spt[i], gpte)) { - /* - * Update spte before increasing tlbs_dirty to make - * sure no tlb flush is lost after spte is zapped; see - * the comments in kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(). - */ - smp_wmb(); - vcpu->kvm->tlbs_dirty++; + set_spte_ret |= SET_SPTE_NEED_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH; continue; } @@ -1128,12 +1133,7 @@ static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) if (gfn != sp->gfns[i]) { drop_spte(vcpu->kvm, &sp->spt[i]); - /* - * The same as above where we are doing - * prefetch_invalid_gpte(). - */ - smp_wmb(); - vcpu->kvm->tlbs_dirty++; + set_spte_ret |= SET_SPTE_NEED_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH; continue; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c index 2545d0c61985..510b833cbd39 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c @@ -545,7 +545,6 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm) (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & int_ctl_vmcb12_bits) | (svm->vmcb01.ptr->control.int_ctl & int_ctl_vmcb01_bits); - svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext = svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext; svm->vmcb->control.int_vector = svm->nested.ctl.int_vector; svm->vmcb->control.int_state = svm->nested.ctl.int_state; svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = svm->nested.ctl.event_inj; @@ -579,7 +578,7 @@ static void nested_svm_copy_common_state(struct vmcb *from_vmcb, struct vmcb *to } int enter_svm_guest_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 vmcb12_gpa, - struct vmcb *vmcb12) + struct vmcb *vmcb12, bool from_vmrun) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); int ret; @@ -609,13 +608,16 @@ int enter_svm_guest_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 vmcb12_gpa, nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(svm, vmcb12); ret = nested_svm_load_cr3(&svm->vcpu, vmcb12->save.cr3, - nested_npt_enabled(svm), true); + nested_npt_enabled(svm), from_vmrun); if (ret) return ret; if (!npt_enabled) vcpu->arch.mmu->inject_page_fault = svm_inject_page_fault_nested; + if (!from_vmrun) + kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES, vcpu); + svm_set_gif(svm, true); return 0; @@ -681,7 +683,7 @@ int nested_svm_vmrun(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) svm->nested.nested_run_pending = 1; - if (enter_svm_guest_mode(vcpu, vmcb12_gpa, vmcb12)) + if (enter_svm_guest_mode(vcpu, vmcb12_gpa, vmcb12, true)) goto out_exit_err; if (nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm(svm)) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 75e0b21ad07c..c36b5fe4c27c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -595,43 +595,50 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm) return 0; } -static int sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + int *error) { - struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa; + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + int ret; + + /* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */ + ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* + * The LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command will perform in-place encryption of + * the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region + * with the guest's key), so invalidate it first. + */ + clflush_cache_range(svm->vmsa, PAGE_SIZE); + + vmsa.reserved = 0; + vmsa.handle = to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.handle; + vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->vmsa); + vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE; + return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa, error); +} + +static int sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; int i, ret; if (!sev_es_guest(kvm)) return -ENOTTY; - vmsa.reserved = 0; - kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) { - struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); - - /* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */ - ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm); + ret = mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex); if (ret) return ret; - /* - * The LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command will perform in-place - * encryption of the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write - * the same memory region with the guest's key), so invalidate - * it first. - */ - clflush_cache_range(svm->vmsa, PAGE_SIZE); + ret = __sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, vcpu, &argp->error); - vmsa.handle = sev->handle; - vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->vmsa); - vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE; - ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa, - &argp->error); + mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex); if (ret) return ret; - - svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected = true; } return 0; @@ -1397,8 +1404,10 @@ static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) /* Bind ASID to this guest */ ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error); - if (ret) + if (ret) { + sev_decommission(start.handle); goto e_free_session; + } params.handle = start.handle; if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, @@ -1464,7 +1473,7 @@ static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) /* Pin guest memory */ guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK, - PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0); + PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1); if (IS_ERR(guest_page)) { ret = PTR_ERR(guest_page); goto e_free_trans; @@ -1501,6 +1510,20 @@ static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, &data, &argp->error); } +static bool cmd_allowed_from_miror(u32 cmd_id) +{ + /* + * Allow mirrors VM to call KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA to enable SEV-ES + * active mirror VMs. Also allow the debugging and status commands. + */ + if (cmd_id == KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA || + cmd_id == KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS || cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT || + cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT) + return true; + + return false; +} + int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -1517,8 +1540,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); - /* enc_context_owner handles all memory enc operations */ - if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) { + /* Only the enc_context_owner handles some memory enc operations. */ + if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm) && + !cmd_allowed_from_miror(sev_cmd.id)) { r = -EINVAL; goto out; } @@ -1715,8 +1739,7 @@ int svm_vm_copy_asid_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd) { struct file *source_kvm_file; struct kvm *source_kvm; - struct kvm_sev_info *mirror_sev; - unsigned int asid; + struct kvm_sev_info source_sev, *mirror_sev; int ret; source_kvm_file = fget(source_fd); @@ -1739,7 +1762,8 @@ int svm_vm_copy_asid_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd) goto e_source_unlock; } - asid = to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info.asid; + memcpy(&source_sev, &to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info, + sizeof(source_sev)); /* * The mirror kvm holds an enc_context_owner ref so its asid can't @@ -1759,8 +1783,16 @@ int svm_vm_copy_asid_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd) /* Set enc_context_owner and copy its encryption context over */ mirror_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; mirror_sev->enc_context_owner = source_kvm; - mirror_sev->asid = asid; mirror_sev->active = true; + mirror_sev->asid = source_sev.asid; + mirror_sev->fd = source_sev.fd; + mirror_sev->es_active = source_sev.es_active; + mirror_sev->handle = source_sev.handle; + /* + * Do not copy ap_jump_table. Since the mirror does not share the same + * KVM contexts as the original, and they may have different + * memory-views. + */ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); return 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 05e8d4d27969..989685098b3e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -1566,6 +1566,8 @@ static void svm_clear_vintr(struct vcpu_svm *svm) svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK; + + svm->vmcb->control.int_vector = svm->nested.ctl.int_vector; } vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTR); @@ -2222,6 +2224,10 @@ static int gp_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (error_code) goto reinject; + /* All SVM instructions expect page aligned RAX */ + if (svm->vmcb->save.rax & ~PAGE_MASK) + goto reinject; + /* Decode the instruction for usage later */ if (x86_decode_emulated_instruction(vcpu, 0, NULL, 0) != EMULATION_OK) goto reinject; @@ -4285,43 +4291,44 @@ static int svm_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate) struct kvm_host_map map_save; int ret; - if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) { - /* FED8h - SVM Guest */ - put_smstate(u64, smstate, 0x7ed8, 1); - /* FEE0h - SVM Guest VMCB Physical Address */ - put_smstate(u64, smstate, 0x7ee0, svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa); + if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) + return 0; - svm->vmcb->save.rax = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]; - svm->vmcb->save.rsp = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]; - svm->vmcb->save.rip = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP]; + /* FED8h - SVM Guest */ + put_smstate(u64, smstate, 0x7ed8, 1); + /* FEE0h - SVM Guest VMCB Physical Address */ + put_smstate(u64, smstate, 0x7ee0, svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa); - ret = nested_svm_vmexit(svm); - if (ret) - return ret; + svm->vmcb->save.rax = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]; + svm->vmcb->save.rsp = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]; + svm->vmcb->save.rip = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP]; - /* - * KVM uses VMCB01 to store L1 host state while L2 runs but - * VMCB01 is going to be used during SMM and thus the state will - * be lost. Temporary save non-VMLOAD/VMSAVE state to the host save - * area pointed to by MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA. APM guarantees that the - * format of the area is identical to guest save area offsetted - * by 0x400 (matches the offset of 'struct vmcb_save_area' - * within 'struct vmcb'). Note: HSAVE area may also be used by - * L1 hypervisor to save additional host context (e.g. KVM does - * that, see svm_prepare_guest_switch()) which must be - * preserved. - */ - if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->nested.hsave_msr), - &map_save) == -EINVAL) - return 1; + ret = nested_svm_vmexit(svm); + if (ret) + return ret; - BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vmcb, save) != 0x400); + /* + * KVM uses VMCB01 to store L1 host state while L2 runs but + * VMCB01 is going to be used during SMM and thus the state will + * be lost. Temporary save non-VMLOAD/VMSAVE state to the host save + * area pointed to by MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA. APM guarantees that the + * format of the area is identical to guest save area offsetted + * by 0x400 (matches the offset of 'struct vmcb_save_area' + * within 'struct vmcb'). Note: HSAVE area may also be used by + * L1 hypervisor to save additional host context (e.g. KVM does + * that, see svm_prepare_guest_switch()) which must be + * preserved. + */ + if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->nested.hsave_msr), + &map_save) == -EINVAL) + return 1; - svm_copy_vmrun_state(map_save.hva + 0x400, - &svm->vmcb01.ptr->save); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vmcb, save) != 0x400); - kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map_save, true); - } + svm_copy_vmrun_state(map_save.hva + 0x400, + &svm->vmcb01.ptr->save); + + kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map_save, true); return 0; } @@ -4329,50 +4336,54 @@ static int svm_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); struct kvm_host_map map, map_save; - int ret = 0; + u64 saved_efer, vmcb12_gpa; + struct vmcb *vmcb12; + int ret; - if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM)) { - u64 saved_efer = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ed0); - u64 guest = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ed8); - u64 vmcb12_gpa = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ee0); - struct vmcb *vmcb12; + if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM)) + return 0; - if (guest) { - if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SVM)) - return 1; + /* Non-zero if SMI arrived while vCPU was in guest mode. */ + if (!GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ed8)) + return 0; - if (!(saved_efer & EFER_SVME)) - return 1; + if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SVM)) + return 1; - if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, - gpa_to_gfn(vmcb12_gpa), &map) == -EINVAL) - return 1; + saved_efer = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ed0); + if (!(saved_efer & EFER_SVME)) + return 1; - if (svm_allocate_nested(svm)) - return 1; + vmcb12_gpa = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ee0); + if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(vmcb12_gpa), &map) == -EINVAL) + return 1; - vmcb12 = map.hva; + ret = 1; + if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->nested.hsave_msr), &map_save) == -EINVAL) + goto unmap_map; - nested_load_control_from_vmcb12(svm, &vmcb12->control); + if (svm_allocate_nested(svm)) + goto unmap_save; - ret = enter_svm_guest_mode(vcpu, vmcb12_gpa, vmcb12); - kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map, true); + /* + * Restore L1 host state from L1 HSAVE area as VMCB01 was + * used during SMM (see svm_enter_smm()) + */ - /* - * Restore L1 host state from L1 HSAVE area as VMCB01 was - * used during SMM (see svm_enter_smm()) - */ - if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->nested.hsave_msr), - &map_save) == -EINVAL) - return 1; + svm_copy_vmrun_state(&svm->vmcb01.ptr->save, map_save.hva + 0x400); - svm_copy_vmrun_state(&svm->vmcb01.ptr->save, - map_save.hva + 0x400); + /* + * Enter the nested guest now + */ - kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map_save, true); - } - } + vmcb12 = map.hva; + nested_load_control_from_vmcb12(svm, &vmcb12->control); + ret = enter_svm_guest_mode(vcpu, vmcb12_gpa, vmcb12, false); +unmap_save: + kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map_save, true); +unmap_map: + kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map, true); return ret; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index 524d943f3efc..128a54b1fbf1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -459,7 +459,8 @@ static inline bool nested_exit_on_nmi(struct vcpu_svm *svm) return vmcb_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_NMI); } -int enter_svm_guest_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 vmcb_gpa, struct vmcb *vmcb12); +int enter_svm_guest_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + u64 vmcb_gpa, struct vmcb *vmcb12, bool from_vmrun); void svm_leave_nested(struct vcpu_svm *svm); void svm_free_nested(struct vcpu_svm *svm); int svm_allocate_nested(struct vcpu_svm *svm); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c index 0dab1b7b529f..ba6f99f584ac 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c @@ -353,14 +353,20 @@ void nested_evmcs_filter_control_msr(u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata) switch (msr_index) { case MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS: case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS: - ctl_high &= ~VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL; + ctl_high &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMEXIT_CTRL; break; case MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS: case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS: - ctl_high &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL; + ctl_high &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMENTRY_CTRL; break; case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2: - ctl_high &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES; + ctl_high &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_2NDEXEC; + break; + case MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS: + ctl_high &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_PINCTRL; + break; + case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC: + ctl_low &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMFUNC; break; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index ccb03d69546c..eedcebf58004 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -2583,8 +2583,13 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, * Guest state is invalid and unrestricted guest is disabled, * which means L1 attempted VMEntry to L2 with invalid state. * Fail the VMEntry. + * + * However when force loading the guest state (SMM exit or + * loading nested state after migration, it is possible to + * have invalid guest state now, which will be later fixed by + * restoring L2 register state */ - if (CC(!vmx_guest_state_valid(vcpu))) { + if (CC(from_vmentry && !vmx_guest_state_valid(vcpu))) { *entry_failure_code = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT; return -EINVAL; } @@ -4351,6 +4356,8 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, if (nested_vmx_load_msr(vcpu, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count)) nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_MSR_FAIL); + + to_vmx(vcpu)->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu); } static inline u64 nested_vmx_get_vmcs01_guest_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) @@ -4899,14 +4906,7 @@ out_vmcs02: return -ENOMEM; } -/* - * Emulate the VMXON instruction. - * Currently, we just remember that VMX is active, and do not save or even - * inspect the argument to VMXON (the so-called "VMXON pointer") because we - * do not currently need to store anything in that guest-allocated memory - * region. Consequently, VMCLEAR and VMPTRLD also do not verify that the their - * argument is different from the VMXON pointer (which the spec says they do). - */ +/* Emulate the VMXON instruction. */ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { int ret; @@ -5903,6 +5903,12 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, case EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC: /* VM functions are emulated through L2->L0 vmexits. */ return true; + case EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK: + /* + * At present, bus lock VM exit is never exposed to L1. + * Handle L2's bus locks in L0 directly. + */ + return true; default: break; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 0c2c0d5ae873..9ecfcf13a046 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(to_vmx(vcpu)); } -static bool emulation_required(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +bool vmx_emulation_required(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return emulate_invalid_guest_state && !vmx_guest_state_valid(vcpu); } @@ -1367,7 +1367,7 @@ void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags) vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags); if ((old_rflags ^ vmx->rflags) & X86_EFLAGS_VM) - vmx->emulation_required = emulation_required(vcpu); + vmx->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu); } u32 vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -1837,10 +1837,11 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) &msr_info->data)) return 1; /* - * Enlightened VMCS v1 doesn't have certain fields, but buggy - * Hyper-V versions are still trying to use corresponding - * features when they are exposed. Filter out the essential - * minimum. + * Enlightened VMCS v1 doesn't have certain VMCS fields but + * instead of just ignoring the features, different Hyper-V + * versions are either trying to use them and fail or do some + * sanity checking and refuse to boot. Filter all unsupported + * features out. */ if (!msr_info->host_initiated && vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled) @@ -3077,7 +3078,7 @@ void vmx_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0) } /* depends on vcpu->arch.cr0 to be set to a new value */ - vmx->emulation_required = emulation_required(vcpu); + vmx->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu); } static int vmx_get_max_tdp_level(void) @@ -3330,7 +3331,7 @@ static void vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int { __vmx_set_segment(vcpu, var, seg); - to_vmx(vcpu)->emulation_required = emulation_required(vcpu); + to_vmx(vcpu)->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu); } static void vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l) @@ -6621,10 +6622,24 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)) vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time = ktime_get(); - /* Don't enter VMX if guest state is invalid, let the exit handler - start emulation until we arrive back to a valid state */ - if (vmx->emulation_required) + /* + * Don't enter VMX if guest state is invalid, let the exit handler + * start emulation until we arrive back to a valid state. Synthesize a + * consistency check VM-Exit due to invalid guest state and bail. + */ + if (unlikely(vmx->emulation_required)) { + + /* We don't emulate invalid state of a nested guest */ + vmx->fail = is_guest_mode(vcpu); + + vmx->exit_reason.full = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE; + vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry = 1; + kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_1); + vmx->exit_qualification = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT; + kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_2); + vmx->exit_intr_info = 0; return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE; + } trace_kvm_entry(vcpu); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 4858c5fd95f2..592217fd7d92 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -248,12 +248,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { * only loaded into hardware when necessary, e.g. SYSCALL #UDs outside * of 64-bit mode or if EFER.SCE=1, thus the SYSCALL MSRs don't need to * be loaded into hardware if those conditions aren't met. - * nr_active_uret_msrs tracks the number of MSRs that need to be loaded - * into hardware when running the guest. guest_uret_msrs[] is resorted - * whenever the number of "active" uret MSRs is modified. */ struct vmx_uret_msr guest_uret_msrs[MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS]; - int nr_active_uret_msrs; bool guest_uret_msrs_loaded; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 u64 msr_host_kernel_gs_base; @@ -359,6 +355,7 @@ void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_set_host_fs_gs(struct vmcs_host_state *host, u16 fs_sel, u16 gs_sel, unsigned long fs_base, unsigned long gs_base); int vmx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool vmx_emulation_required(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); unsigned long vmx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags); u32 vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 28ef14155726..aabd3a2ec1bc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1332,6 +1332,13 @@ static const u32 msrs_to_save_all[] = { MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 12, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 13, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 14, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 15, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 16, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 17, + + MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0, MSR_K7_EVNTSEL1, MSR_K7_EVNTSEL2, MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3, + MSR_K7_PERFCTR0, MSR_K7_PERFCTR1, MSR_K7_PERFCTR2, MSR_K7_PERFCTR3, + MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL0, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL1, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL2, + MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL3, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL4, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL5, + MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR0, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR1, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR2, + MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR3, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR4, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR5, }; static u32 msrs_to_save[ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save_all)]; @@ -2969,7 +2976,7 @@ static int kvm_guest_time_update(struct kvm_vcpu *v) offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_info, time)); if (vcpu->xen.vcpu_time_info_set) kvm_setup_pvclock_page(v, &vcpu->xen.vcpu_time_info_cache, 0); - if (v == kvm_get_vcpu(v->kvm, 0)) + if (!v->vcpu_idx) kvm_hv_setup_tsc_page(v->kvm, &vcpu->hv_clock); return 0; } @@ -7658,6 +7665,13 @@ static void kvm_smm_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool entering_smm) /* Process a latched INIT or SMI, if any. */ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu); + + /* + * Even if KVM_SET_SREGS2 loaded PDPTRs out of band, + * on SMM exit we still need to reload them from + * guest memory + */ + vcpu->arch.pdptrs_from_userspace = false; } kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu); @@ -10652,6 +10666,8 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) int r; vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu = -1; + vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~0; + vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = ~0; if (!irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm) || kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu)) vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE; @@ -10893,6 +10909,9 @@ void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, X86_EFLAGS_FIXED); kvm_rip_write(vcpu, 0xfff0); + vcpu->arch.cr3 = 0; + kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3); + /* * CR0.CD/NW are set on RESET, preserved on INIT. Note, some versions * of Intel's SDM list CD/NW as being set on INIT, but they contradict @@ -11139,9 +11158,15 @@ void kvm_arch_free_vm(struct kvm *kvm) int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type) { + int ret; + if (type) return -EINVAL; + ret = kvm_page_track_init(kvm); + if (ret) + return ret; + INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.mask_notifier_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages); @@ -11174,7 +11199,6 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type) kvm_apicv_init(kvm); kvm_hv_init_vm(kvm); - kvm_page_track_init(kvm); kvm_mmu_init_vm(kvm); kvm_xen_init_vm(kvm); diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/insn.c b/arch/x86/lib/insn.c index 058f19b20465..c565def611e2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/insn.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn.c @@ -37,10 +37,10 @@ ((insn)->next_byte + sizeof(t) + n <= (insn)->end_kaddr) #define __get_next(t, insn) \ - ({ t r = *(t*)insn->next_byte; insn->next_byte += sizeof(t); leXX_to_cpu(t, r); }) + ({ t r; memcpy(&r, insn->next_byte, sizeof(t)); insn->next_byte += sizeof(t); leXX_to_cpu(t, r); }) #define __peek_nbyte_next(t, insn, n) \ - ({ t r = *(t*)((insn)->next_byte + n); leXX_to_cpu(t, r); }) + ({ t r; memcpy(&r, (insn)->next_byte + n, sizeof(t)); leXX_to_cpu(t, r); }) #define get_next(t, insn) \ ({ if (unlikely(!validate_next(t, insn, 0))) goto err_out; __get_next(t, insn); }) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index b2eefdefc108..84a2c8c4af73 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -710,7 +710,8 @@ oops: static noinline void kernelmode_fixup_or_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long address, int signal, int si_code) + unsigned long address, int signal, int si_code, + u32 pkey) { WARN_ON_ONCE(user_mode(regs)); @@ -735,8 +736,12 @@ kernelmode_fixup_or_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code); - /* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */ - force_sig_fault(signal, si_code, (void __user *)address); + if (si_code == SEGV_PKUERR) { + force_sig_pkuerr((void __user *)address, pkey); + } else { + /* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */ + force_sig_fault(signal, si_code, (void __user *)address); + } } /* @@ -798,7 +803,8 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, struct task_struct *tsk = current; if (!user_mode(regs)) { - kernelmode_fixup_or_oops(regs, error_code, address, pkey, si_code); + kernelmode_fixup_or_oops(regs, error_code, address, + SIGSEGV, si_code, pkey); return; } @@ -930,7 +936,8 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, { /* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die: */ if (!user_mode(regs)) { - kernelmode_fixup_or_oops(regs, error_code, address, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR); + kernelmode_fixup_or_oops(regs, error_code, address, + SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR, ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY); return; } @@ -1396,7 +1403,8 @@ good_area: */ if (!user_mode(regs)) kernelmode_fixup_or_oops(regs, error_code, address, - SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR); + SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR, + ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY); return; } @@ -1416,7 +1424,8 @@ good_area: return; if (fatal_signal_pending(current) && !user_mode(regs)) { - kernelmode_fixup_or_oops(regs, error_code, address, 0, 0); + kernelmode_fixup_or_oops(regs, error_code, address, + 0, 0, ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY); return; } @@ -1424,7 +1433,8 @@ good_area: /* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die: */ if (!user_mode(regs)) { kernelmode_fixup_or_oops(regs, error_code, address, - SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR); + SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, + ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY); return; } diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 20d2d6a1f9de..576ef1a6954a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -1334,9 +1334,10 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off)) if (insn->imm == (BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH) || insn->imm == (BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH) || insn->imm == (BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH)) { - u8 *branch_target; bool is64 = BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW; u32 real_src_reg = src_reg; + u32 real_dst_reg = dst_reg; + u8 *branch_target; /* * Can't be implemented with a single x86 insn. @@ -1347,11 +1348,13 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off)) emit_mov_reg(&prog, true, BPF_REG_AX, BPF_REG_0); if (src_reg == BPF_REG_0) real_src_reg = BPF_REG_AX; + if (dst_reg == BPF_REG_0) + real_dst_reg = BPF_REG_AX; branch_target = prog; /* Load old value */ emit_ldx(&prog, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), - BPF_REG_0, dst_reg, insn->off); + BPF_REG_0, real_dst_reg, insn->off); /* * Perform the (commutative) operation locally, * put the result in the AUX_REG. @@ -1362,7 +1365,8 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off)) add_2reg(0xC0, AUX_REG, real_src_reg)); /* Attempt to swap in new value */ err = emit_atomic(&prog, BPF_CMPXCHG, - dst_reg, AUX_REG, insn->off, + real_dst_reg, AUX_REG, + insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code)); if (WARN_ON(err)) return err; @@ -1376,11 +1380,10 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off)) /* Restore R0 after clobbering RAX */ emit_mov_reg(&prog, true, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_AX); break; - } err = emit_atomic(&prog, insn->imm, dst_reg, src_reg, - insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code)); + insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code)); if (err) return err; break; @@ -1737,7 +1740,7 @@ static void restore_regs(const struct btf_func_model *m, u8 **prog, int nr_args, } static int invoke_bpf_prog(const struct btf_func_model *m, u8 **pprog, - struct bpf_prog *p, int stack_size, bool mod_ret) + struct bpf_prog *p, int stack_size, bool save_ret) { u8 *prog = *pprog; u8 *jmp_insn; @@ -1770,11 +1773,15 @@ static int invoke_bpf_prog(const struct btf_func_model *m, u8 **pprog, if (emit_call(&prog, p->bpf_func, prog)) return -EINVAL; - /* BPF_TRAMP_MODIFY_RETURN trampolines can modify the return + /* + * BPF_TRAMP_MODIFY_RETURN trampolines can modify the return * of the previous call which is then passed on the stack to * the next BPF program. + * + * BPF_TRAMP_FENTRY trampoline may need to return the return + * value of BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS prog. */ - if (mod_ret) + if (save_ret) emit_stx(&prog, BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_0, -8); /* replace 2 nops with JE insn, since jmp target is known */ @@ -1821,13 +1828,15 @@ static int emit_cond_near_jump(u8 **pprog, void *func, void *ip, u8 jmp_cond) } static int invoke_bpf(const struct btf_func_model *m, u8 **pprog, - struct bpf_tramp_progs *tp, int stack_size) + struct bpf_tramp_progs *tp, int stack_size, + bool save_ret) { int i; u8 *prog = *pprog; for (i = 0; i < tp->nr_progs; i++) { - if (invoke_bpf_prog(m, &prog, tp->progs[i], stack_size, false)) + if (invoke_bpf_prog(m, &prog, tp->progs[i], stack_size, + save_ret)) return -EINVAL; } *pprog = prog; @@ -1870,6 +1879,23 @@ static int invoke_bpf_mod_ret(const struct btf_func_model *m, u8 **pprog, return 0; } +static bool is_valid_bpf_tramp_flags(unsigned int flags) +{ + if ((flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_RESTORE_REGS) && + (flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_SKIP_FRAME)) + return false; + + /* + * BPF_TRAMP_F_RET_FENTRY_RET is only used by bpf_struct_ops, + * and it must be used alone. + */ + if ((flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_RET_FENTRY_RET) && + (flags & ~BPF_TRAMP_F_RET_FENTRY_RET)) + return false; + + return true; +} + /* Example: * __be16 eth_type_trans(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev); * its 'struct btf_func_model' will be nr_args=2 @@ -1942,17 +1968,19 @@ int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image, void *i struct bpf_tramp_progs *fmod_ret = &tprogs[BPF_TRAMP_MODIFY_RETURN]; u8 **branches = NULL; u8 *prog; + bool save_ret; /* x86-64 supports up to 6 arguments. 7+ can be added in the future */ if (nr_args > 6) return -ENOTSUPP; - if ((flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_RESTORE_REGS) && - (flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_SKIP_FRAME)) + if (!is_valid_bpf_tramp_flags(flags)) return -EINVAL; - if (flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG) - stack_size += 8; /* room for return value of orig_call */ + /* room for return value of orig_call or fentry prog */ + save_ret = flags & (BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG | BPF_TRAMP_F_RET_FENTRY_RET); + if (save_ret) + stack_size += 8; if (flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_IP_ARG) stack_size += 8; /* room for IP address argument */ @@ -1998,7 +2026,8 @@ int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image, void *i } if (fentry->nr_progs) - if (invoke_bpf(m, &prog, fentry, stack_size)) + if (invoke_bpf(m, &prog, fentry, stack_size, + flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_RET_FENTRY_RET)) return -EINVAL; if (fmod_ret->nr_progs) { @@ -2045,7 +2074,7 @@ int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image, void *i } if (fexit->nr_progs) - if (invoke_bpf(m, &prog, fexit, stack_size)) { + if (invoke_bpf(m, &prog, fexit, stack_size, false)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto cleanup; } @@ -2065,9 +2094,10 @@ int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image, void *i ret = -EINVAL; goto cleanup; } - /* restore original return value back into RAX */ - emit_ldx(&prog, BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_FP, -8); } + /* restore return value of orig_call or fentry prog back into RAX */ + if (save_ret) + emit_ldx(&prog, BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_FP, -8); EMIT1(0x5B); /* pop rbx */ EMIT1(0xC9); /* leave */ diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c index 349f780a1567..6e0d0754f94f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c @@ -755,8 +755,8 @@ static void xen_write_idt_entry(gate_desc *dt, int entrynum, const gate_desc *g) preempt_enable(); } -static void xen_convert_trap_info(const struct desc_ptr *desc, - struct trap_info *traps) +static unsigned xen_convert_trap_info(const struct desc_ptr *desc, + struct trap_info *traps, bool full) { unsigned in, out, count; @@ -766,17 +766,18 @@ static void xen_convert_trap_info(const struct desc_ptr *desc, for (in = out = 0; in < count; in++) { gate_desc *entry = (gate_desc *)(desc->address) + in; - if (cvt_gate_to_trap(in, entry, &traps[out])) + if (cvt_gate_to_trap(in, entry, &traps[out]) || full) out++; } - traps[out].address = 0; + + return out; } void xen_copy_trap_info(struct trap_info *traps) { const struct desc_ptr *desc = this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc); - xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps); + xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps, true); } /* Load a new IDT into Xen. In principle this can be per-CPU, so we @@ -786,6 +787,7 @@ static void xen_load_idt(const struct desc_ptr *desc) { static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); static struct trap_info traps[257]; + unsigned out; trace_xen_cpu_load_idt(desc); @@ -793,7 +795,8 @@ static void xen_load_idt(const struct desc_ptr *desc) memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc), desc, sizeof(idt_desc)); - xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps); + out = xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps, false); + memset(&traps[out], 0, sizeof(traps[0])); xen_mc_flush(); if (HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(traps)) diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/pci-swiotlb-xen.c b/arch/x86/xen/pci-swiotlb-xen.c index 54f9aa7e8457..46df59aeaa06 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/pci-swiotlb-xen.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/pci-swiotlb-xen.c @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ #endif #include <linux/export.h> -int xen_swiotlb __read_mostly; +static int xen_swiotlb __read_mostly; /* * pci_xen_swiotlb_detect - set xen_swiotlb to 1 if necessary @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ int __init pci_xen_swiotlb_detect(void) return xen_swiotlb; } -void __init pci_xen_swiotlb_init(void) +static void __init pci_xen_swiotlb_init(void) { if (xen_swiotlb) { xen_swiotlb_init_early(); diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c index 96afadf9878e..7ed56c6075b0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c @@ -290,8 +290,6 @@ cpu_initialize_context(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle) gdt = get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu); - memset(&ctxt->fpu_ctxt, 0, sizeof(ctxt->fpu_ctxt)); - /* * Bring up the CPU in cpu_bringup_and_idle() with the stack * pointing just below where pt_regs would be if it were a normal @@ -308,8 +306,6 @@ cpu_initialize_context(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle) xen_copy_trap_info(ctxt->trap_ctxt); - ctxt->ldt_ents = 0; - BUG_ON((unsigned long)gdt & ~PAGE_MASK); gdt_mfn = arbitrary_virt_to_mfn(gdt); |