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authorMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>2019-04-23 07:42:35 +0300
committerMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>2019-04-24 17:30:40 +0300
commit384b40caa8afae44a54e8f69bd37097c0279fdce (patch)
tree51d9c189ca2c5c5c9a26e9a617e66bd10626f2a0 /Documentation/virtual
parentb890d75c4cdc963c96e7774b088120966c23ab8e (diff)
downloadlinux-384b40caa8afae44a54e8f69bd37097c0279fdce.tar.xz
KVM: arm/arm64: Context-switch ptrauth registers
When pointer authentication is supported, a guest may wish to use it. This patch adds the necessary KVM infrastructure for this to work, with a semi-lazy context switch of the pointer auth state. Pointer authentication feature is only enabled when VHE is built in the kernel and present in the CPU implementation so only VHE code paths are modified. When we schedule a vcpu, we disable guest usage of pointer authentication instructions and accesses to the keys. While these are disabled, we avoid context-switching the keys. When we trap the guest trying to use pointer authentication functionality, we change to eagerly context-switching the keys, and enable the feature. The next time the vcpu is scheduled out/in, we start again. However the host key save is optimized and implemented inside ptrauth instruction/register access trap. Pointer authentication consists of address authentication and generic authentication, and CPUs in a system might have varied support for either. Where support for either feature is not uniform, it is hidden from guests via ID register emulation, as a result of the cpufeature framework in the host. Unfortunately, address authentication and generic authentication cannot be trapped separately, as the architecture provides a single EL2 trap covering both. If we wish to expose one without the other, we cannot prevent a (badly-written) guest from intermittently using a feature which is not uniformly supported (when scheduled on a physical CPU which supports the relevant feature). Hence, this patch expects both type of authentication to be present in a cpu. This switch of key is done from guest enter/exit assembly as preparation for the upcoming in-kernel pointer authentication support. Hence, these key switching routines are not implemented in C code as they may cause pointer authentication key signing error in some situations. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [Only VHE, key switch in full assembly, vcpu_has_ptrauth checks , save host key in ptrauth exception trap] Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com> Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu [maz: various fixups] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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