summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/selinux/ss
AgeCommit message (Collapse)AuthorFilesLines
2025-01-22Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20250121' of ↵Linus Torvalds14-149/+149
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Extended permissions supported in conditional policy The SELinux extended permissions, aka "xperms", allow security admins to target individuals ioctls, and recently netlink messages, with their SELinux policy. Adding support for conditional policies allows admins to toggle the granular xperms using SELinux booleans, helping pave the way for greater use of xperms in general purpose SELinux policies. This change bumps the maximum SELinux policy version to 34. - Fix a SCTP/SELinux error return code inconsistency Depending on the loaded SELinux policy, specifically it's EXTSOCKCLASS support, the bind(2) LSM/SELinux hook could return different error codes due to the SELinux code checking the socket's SELinux object class (which can vary depending on EXTSOCKCLASS) and not the socket's sk_protocol field. We fix this by doing the obvious, and looking at the sock->sk_protocol field instead of the object class. - Makefile fixes to properly cleanup av_permissions.h Add av_permissions.h to "targets" so that it is properly cleaned up using the kbuild infrastructure. - A number of smaller improvements by Christian Göttsche A variety of straightforward changes to reduce code duplication, reduce pointer lookups, migrate void pointers to defined types, simplify code, constify function parameters, and correct iterator types. * tag 'selinux-pr-20250121' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: make more use of str_read() when loading the policy selinux: avoid unnecessary indirection in struct level_datum selinux: use known type instead of void pointer selinux: rename comparison functions for clarity selinux: rework match_ipv6_addrmask() selinux: constify and reconcile function parameter names selinux: avoid using types indicating user space interaction selinux: supply missing field initializers selinux: add netlink nlmsg_type audit message selinux: add support for xperms in conditional policies selinux: Fix SCTP error inconsistency in selinux_socket_bind() selinux: use native iterator types selinux: add generated av_permissions.h to targets
2025-01-08selinux: make more use of str_read() when loading the policyChristian Göttsche3-22/+12
Simplify the call sites, and enable future string validation in a single place. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: subject tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2025-01-08selinux: avoid unnecessary indirection in struct level_datumChristian Göttsche3-17/+10
Store the owned member of type struct mls_level directly in the parent struct instead of an extra heap allocation. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2025-01-08selinux: use known type instead of void pointerChristian Göttsche8-74/+77
Improve type safety and readability by using the known type. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2025-01-08selinux: rename comparison functions for clarityChristian Göttsche7-16/+16
The functions context_cmp(), mls_context_cmp() and ebitmap_cmp() are not traditional C style compare functions returning -1, 0, and 1 for less than, equal, and greater than; they only return whether their arguments are equal. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2025-01-08selinux: rework match_ipv6_addrmask()Christian Göttsche1-7/+5
Constify parameters, add size hints, and simplify control flow. According to godbolt the same assembly is generated. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2025-01-08selinux: constify and reconcile function parameter namesChristian Göttsche2-3/+3
Align the parameter names between declarations and definitions, and constify read-only parameters. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: tweak the subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2025-01-08selinux: avoid using types indicating user space interactionChristian Göttsche1-1/+1
Integer types starting with a double underscore, like __u32, are intended for usage of variables interacting with user-space. Just use the plain variant. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2025-01-05selinux: match extended permissions to their base permissionsThiébaud Weksteen1-7/+21
In commit d1d991efaf34 ("selinux: Add netlink xperm support") a new extended permission was added ("nlmsg"). This was the second extended permission implemented in selinux ("ioctl" being the first one). Extended permissions are associated with a base permission. It was found that, in the access vector cache (avc), the extended permission did not keep track of its base permission. This is an issue for a domain that is using both extended permissions (i.e., a domain calling ioctl() on a netlink socket). In this case, the extended permissions were overlapping. Keep track of the base permission in the cache. A new field "base_perm" is added to struct extended_perms_decision to make sure that the extended permission refers to the correct policy permission. A new field "base_perms" is added to struct extended_perms to quickly decide if extended permissions apply. While it is in theory possible to retrieve the base permission from the access vector, the same base permission may not be mapped to the same bit for each class (e.g., "nlmsg" is mapped to a different bit for "netlink_route_socket" and "netlink_audit_socket"). Instead, use a constant (AVC_EXT_IOCTL or AVC_EXT_NLMSG) provided by the caller. Fixes: d1d991efaf34 ("selinux: Add netlink xperm support") Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-12-16selinux: ignore unknown extended permissionsThiébaud Weksteen1-2/+6
When evaluating extended permissions, ignore unknown permissions instead of calling BUG(). This commit ensures that future permissions can be added without interfering with older kernels. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls") Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-12-14selinux: add support for xperms in conditional policiesChristian Göttsche5-8/+24
Add support for extended permission rules in conditional policies. Currently the kernel accepts such rules already, but evaluating a security decision will hit a BUG() in services_compute_xperms_decision(). Thus reject extended permission rules in conditional policies for current policy versions. Add a new policy version for this feature. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-12-11selinux: use native iterator typesChristian Göttsche1-2/+2
Use types for iterators equal to the type of the to be compared values. Reported by clang: ../ss/sidtab.c:126:2: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'int' and 'unsigned long' 126 | hash_for_each_rcu(sidtab->context_to_sid, i, entry, list) { | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ../hashtable.h:139:51: note: expanded from macro 'hash_for_each_rcu' 139 | for (... ; obj == NULL && (bkt) < HASH_SIZE(name);\ | ~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ../selinuxfs.c:1520:23: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'int' and 'unsigned int' 1520 | for (cpu = *idx; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; ++cpu) { | ~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~ ../hooks.c:412:16: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'int' and 'unsigned long' 412 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) { | ~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: munged the clang output due to line length concerns] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-11-19Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20241112' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-3/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: "Thirteen patches, all focused on moving away from the current 'secid' LSM identifier to a richer 'lsm_prop' structure. This move will help reduce the translation that is necessary in many LSMs, offering better performance, and make it easier to support different LSMs in the future" * tag 'lsm-pr-20241112' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lsm: remove lsm_prop scaffolding netlabel,smack: use lsm_prop for audit data audit: change context data from secid to lsm_prop lsm: create new security_cred_getlsmprop LSM hook audit: use an lsm_prop in audit_names lsm: use lsm_prop in security_inode_getsecid lsm: use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid audit: update shutdown LSM data lsm: use lsm_prop in security_ipc_getsecid audit: maintain an lsm_prop in audit_context lsm: add lsmprop_to_secctx hook lsm: use lsm_prop in security_audit_rule_match lsm: add the lsm_prop data structure
2024-10-11lsm: remove lsm_prop scaffoldingCasey Schaufler1-4/+0
Remove the scaffold member from the lsm_prop. Remove the remaining places it is being set. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subj line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-10-11lsm: use lsm_prop in security_audit_rule_matchCasey Schaufler1-3/+7
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsm_prop structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsm_prop structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook. Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsm_prop instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmprop_init() fills the structure with the value of the old secid, ensuring that it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(), will be converted to use the lsm_prop structure later in the series. At that point the use of lsmprop_init() is dropped. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-10-07selinux: Add netlink xperm supportThiébaud Weksteen2-38/+45
Reuse the existing extended permissions infrastructure to support policies based on the netlink message types. A new policy capability "netlink_xperm" is introduced. When disabled, the previous behaviour is preserved. That is, netlink_send will rely on the permission mappings defined in nlmsgtab.c (e.g, nlmsg_read for RTM_GETADDR on NETLINK_ROUTE). When enabled, the mappings are ignored and the generic "nlmsg" permission is used instead. The new "nlmsg" permission is an extended permission. The 16 bits of the extended permission are mapped to the nlmsg_type field. Example policy on Android, preventing regular apps from accessing the device's MAC address and ARP table, but allowing this access to privileged apps, looks as follows: allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket { create read getattr write setattr lock append connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg }; allowxperm netdomain self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg ~{ RTM_GETLINK RTM_GETNEIGH RTM_GETNEIGHTBL }; allowxperm priv_app self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg { RTM_GETLINK RTM_GETNEIGH RTM_GETNEIGHTBL }; The constants in the example above (e.g., RTM_GETLINK) are explicitly defined in the policy. It is possible to generate policies to support kernels that may or may not have the capability enabled by generating a rule for each scenario. For instance: allow domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_read; allow domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg; allowxperm domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg { AUDIT_GET }; The approach of defining a new permission ("nlmsg") instead of relying on the existing permissions (e.g., "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_readpriv" or "nlmsg_tty_audit") has been preferred because: 1. This is similar to the other extended permission ("ioctl"); 2. With the new extended permission, the coarse-grained mapping is not necessary anymore. It could eventually be removed, which would be impossible if the extended permission was defined below these. 3. Having a single extra extended permission considerably simplifies the implementation here and in libselinux. Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> Signed-off-by: Bram Bonné <brambonne@google.com> [PM: manual merge fixes for sock_skip_has_perm()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-08-28selinux: replace kmem_cache_create() with KMEM_CACHE()Eric Suen3-11/+4
Based on guidance in include/linux/slab.h, replace kmem_cache_create() with KMEM_CACHE() for sources under security/selinux to simplify creation of SLAB caches. Signed-off-by: Eric Suen <ericsu@linux.microsoft.com> [PM: minor grammar nits in the description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-07-29selinux: Streamline type determination in security_compute_sidCanfeng Guo1-17/+19
Simplifies the logic for determining the security context type in security_compute_sid, enhancing readability and efficiency. Consolidates default type assignment logic next to type transition checks, removing redundancy and improving code flow. Signed-off-by: Canfeng Guo <guocanfeng@uniontech.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-07-17Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20240715' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux update from Paul Moore: "A single SELinux patch to change the type of a pre-processor constant to better match its use" * tag 'selinux-pr-20240715' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: Use 1UL for EBITMAP_BIT to match maps type
2024-07-02selinux: Use 1UL for EBITMAP_BIT to match maps typeCanfeng Guo1-1/+1
This patch modifies the definition of EBITMAP_BIT in security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h from 1ULL to 1UL to match the type of elements in the ebitmap_node maps array. This change does not affect the functionality or correctness of the code but aims to enhance code quality by adhering to good programming practices and avoiding unnecessary type conversions. Signed-off-by: Canfeng Guo <guocanfeng@uniontech.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-06-13ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical sectionGUO Zihua1-2/+3
A panic happens in ima_match_policy: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen. The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: | Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next| ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). | | entry->action | ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-05-01selinux: constify source policy in cond_policydb_dup()Christian Göttsche4-14/+17
cond_policydb_dup() duplicates conditional parts of an existing policy. Declare the source policy const, since it should not be modified. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: various line length fixups] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-05-01selinux: avoid printk_ratelimit()Christian Göttsche1-2/+1
The usage of printk_ratelimit() is discouraged, see include/linux/printk.h, thus use pr_warn_ratelimited(). While editing this line address the following checkpatch warning: WARNING: Integer promotion: Using 'h' in '%hu' is unnecessary Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-04-04selinux: clarify return code in filename_trans_read_helper_compat()Ondrej Mosnacek1-0/+1
For the "conflicting/duplicate rules" branch in filename_trans_read_helper_compat() the Smatch static checker reports: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:1953 filename_trans_read_helper_compat() warn: missing error code 'rc' While the value of rc will already always be zero here, it is not obvious that it's the case and that it's the intended return value (Smatch expects rc to be assigned within 5 lines from the goto). Therefore, add an explicit assignment just before the goto to make the intent more clear and the code less error-prone. Fixes: c3a276111ea2 ("selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/722b90c4-1f4b-42ff-a6c2-108ea262bd10@moroto.mountain/ Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-03-28selinux: use u32 as bit position type in ebitmap codeChristian Göttsche2-35/+34
The extensible bitmap supports bit positions up to U32_MAX due to the type of the member highbit being u32. Use u32 consistently as the type for bit positions to announce to callers what range of values is supported. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: merge fuzz, subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-03-28selinux: improve symtab string hashingChristian Göttsche1-11/+11
The number of buckets is calculated by performing a binary AND against the mask of the hash table, which is one less than its size (which is a power of two). This leads to all top bits being discarded, requiring for short or similar inputs a hash function with a good avalanche effect. Use djb2a: # current common prefixes: 7 entries and 5/8 buckets used, longest chain length 2, sum of chain length^2 11 classes: 134 entries and 100/256 buckets used, longest chain length 5, sum of chain length^2 234 roles: 15 entries and 6/16 buckets used, longest chain length 5, sum of chain length^2 57 types: 4448 entries and 3016/8192 buckets used, longest chain length 41, sum of chain length^2 14922 users: 7 entries and 3/8 buckets used, longest chain length 3, sum of chain length^2 17 bools: 306 entries and 221/512 buckets used, longest chain length 4, sum of chain length^2 524 levels: 1 entries and 1/1 buckets used, longest chain length 1, sum of chain length^2 1 categories: 1024 entries and 400/1024 buckets used, longest chain length 4, sum of chain length^2 2740 # patch common prefixes: 7 entries and 5/8 buckets used, longest chain length 2, sum of chain length^2 11 classes: 134 entries and 101/256 buckets used, longest chain length 3, sum of chain length^2 210 roles: 15 entries and 9/16 buckets used, longest chain length 3, sum of chain length^2 31 types: 4448 entries and 3459/8192 buckets used, longest chain length 5, sum of chain length^2 6778 users: 7 entries and 5/8 buckets used, longest chain length 3, sum of chain length^2 13 bools: 306 entries and 236/512 buckets used, longest chain length 5, sum of chain length^2 470 levels: 1 entries and 1/1 buckets used, longest chain length 1, sum of chain length^2 1 categories: 1024 entries and 518/1024 buckets used, longest chain length 7, sum of chain length^2 2992 Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: line length fixes in the commit message] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-03-28selinux: dump statistics for more hash tablesChristian Göttsche2-7/+19
Dump in the SELinux debug configuration the statistics for the conditional rules avtab, the role transition, and class and common permission hash tables. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: style fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-03-27selinux: update numeric format specifiers for ebitmapsChristian Göttsche1-6/+6
Use the correct, according to Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst, format specifiers for numeric arguments in string formatting. The general bit type is u32 thus use %u, EBITMAP_SIZE is a constant computed via sizeof() thus use %zu. Fixes: 0142c56682fb ("selinux: reject invalid ebitmaps") Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-next/20240327131044.2c629921@canb.auug.org.au/ Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-03-26selinux: reject invalid ebitmapsChristian Göttsche1-0/+11
Reject ebitmaps with a node containing an empty map or with an incorrect highbit. Both checks are already performed by userspace, the former since 2008 (patch 13cd4c896068 ("initial import from svn trunk revision 2950")), the latter since v2.7 in 2017 (patch 75b14a5de10a ("libsepol: ebitmap: reject loading bitmaps with incorrect high bit")). Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/symtab.cPaul Moore1-1/+3
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/symtab.hPaul Moore1-5/+4
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/sidtab.cPaul Moore1-32/+37
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/sidtab.hPaul Moore1-17/+19
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/services.hPaul Moore1-1/+2
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/policydb.cPaul Moore1-192/+213
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/policydb.hPaul Moore1-97/+95
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/mls_types.hPaul Moore1-16/+16
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/mls.cPaul Moore1-50/+33
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/mls.hPaul Moore1-39/+19
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/hashtab.cPaul Moore1-12/+11
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/hashtab.hPaul Moore1-18/+17
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.cPaul Moore1-28/+28
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.hPaul Moore1-19/+23
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/context.hPaul Moore1-1/+1
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/context.hPaul Moore1-19/+22
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/constraint.hPaul Moore1-33/+34
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/conditional.cPaul Moore1-35/+33
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/conditional.hPaul Moore1-12/+11
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/avtab.cPaul Moore1-54/+51
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-24selinux: fix style issues in security/selinux/ss/avtab.hPaul Moore1-37/+37
As part of on ongoing effort to perform more automated testing and provide more tools for individual developers to validate their patches before submitting, we are trying to make our code "clang-format clean". My hope is that once we have fixed all of our style "quirks", developers will be able to run clang-format on their patches to help avoid silly formatting problems and ensure their changes fit in well with the rest of the SELinux kernel code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>