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2025-05-16KVM: SVM: Add architectural definitions/assets for Bus Lock ThresholdNikunj A Dadhania1-2/+5
Virtual machines can exploit bus locks to degrade the performance of the system. Bus locks can be caused by Non-WB(Write back) and misaligned locked RMW (Read-modify-Write) instructions and require systemwide synchronization among all processors which can result into significant performance penalties. To address this issue, the Bus Lock Threshold feature is introduced to provide ability to hypervisor to restrict guests' capability of initiating mulitple buslocks, thereby preventing system slowdowns. Support for the buslock threshold is indicated via CPUID function 0x8000000A_EDX[29]. On the processors that support the Bus Lock Threshold feature, the VMCB provides a Bus Lock Threshold enable bit and an unsigned 16-bit Bus Lock threshold count. VMCB intercept bit VMCB Offset Bits Function 14h 5 Intercept bus lock operations Bus lock threshold count VMCB Offset Bits Function 120h 15:0 Bus lock counter When a VMRUN instruction is executed, the bus lock threshold count is loaded into an internal count register. Before the processor executes a bus lock in the guest, it checks the value of this register: - If the value is greater than '0', the processor successfully executes the bus lock and decrements the count. - If the value is '0', the bus lock is not executed, and a #VMEXIT to the VMM is taken. The bus lock threshold #VMEXIT is reported to the VMM with the VMEXIT code A5h, SVM_EXIT_BUS_LOCK. Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250502050346.14274-4-manali.shukla@amd.com [sean: rewrite shortlog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2025-04-26KVM: SEV: Configure "ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES" VMCB FieldKim Phillips1-1/+6
AMD EPYC 5th generation processors have introduced a feature that allows the hypervisor to control the SEV_FEATURES that are set for, or by, a guest [1]. ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES can be used by the hypervisor to enforce that SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests cannot enable features that the hypervisor does not want to be enabled. Always enable ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES. A VMRUN will fail if any non-reserved bits are 1 in SEV_FEATURES but are 0 in ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES. Some SEV_FEATURES - currently PmcVirtualization and SecureAvic (see Appendix B, Table B-4) - require an opt-in via ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES, i.e. are off-by-default, whereas all other features are effectively on-by-default, but still honor ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES. [1] Section 15.36.20 "Allowed SEV Features", AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250 Co-developed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310201603.1217954-3-kim.phillips@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2025-03-03KVM: SVM: Require AP's "requested" SEV_FEATURES to match KVM's viewSean Christopherson1-4/+0
When handling an "AP Create" event, return an error if the "requested" SEV features for the vCPU don't exactly match KVM's view of the VM-scoped features. There is no known use case for heterogeneous SEV features across vCPUs, and while KVM can't actually enforce an exact match since the value in RAX isn't guaranteed to match what the guest shoved into the VMSA, KVM can at least avoid knowingly letting the guest run in an unsupported state. E.g. if a VM is created with DebugSwap disabled, KVM will intercept #DBs and DRs for all vCPUs, even if an AP is "created" with DebugSwap enabled in its VMSA. Note, the GHCB spec only "requires" that "AP use the same interrupt injection mechanism as the BSP", but given the disaster that is DebugSwap and SEV_FEATURES in general, it's safe to say that AMD didn't consider all possible complications with mismatching features between the BSP and APs. Opportunistically fold the check into the relevant request flavors; the "request < AP_DESTROY" check is just a bizarre way of implementing the AP_CREATE_ON_INIT => AP_CREATE fallthrough. Fixes: e366f92ea99e ("KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event") Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227012541.3234589-6-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2025-02-26KVM: SVM: Add Idle HLT intercept supportManali Shukla1-0/+1
Add support for "Idle HLT" interception on AMD CPUs, and enable Idle HLT interception instead of "normal" HLT interception for all VMs for which HLT-exiting is enabled. Idle HLT provides a mild performance boost for all VM types, by avoiding a VM-Exit in the scenario where KVM would immediately "wake" and resume the vCPU. Idle HLT makes HLT-exiting conditional on the vCPU not having a valid, unmasked interrupt. Specifically, a VM-Exit occurs on execution of HLT if and only if there are no pending V_IRQ or V_NMI events. Note, Idle is a replacement for full HLT interception, i.e. enabling HLT interception would result in all HLT instructions causing unconditional VM-Exits. Per the APM: When both HLT and Idle HLT intercepts are active at the same time, the HLT intercept takes priority. This intercept occurs only if a virtual interrupt is not pending (V_INTR or V_NMI). For KVM's use of V_IRQ (also called V_INTR in the APM) to detect interrupt windows, the net effect of enabling Idle HLT is that, if a virtual interupt is pending and unmasked at the time of HLT, the vCPU will take a V_IRQ intercept instead of a HLT intercept. When AVIC is enabled, Idle HLT works as intended: the vCPU continues unimpeded and services the pending virtual interrupt. Note, the APM's description of V_IRQ interaction with AVIC is quite confusing, and requires piecing together implied behavior. Per the APM, when AVIC is enabled, V_IRQ *from the VMCB* is ignored: When AVIC mode is enabled for a virtual processor, the V_IRQ, V_INTR_PRIO, V_INTR_VECTOR, and V_IGN_TPR fields in the VMCB are ignored. Which seems to contradict the behavior of Idle HLT: This intercept occurs only if a virtual interrupt is not pending (V_INTR or V_NMI). What's not explicitly stated is that hardware's internal copy of V_IRQ (and related fields) *are* still active, i.e. are presumably used to cache information from the virtual APIC. Handle Idle HLT exits as if they were normal HLT exits, e.g. don't try to optimize the handling under the assumption that there isn't a pending IRQ. Irrespective of AVIC, Idle HLT is inherently racy with respect to the vIRR, as KVM can set vIRR bits asychronously. No changes are required to support KVM's use Idle HLT while running L2. In fact, supporting Idle HLT is actually a bug fix to some extent. If L1 wants to intercept HLT, recalc_intercepts() will enable HLT interception in vmcb02 and forward the intercept to L1 as normal. But if L1 does not want to intercept HLT, then KVM will run L2 with Idle HLT enabled and HLT interception disabled. If a V_IRQ or V_NMI for L2 becomes pending and L2 executes HLT, then use of Idle HLT will do the right thing, i.e. not #VMEXIT and instead deliver the virtual event. KVM currently doesn't handle this scenario correctly, e.g. doesn't check V_IRQ or V_NMI in vmcs02 as part of kvm_vcpu_has_events(). Do not expose Idle HLT to L1 at this time, as supporting nested Idle HLT is more complex than just enumerating the feature, e.g. requires KVM to handle the aforementioned scenarios of V_IRQ and V_NMI at the time of exit. Signed-off-by: Manali Shukla <Manali.Shukla@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250128124812.7324-3-manali.shukla@amd.com [sean: rewrite changelog, drop nested "support"] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2025-01-25Merge tag 'hyperv-next-signed-20250123' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux Pull hyperv updates from Wei Liu: - Introduce a new set of Hyper-V headers in include/hyperv and replace the old hyperv-tlfs.h with the new headers (Nuno Das Neves) - Fixes for the Hyper-V VTL mode (Roman Kisel) - Fixes for cpu mask usage in Hyper-V code (Michael Kelley) - Document the guest VM hibernation behaviour (Michael Kelley) - Miscellaneous fixes and cleanups (Jacob Pan, John Starks, Naman Jain) * tag 'hyperv-next-signed-20250123' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux: Documentation: hyperv: Add overview of guest VM hibernation hyperv: Do not overlap the hvcall IO areas in hv_vtl_apicid_to_vp_id() hyperv: Do not overlap the hvcall IO areas in get_vtl() hyperv: Enable the hypercall output page for the VTL mode hv_balloon: Fallback to generic_online_page() for non-HV hot added mem Drivers: hv: vmbus: Log on missing offers if any Drivers: hv: vmbus: Wait for boot-time offers during boot and resume uio_hv_generic: Add a check for HV_NIC for send, receive buffers setup iommu/hyper-v: Don't assume cpu_possible_mask is dense Drivers: hv: Don't assume cpu_possible_mask is dense x86/hyperv: Don't assume cpu_possible_mask is dense hyperv: Remove the now unused hyperv-tlfs.h files hyperv: Switch from hyperv-tlfs.h to hyperv/hvhdk.h hyperv: Add new Hyper-V headers in include/hyperv hyperv: Clean up unnecessary #includes hyperv: Move hv_connection_id to hyperv-tlfs.h
2025-01-10hyperv: Switch from hyperv-tlfs.h to hyperv/hvhdk.hNuno Das Neves1-1/+1
Switch to using hvhdk.h everywhere in the kernel. This header includes all the new Hyper-V headers in include/hyperv, which form a superset of the definitions found in hyperv-tlfs.h. This makes it easier to add new Hyper-V interfaces without being restricted to those in the TLFS doc (reflected in hyperv-tlfs.h). To be more consistent with the original Hyper-V code, the names of some definitions are changed slightly. Update those where needed. Update comments in mshyperv.h files to point to include/hyperv for adding new definitions. Signed-off-by: Nuno Das Neves <nunodasneves@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com> Reviewed-by: Easwar Hariharan <eahariha@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Roman Kisel <romank@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Easwar Hariharan <eahariha@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1732577084-2122-5-git-send-email-nunodasneves@linux.microsoft.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250108222138.1623703-3-romank@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
2025-01-07x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guestsNikunj A Dadhania1-2/+4
Add support for Secure TSC in SNP-enabled guests. Secure TSC allows guests to securely use RDTSC/RDTSCP instructions, ensuring that the parameters used cannot be altered by the hypervisor once the guest is launched. Secure TSC-enabled guests need to query TSC information from the AMD Security Processor. This communication channel is encrypted between the AMD Security Processor and the guest, with the hypervisor acting merely as a conduit to deliver the guest messages to the AMD Security Processor. Each message is protected with AEAD (AES-256 GCM). [ bp: Zap a stray newline over amd_cc_platform_has() while at it, simplify CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC check ] Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250106124633.1418972-6-nikunj@amd.com
2024-08-30KVM: SVM: Add host SEV-ES save area structure into VMCB via a unionSean Christopherson1-5/+15
Incorporate the _host_ SEV-ES save area into the VMCB as a union with the legacy save area. The SEV-ES variant used to save/load host state is larger than the legacy save area, but resides at the same offset. Prefix the field with "host" to make it as obvious as possible that the SEV-ES variant in the VMCB is only ever used for host state. Guest state for SEV-ES VMs is stored in a completely separate page (VMSA), albeit with the same layout as the host state. Add a compile-time assert to ensure the VMCB layout is correct, i.e. that KVM's layout matches the architectural definitions. No functional change intended. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802204511.352017-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-05-12KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE eventTom Lendacky1-0/+6
Add support for the SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event. This allows SEV-SNP guests to alter the register state of the APs on their own. This allows the guest a way of simulating INIT-SIPI. A new event, KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE, is created and used so as to avoid updating the VMSA pointer while the vCPU is running. For CREATE The guest supplies the GPA of the VMSA to be used for the vCPU with the specified APIC ID. The GPA is saved in the svm struct of the target vCPU, the KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE event is added to the vCPU and then the vCPU is kicked. For CREATE_ON_INIT: The guest supplies the GPA of the VMSA to be used for the vCPU with the specified APIC ID the next time an INIT is performed. The GPA is saved in the svm struct of the target vCPU. For DESTROY: The guest indicates it wishes to stop the vCPU. The GPA is cleared from the svm struct, the KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE event is added to vCPU and then the vCPU is kicked. The KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE event handler will be invoked as a result of the event or as a result of an INIT. If a new VMSA is to be installed, the VMSA guest page is set as the VMSA in the vCPU VMCB and the vCPU state is set to KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE. If a new VMSA is not to be installed, the VMSA is cleared in the vCPU VMCB and the vCPU state is set to KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED to prevent it from being run. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Message-ID: <20240501085210.2213060-13-michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-05-12KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP supportBrijesh Singh1-1/+2
SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware-based security protection. SEV-SNP adds strong memory encryption and integrity protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks such as data replay, memory re-mapping, and more, to create an isolated execution environment. Define a new KVM_X86_SNP_VM type which makes use of these capabilities and extend the KVM_SEV_INIT2 ioctl to support it. Also add a basic helper to check whether SNP is enabled and set PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS for private #NPFs so they are handled appropriately by KVM MMU. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-ID: <20240501085210.2213060-5-michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-02-27KVM: SVM: Rename vmplX_ssp -> plX_sspJohn Allen1-4/+4
The SSP fields in the SEV-ES save area were mistakenly named vmplX_ssp instead of plX_ssp. Rename these to the correct names as defined in the APM. Fixes: 6d3b3d34e39e ("KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping") Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227200356.35114-1-john.allen@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-10-31Merge tag 'x86_cpu_for_6.7_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-6/+0
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 cpuid updates from Borislav Petkov: - Make sure the "svm" feature flag is cleared from /proc/cpuinfo when virtualization support is disabled in the BIOS on AMD and Hygon platforms - A minor cleanup * tag 'x86_cpu_for_6.7_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/cpu/amd: Remove redundant 'break' statement x86/cpu: Clear SVM feature if disabled by BIOS
2023-10-12x86: KVM: SVM: add support for Invalid IPI Vector interceptionMaxim Levitsky1-0/+1
In later revisions of AMD's APM, there is a new 'incomplete IPI' exit code: "Invalid IPI Vector - The vector for the specified IPI was set to an illegal value (VEC < 16)" Note that tests on Zen2 machine show that this VM exit doesn't happen and instead AVIC just does nothing. Add support for this exit code by doing nothing, instead of filling the kernel log with errors. Also replace an unthrottled 'pr_err()' if another unknown incomplete IPI exit happens with vcpu_unimpl() (e.g in case AMD adds yet another 'Invalid IPI' exit reason) Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20230928173354.217464-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2023-09-22x86/cpu: Clear SVM feature if disabled by BIOSPaolo Bonzini1-6/+0
When SVM is disabled by BIOS, one cannot use KVM but the SVM feature is still shown in the output of /proc/cpuinfo. On Intel machines, VMX is cleared by init_ia32_feat_ctl(), so do the same on AMD and Hygon processors. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921114940.957141-1-pbonzini@redhat.com
2023-08-17KVM: SVM: correct the size of spec_ctrl field in VMCB save areaManali Shukla1-2/+2
Correct the spec_ctrl field in the VMCB save area based on the AMD Programmer's manual. Originally, the spec_ctrl was listed as u32 with 4 bytes of reserved area. The AMD Programmer's Manual now lists the spec_ctrl as 8 bytes in VMCB save area. The Public Processor Programming reference for Genoa, shows SPEC_CTRL as 64b register, but the AMD Programmer's Manual lists SPEC_CTRL as 32b register. This discrepancy will be cleaned up in next revision of the AMD Programmer's Manual. Since remaining bits above bit 7 are reserved bits in SPEC_CTRL MSR and thus, not being used, the spec_ctrl added as u32 in the VMCB save area is currently not an issue. Fixes: 3dd2775b74c9 ("KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area") Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230717041903.85480-1-manali.shukla@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-07-29KVM: SEV: Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ESAlexey Kardashevskiy1-0/+1
Add support for "DebugSwap for SEV-ES guests", which provides support for swapping DR[0-3] and DR[0-3]_ADDR_MASK on VMRUN and VMEXIT, i.e. allows KVM to expose debug capabilities to SEV-ES guests. Without DebugSwap support, the CPU doesn't save/load most _guest_ debug registers (except DR6/7), and KVM cannot manually context switch guest DRs due the VMSA being encrypted. Enable DebugSwap if and only if the CPU also supports NoNestedDataBp, which causes the CPU to ignore nested #DBs, i.e. #DBs that occur when vectoring a #DB. Without NoNestedDataBp, a malicious guest can DoS the host by putting the CPU into an infinite loop of vectoring #DBs (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1278496) Set the features bit in sev_es_sync_vmsa() which is the last point when VMSA is not encrypted yet as sev_(es_)init_vmcb() (where the most init happens) is called not only when VCPU is initialised but also on intrahost migration when VMSA is encrypted. Eliminate DR7 intercepts as KVM can't modify guest DR7, and intercepting DR7 would completely defeat the purpose of enabling DebugSwap. Make X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP appear in /proc/cpuinfo (by not adding "") to let the operator know if the VM can debug. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615063757.3039121-7-aik@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-04-04KVM: SVM: Remove a duplicate definition of VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASKXinghui Li1-1/+0
VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK is defined twice with the same value in svm.h, which is meaningless. Delete the duplicate one. Fixes: 391503528257 ("KVM: x86: SVM: move avic definitions from AMD's spec to svm.h") Signed-off-by: Xinghui Li <korantli@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230403095200.1391782-1-korantwork@gmail.com [sean: tweak shortlog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-03-23KVM: SVM: Add definitions for new bits in VMCB::int_ctrl related to vNMISantosh Shukla1-0/+9
Add defines for three new bits in VMVC::int_ctrl that are part of SVM's Virtual NMI (vNMI) support: V_NMI_PENDING_MASK(11) - Virtual NMI is pending V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK(12) - Virtual NMI is masked V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK(26) - Enable NMI virtualization To "inject" an NMI, the hypervisor (KVM) sets V_NMI_PENDING. When the CPU services the pending vNMI, hardware clears V_NMI_PENDING and sets V_NMI_BLOCKING, e.g. to indicate that the vCPU is handling an NMI. Hardware clears V_NMI_BLOCKING upon successful execution of IRET, or if a VM-Exit occurs while delivering the virtual NMI. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230227084016.3368-10-santosh.shukla@amd.com [sean: massage changelog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-03-14KVM: SVM: Fix a benign off-by-one bug in AVIC physical table maskSean Christopherson1-5/+7
Define the "physical table max index mask" as bits 8:0, not 9:0. x2AVIC currently supports a max of 512 entries, i.e. the max index is 511, and the inputs to GENMASK_ULL() are inclusive. The bug is benign as bit 9 is reserved and never set by KVM, i.e. KVM is just clearing bits that are guaranteed to be zero. Note, as of this writing, APM "Rev. 3.39-October 2022" incorrectly states that bits 11:8 are reserved in Table B-1. VMCB Layout, Control Area. I.e. that table wasn't updated when x2AVIC support was added. Opportunistically fix the comment for the max AVIC ID to align with the code, and clean up comment formatting too. Fixes: 4d1d7942e36a ("KVM: SVM: Introduce logic to (de)activate x2AVIC mode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Tested-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Message-Id: <20230207002156.521736-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-18x86/hyperv: KVM: Rename "hv_enlightenments" to "hv_vmcb_enlightenments"Sean Christopherson1-1/+1
Now that KVM isn't littered with "struct hv_enlightenments" casts, rename the struct to "hv_vmcb_enlightenments" to highlight the fact that the struct is specifically for SVM's VMCB. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-5-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-18KVM: SVM: Add a proper field for Hyper-V VMCB enlightenmentsSean Christopherson1-1/+6
Add a union to provide hv_enlightenments side-by-side with the sw_reserved bytes that Hyper-V's enlightenments overlay. Casting sw_reserved everywhere is messy, confusing, and unnecessarily unsafe. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-4-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: SVM: Name and check reserved fields with structs offsetCarlos Bilbao1-28/+65
Rename reserved fields on all structs in arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h following their offset within the structs. Include compile time checks for this in the same place where other BUILD_BUG_ON for the structs are. This also solves that fields of struct sev_es_save_area are named by their order of appearance, but right now they jump from reserved_5 to reserved_7. Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/10/22/376 Signed-off-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com> Message-Id: <20221024164448.203351-1-carlos.bilbao@amd.com> [Use ASSERT_STRUCT_OFFSET + fix a couple wrong offsets. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-06-24KVM: SVM: Introduce logic to (de)activate x2AVIC modeSuravee Suthikulpanit1-0/+1
Introduce logic to (de)activate AVIC, which also allows switching between AVIC to x2AVIC mode at runtime. When an AVIC-enabled guest switches from APIC to x2APIC mode, the SVM driver needs to perform the following steps: 1. Set the x2APIC mode bit for AVIC in VMCB along with the maximum APIC ID support for each mode accodingly. 2. Disable x2APIC MSRs interception in order to allow the hardware to virtualize x2APIC MSRs accesses. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Message-Id: <20220519102709.24125-12-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-06-24KVM: SVM: Update max number of vCPUs supported for x2AVIC modeSuravee Suthikulpanit1-3/+9
xAVIC and x2AVIC modes can support diffferent number of vcpus. Update existing logics to support each mode accordingly. Also, modify the maximum physical APIC ID for AVIC to 255 to reflect the actual value supported by the architecture. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Message-Id: <20220519102709.24125-5-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-06-24KVM: SVM: Detect X2APIC virtualization (x2AVIC) supportSuravee Suthikulpanit1-0/+3
Add CPUID check for the x2APIC virtualization (x2AVIC) feature. If available, the SVM driver can support both AVIC and x2AVIC modes when load the kvm_amd driver with avic=1. The operating mode will be determined at runtime depending on the guest APIC mode. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Message-Id: <20220519102709.24125-4-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-05-24Merge tag 'locking-core-2022-05-23' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-4/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull locking updates from Ingo Molnar: - rwsem cleanups & optimizations/fixes: - Conditionally wake waiters in reader/writer slowpaths - Always try to wake waiters in out_nolock path - Add try_cmpxchg64() implementation, with arch optimizations - and use it to micro-optimize sched_clock_{local,remote}() - Various force-inlining fixes to address objdump instrumentation-check warnings - Add lock contention tracepoints: lock:contention_begin lock:contention_end - Misc smaller fixes & cleanups * tag 'locking-core-2022-05-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: sched/clock: Use try_cmpxchg64 in sched_clock_{local,remote} locking/atomic/x86: Introduce arch_try_cmpxchg64 locking/atomic: Add generic try_cmpxchg64 support futex: Remove a PREEMPT_RT_FULL reference. locking/qrwlock: Change "queue rwlock" to "queued rwlock" lockdep: Delete local_irq_enable_in_hardirq() locking/mutex: Make contention tracepoints more consistent wrt adaptive spinning locking: Apply contention tracepoints in the slow path locking: Add lock contention tracepoints locking/rwsem: Always try to wake waiters in out_nolock path locking/rwsem: Conditionally wake waiters in reader/writer slowpaths locking/rwsem: No need to check for handoff bit if wait queue empty lockdep: Fix -Wunused-parameter for _THIS_IP_ x86/mm: Force-inline __phys_addr_nodebug() x86/kvm/svm: Force-inline GHCB accessors task_stack, x86/cea: Force-inline stack helpers
2022-04-06KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mappingTom Lendacky1-16/+50
This is the final step in defining the multiple save areas to keep them separate and ensuring proper operation amongst the different types of guests. Update the SEV-ES/SEV-SNP save area to match the APM. This save area will be used for the upcoming SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event support. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-5-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-04-06KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save areaTom Lendacky1-3/+45
The initial implementation of the GHCB spec was based on trying to keep the register state offsets the same relative to the VM save area. However, the save area for SEV-ES has changed within the hardware causing the relation between the SEV-ES save area to change relative to the GHCB save area. This is the second step in defining the multiple save areas to keep them separate and ensuring proper operation amongst the different types of guests. Create a GHCB save area that matches the GHCB specification. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-4-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-04-06KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save areaTom Lendacky1-20/+67
The save area for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guests, as used by the hardware, is different from the save area of a non SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guest. This is the first step in defining the multiple save areas to keep them separate and ensuring proper operation amongst the different types of guests. Create an SEV-ES/SEV-SNP save area and adjust usage to the new save area definition where needed. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405182743.308853-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-04-05KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and VMPL field in the VMSABrijesh Singh1-2/+4
The hypervisor uses the sev_features field (offset 3B0h) in the Save State Area to control the SEV-SNP guest features such as SNPActive, vTOM, ReflectVC etc. An SEV-SNP guest can read the sev_features field through the SEV_STATUS MSR. While at it, update dump_vmcb() to log the VMPL level. See APM2 Table 15-34 and B-4 for more details. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-04-04x86/kvm/svm: Force-inline GHCB accessorsBorislav Petkov1-4/+4
In order to fix: vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __sev_es_nmi_complete()+0x4c: call to ghcb_set_sw_exit_code() leaves .noinstr.text section Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220324183607.31717-3-bp@alien8.de
2022-04-02KVM: x86: SVM: move tsc ratio definitions to svm.hMaxim Levitsky1-0/+6
Another piece of SVM spec which should be in the header file Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220322172449.235575-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-04-02KVM: x86: SVM: fix avic spec based definitions againMaxim Levitsky1-3/+5
Due to wrong rebase, commit 4a204f7895878 ("KVM: SVM: Allow AVIC support on system w/ physical APIC ID > 255") moved avic spec #defines back to avic.c. Move them back, and while at it extend AVIC_DOORBELL_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK to 12 bits as well (it will be used in nested avic) Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220322172449.235575-5-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-03-08KVM: SVM: Allow AVIC support on system w/ physical APIC ID > 255Suravee Suthikulpanit1-1/+1
Expand KVM's mask for the AVIC host physical ID to the full 12 bits defined by the architecture. The number of bits consumed by hardware is model specific, e.g. early CPUs ignored bits 11:8, but there is no way for KVM to enumerate the "true" size. So, KVM must allow using all bits, else it risks rejecting completely legal x2APIC IDs on newer CPUs. This means KVM relies on hardware to not assign x2APIC IDs that exceed the "true" width of the field, but presumably hardware is smart enough to tie the width to the max x2APIC ID. KVM also relies on hardware to support at least 8 bits, as the legacy xAPIC ID is writable by software. But, those assumptions are unavoidable due to the lack of any way to enumerate the "true" width. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Fixes: 44a95dae1d22 ("KVM: x86: Detect and Initialize AVIC support") Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Message-Id: <20220211000851.185799-1-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-02-08KVM: x86: SVM: move avic definitions from AMD's spec to svm.hMaxim Levitsky1-0/+36
asm/svm.h is the correct place for all values that are defined in the SVM spec, and that includes AVIC. Also add some values from the spec that were not defined before and will be soon useful. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220207155447.840194-10-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-08-16KVM: nSVM: avoid picking up unsupported bits from L2 in int_ctl (CVE-2021-3653)Maxim Levitsky1-0/+2
* Invert the mask of bits that we pick from L2 in nested_vmcb02_prepare_control * Invert and explicitly use VIRQ related bits bitmask in svm_clear_vintr This fixes a security issue that allowed a malicious L1 to run L2 with AVIC enabled, which allowed the L2 to exploit the uninitialized and enabled AVIC to read/write the host physical memory at some offsets. Fixes: 3d6368ef580a ("KVM: SVM: Add VMRUN handler") Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17KVM: SVM: Software reserved fieldsVineeth Pillai1-2/+7
SVM added support for certain reserved fields to be used by software or hypervisor. Add the following reserved fields: - VMCB offset 0x3e0 - 0x3ff - Clean bit 31 - SVM intercept exit code 0xf0000000 Later patches will make use of this for supporting Hyper-V nested virtualization enhancements. Signed-off-by: Vineeth Pillai <viremana@linux.microsoft.com> Message-Id: <a1f17a43a8e9e751a1a9cc0281649d71bdbf721b.1622730232.git.viremana@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-03-15KVM: SVM: Add support for Virtual SPEC_CTRLBabu Moger1-1/+3
Newer AMD processors have a feature to virtualize the use of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. Presence of this feature is indicated via CPUID function 0x8000000A_EDX[20]: GuestSpecCtrl. Hypervisors are not required to enable this feature since it is automatically enabled on processors that support it. A hypervisor may wish to impose speculation controls on guest execution or a guest may want to impose its own speculation controls. Therefore, the processor implements both host and guest versions of SPEC_CTRL. When in host mode, the host SPEC_CTRL value is in effect and writes update only the host version of SPEC_CTRL. On a VMRUN, the processor loads the guest version of SPEC_CTRL from the VMCB. When the guest writes SPEC_CTRL, only the guest version is updated. On a VMEXIT, the guest version is saved into the VMCB and the processor returns to only using the host SPEC_CTRL for speculation control. The guest SPEC_CTRL is located at offset 0x2E0 in the VMCB. The effective SPEC_CTRL setting is the guest SPEC_CTRL setting or'ed with the hypervisor SPEC_CTRL setting. This allows the hypervisor to ensure a minimum SPEC_CTRL if desired. This support also fixes an issue where a guest may sometimes see an inconsistent value for the SPEC_CTRL MSR on processors that support this feature. With the current SPEC_CTRL support, the first write to SPEC_CTRL is intercepted and the virtualized version of the SPEC_CTRL MSR is not updated. When the guest reads back the SPEC_CTRL MSR, it will be 0x0, instead of the actual expected value. There isn’t a security concern here, because the host SPEC_CTRL value is or’ed with the Guest SPEC_CTRL value to generate the effective SPEC_CTRL value. KVM writes with the guest's virtualized SPEC_CTRL value to SPEC_CTRL MSR just before the VMRUN, so it will always have the actual value even though it doesn’t appear that way in the guest. The guest will only see the proper value for the SPEC_CTRL register if the guest was to write to the SPEC_CTRL register again. With Virtual SPEC_CTRL support, the save area spec_ctrl is properly saved and restored. So, the guest will always see the proper value when it is read back. Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Message-Id: <161188100955.28787.11816849358413330720.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU loadingTom Lendacky1-3/+7
An SEV-ES vCPU requires additional VMCB vCPU load/put requirements. SEV-ES hardware will restore certain registers on VMEXIT, but not save them on VMRUN (see Table B-3 and Table B-4 of the AMD64 APM Volume 2), so make the following changes: General vCPU load changes: - During vCPU loading, perform a VMSAVE to the per-CPU SVM save area and save the current values of XCR0, XSS and PKRU to the per-CPU SVM save area as these registers will be restored on VMEXIT. General vCPU put changes: - Do not attempt to restore registers that SEV-ES hardware has already restored on VMEXIT. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <019390e9cb5e93cd73014fa5a040c17d42588733.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loadingTom Lendacky1-1/+14
An SEV-ES vCPU requires additional VMCB initialization requirements for vCPU creation and vCPU load/put requirements. This includes: General VMCB initialization changes: - Set a VMCB control bit to enable SEV-ES support on the vCPU. - Set the VMCB encrypted VM save area address. - CRx registers are part of the encrypted register state and cannot be updated. Remove the CRx register read and write intercepts and replace them with CRx register write traps to track the CRx register values. - Certain MSR values are part of the encrypted register state and cannot be updated. Remove certain MSR intercepts (EFER, CR_PAT, etc.). - Remove the #GP intercept (no support for "enable_vmware_backdoor"). - Remove the XSETBV intercept since the hypervisor cannot modify XCR0. General vCPU creation changes: - Set the initial GHCB gpa value as per the GHCB specification. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <3a8aef366416eddd5556dfa3fdc212aafa1ad0a2.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXITTom Lendacky1-1/+1
SEV-ES adds a new VMEXIT reason code, VMGEXIT. Initial support for a VMGEXIT includes mapping the GHCB based on the guest GPA, which is obtained from a new VMCB field, and then validating the required inputs for the VMGEXIT exit reason. Since many of the VMGEXIT exit reasons correspond to existing VMEXIT reasons, the information from the GHCB is copied into the VMCB control exit code areas and KVM register areas. The standard exit handlers are invoked, similar to standard VMEXIT processing. Before restarting the vCPU, the GHCB is updated with any registers that have been updated by the hypervisor. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <c6a4ed4294a369bd75c44d03bd7ce0f0c3840e50.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15KVM: SVM: Add required changes to support intercepts under SEV-ESTom Lendacky1-1/+2
When a guest is running under SEV-ES, the hypervisor cannot access the guest register state. There are numerous places in the KVM code where certain registers are accessed that are not allowed to be accessed (e.g. RIP, CR0, etc). Add checks to prevent register accesses and add intercept update support at various points within the KVM code. Also, when handling a VMGEXIT, exceptions are passed back through the GHCB. Since the RDMSR/WRMSR intercepts (may) inject a #GP on error, update the SVM intercepts to handle this for SEV-ES guests. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> [Redo MSR part using the .complete_emulated_msr callback. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-14KVM: SVM: Add GHCB accessor functions for retrieving fieldsTom Lendacky1-0/+10
Update the GHCB accessor functions to add functions for retrieve GHCB fields by name. Update existing code to use the new accessor functions. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <664172c53a5fb4959914e1a45d88e805649af0ad.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-09-28KVM: SVM: Add new intercept word in vmcb_control_areaBabu Moger1-0/+7
The new intercept bits have been added in vmcb control area to support few more interceptions. Here are the some of them. - INTERCEPT_INVLPGB, - INTERCEPT_INVLPGB_ILLEGAL, - INTERCEPT_INVPCID, - INTERCEPT_MCOMMIT, - INTERCEPT_TLBSYNC, Add a new intercept word in vmcb_control_area to support these instructions. Also update kvm_nested_vmrun trace function to support the new addition. AMD documentation for these instructions is available at "AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual Volume 2: System Programming, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.34(or later)" The documentation can be obtained at the links below: Link: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537 Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Message-Id: <159985251547.11252.16994139329949066945.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-09-28KVM: SVM: Modify 64 bit intercept field to two 32 bit vectorsBabu Moger1-7/+7
Convert all the intercepts to one array of 32 bit vectors in vmcb_control_area. This makes it easy for future intercept vector additions. Also update trace functions. Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Message-Id: <159985250813.11252.5736581193881040525.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-09-28KVM: SVM: Modify intercept_exceptions to generic interceptsBabu Moger1-1/+4
Modify intercept_exceptions to generic intercepts in vmcb_control_area. Use the generic vmcb_set_intercept, vmcb_clr_intercept and vmcb_is_intercept to set/clear/test the intercept_exceptions bits. Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Message-Id: <159985250037.11252.1361972528657052410.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-09-28KVM: SVM: Change intercept_dr to generic interceptsBabu Moger1-18/+18
Modify intercept_dr to generic intercepts in vmcb_control_area. Use the generic vmcb_set_intercept, vmcb_clr_intercept and vmcb_is_intercept to set/clear/test the intercept_dr bits. Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Message-Id: <159985249255.11252.10000868032136333355.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-09-28KVM: SVM: Change intercept_cr to generic interceptsBabu Moger1-10/+13
Change intercept_cr to generic intercepts in vmcb_control_area. Use the new vmcb_set_intercept, vmcb_clr_intercept and vmcb_is_intercept where applicable. Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Message-Id: <159985248506.11252.9081085950784508671.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu> [Change constant names. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-09-28KVM: SVM: Introduce vmcb_(set_intercept/clr_intercept/_is_intercept)Babu Moger1-0/+9
This is in preparation for the future intercept vector additions. Add new functions vmcb_set_intercept, vmcb_clr_intercept and vmcb_is_intercept using kernel APIs __set_bit, __clear_bit and test_bit espectively. Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Message-Id: <159985247876.11252.16039238014239824460.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-09-07KVM: SVM: Use __packed shorthandBorislav Petkov1-6/+6
Use the shorthand to make it more readable. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-5-joro@8bytes.org
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