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-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c819
1 files changed, 804 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index 6788762188fe..fa0f18ec62c4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
+/* Defines AT_EXECVE_CHECK without type conflicts. */
+#define _ASM_GENERIC_FCNTL_H
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+
+#include "audit.h"
#include "common.h"
#ifndef renameat2
@@ -55,11 +60,17 @@ int open_tree(int dfd, const char *filename, unsigned int flags)
}
#endif
+static int sys_execveat(int dirfd, const char *pathname, char *const argv[],
+ char *const envp[], int flags)
+{
+ return syscall(__NR_execveat, dirfd, pathname, argv, envp, flags);
+}
+
#ifndef RENAME_EXCHANGE
#define RENAME_EXCHANGE (1 << 1)
#endif
-#define BINARY_PATH "./true"
+static const char bin_true[] = "./true";
/* Paths (sibling number and depth) */
static const char dir_s1d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s1d1";
@@ -85,6 +96,9 @@ static const char file1_s3d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/f1";
/* dir_s3d2 is a mount point. */
static const char dir_s3d2[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2";
static const char dir_s3d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3";
+static const char file1_s3d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3/f1";
+static const char dir_s3d4[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d4";
+static const char file1_s3d4[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d4/f1";
/*
* layout1 hierarchy:
@@ -108,8 +122,11 @@ static const char dir_s3d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3";
* │   └── f2
* └── s3d1
*    ├── f1
- * └── s3d2
- * └── s3d3
+ * └── s3d2 [mount point]
+ *    ├── s3d3
+ *    │ └── f1
+ *    └── s3d4
+ *    └── f1
*/
static bool fgrep(FILE *const inf, const char *const str)
@@ -358,7 +375,8 @@ static void create_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
ASSERT_EQ(0, mount_opt(&mnt_tmp, dir_s3d2));
clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(dir_s3d3, 0700));
+ create_file(_metadata, file1_s3d3);
+ create_file(_metadata, file1_s3d4);
}
static void remove_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
@@ -378,7 +396,8 @@ static void remove_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(dir_s2d2));
EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s3d1));
- EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(dir_s3d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s3d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s3d4));
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
umount(dir_s3d2);
clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
@@ -1813,6 +1832,46 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, release_inodes)
ASSERT_EQ(ENOENT, test_open(dir_s3d3, O_RDONLY));
}
+/*
+ * This test checks that a rule on a directory used as a mount point does not
+ * grant access to the mount covering it. It is a generalization of the bind
+ * mount case in layout3_fs.hostfs.release_inodes that tests hidden mount points.
+ */
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, covered_rule)
+{
+ const struct rule layer1[] = {
+ {
+ .path = dir_s3d2,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd;
+
+ /* Unmount to simplify FIXTURE_TEARDOWN. */
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, umount(dir_s3d2));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+
+ /* Creates a ruleset with the future hidden directory. */
+ ruleset_fd =
+ create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, layer1);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Covers with a new mount point. */
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mount_opt(&mnt_tmp, dir_s3d2));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s3d2, O_RDONLY));
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ /* Checks that access to the new mount point is denied. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s3d2, O_RDONLY));
+}
+
enum relative_access {
REL_OPEN,
REL_CHDIR,
@@ -1957,8 +2016,8 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, relative_chroot_chdir)
test_relative_path(_metadata, REL_CHROOT_CHDIR);
}
-static void copy_binary(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
- const char *const dst_path)
+static void copy_file(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ const char *const src_path, const char *const dst_path)
{
int dst_fd, src_fd;
struct stat statbuf;
@@ -1968,11 +2027,10 @@ static void copy_binary(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
{
TH_LOG("Failed to open \"%s\": %s", dst_path, strerror(errno));
}
- src_fd = open(BINARY_PATH, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ src_fd = open(src_path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
ASSERT_LE(0, src_fd)
{
- TH_LOG("Failed to open \"" BINARY_PATH "\": %s",
- strerror(errno));
+ TH_LOG("Failed to open \"%s\": %s", src_path, strerror(errno));
}
ASSERT_EQ(0, fstat(src_fd, &statbuf));
ASSERT_EQ(statbuf.st_size,
@@ -2003,11 +2061,26 @@ static void test_execute(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, const int err,
ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
ASSERT_EQ(err ? 2 : 0, WEXITSTATUS(status))
{
- TH_LOG("Unexpected return code for \"%s\": %s", path,
- strerror(errno));
+ TH_LOG("Unexpected return code for \"%s\"", path);
};
}
+static void test_check_exec(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ const int err, const char *const path)
+{
+ int ret;
+ char *const argv[] = { (char *)path, NULL };
+
+ ret = sys_execveat(AT_FDCWD, path, argv, NULL,
+ AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_EXECVE_CHECK);
+ if (err) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, err);
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+}
+
TEST_F_FORK(layout1, execute)
{
const struct rule rules[] = {
@@ -2021,9 +2094,13 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, execute)
create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- copy_binary(_metadata, file1_s1d1);
- copy_binary(_metadata, file1_s1d2);
- copy_binary(_metadata, file1_s1d3);
+ copy_file(_metadata, bin_true, file1_s1d1);
+ copy_file(_metadata, bin_true, file1_s1d2);
+ copy_file(_metadata, bin_true, file1_s1d3);
+
+ /* Checks before file1_s1d1 being denied. */
+ test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
+ test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
@@ -2031,14 +2108,94 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, execute)
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
test_execute(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1);
+ test_check_exec(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1);
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d2);
+ test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d2);
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY));
test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d3);
+ test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d3);
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, umount_sandboxer)
+{
+ int pipe_child[2], pipe_parent[2];
+ char buf_parent;
+ pid_t child;
+ int status;
+
+ copy_file(_metadata, bin_sandbox_and_launch, file1_s3d3);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_child, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_parent, 0));
+
+ child = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+ if (child == 0) {
+ char pipe_child_str[12], pipe_parent_str[12];
+ char *const argv[] = { (char *)file1_s3d3,
+ (char *)bin_wait_pipe, pipe_child_str,
+ pipe_parent_str, NULL };
+
+ /* Passes the pipe FDs to the executed binary and its child. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[0]));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[1]));
+ snprintf(pipe_child_str, sizeof(pipe_child_str), "%d",
+ pipe_child[1]);
+ snprintf(pipe_parent_str, sizeof(pipe_parent_str), "%d",
+ pipe_parent[0]);
+
+ /*
+ * We need bin_sandbox_and_launch (copied inside the mount as
+ * file1_s3d3) to execute bin_wait_pipe (outside the mount) to
+ * make sure the mount point will not be EBUSY because of
+ * file1_s3d3 being in use. This avoids a potential race
+ * condition between the following read() and umount() calls.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, execve(argv[0], argv, NULL))
+ {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to execute \"%s\": %s", argv[0],
+ strerror(errno));
+ };
+ _exit(1);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[1]));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[0]));
+
+ /* Waits for the child to sandbox itself. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buf_parent, 1));
+
+ /* Tests that the sandboxer is tied to its mount point. */
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, umount(dir_s3d2));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EBUSY, errno);
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+
+ /* Signals the child to launch a grandchild. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
+
+ /* Waits for the grandchild. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buf_parent, 1));
+
+ /* Tests that the domain's sandboxer is not tied to its mount point. */
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, umount(dir_s3d2))
+ {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to umount \"%s\": %s", dir_s3d2,
+ strerror(errno));
+ };
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+
+ /* Signals the grandchild to terminate. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
+ ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
TEST_F_FORK(layout1, link)
@@ -2444,6 +2601,44 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, refer_mount_root_deny)
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(root_fd));
}
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, refer_part_mount_tree_is_allowed)
+{
+ const struct rule layer1[] = {
+ {
+ /* Parent mount point. */
+ .path = dir_s3d1,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG,
+ },
+ {
+ /*
+ * Removing the source file is allowed because its
+ * access rights are already a superset of the
+ * destination.
+ */
+ .path = dir_s3d4,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s3d3));
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE,
+ layer1);
+
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, rename(file1_s3d4, file1_s3d3));
+}
+
TEST_F_FORK(layout1, reparent_link)
{
const struct rule layer1[] = {
@@ -5400,4 +5595,598 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout3_fs, release_inodes)
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(TMP_DIR, O_RDONLY));
}
+static int matches_log_fs_extra(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ int audit_fd, const char *const blockers,
+ const char *const path, const char *const extra)
+{
+ static const char log_template[] = REGEX_LANDLOCK_PREFIX
+ " blockers=fs\\.%s path=\"%s\" dev=\"[^\"]\\+\" ino=[0-9]\\+$";
+ char *absolute_path = NULL;
+ size_t log_match_remaining = sizeof(log_template) + strlen(blockers) +
+ PATH_MAX * 2 +
+ (extra ? strlen(extra) : 0) + 1;
+ char log_match[log_match_remaining];
+ char *log_match_cursor = log_match;
+ size_t chunk_len;
+
+ chunk_len = snprintf(log_match_cursor, log_match_remaining,
+ REGEX_LANDLOCK_PREFIX " blockers=%s path=\"",
+ blockers);
+ if (chunk_len < 0 || chunk_len >= log_match_remaining)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ /*
+ * It is assume that absolute_path does not contain control characters nor
+ * spaces, see audit_string_contains_control().
+ */
+ absolute_path = realpath(path, NULL);
+ if (!absolute_path)
+ return -errno;
+
+ log_match_remaining -= chunk_len;
+ log_match_cursor += chunk_len;
+ log_match_cursor = regex_escape(absolute_path, log_match_cursor,
+ log_match_remaining);
+ free(absolute_path);
+ if (log_match_cursor < 0)
+ return (long long)log_match_cursor;
+
+ log_match_remaining -= log_match_cursor - log_match;
+ chunk_len = snprintf(log_match_cursor, log_match_remaining,
+ "\" dev=\"[^\"]\\+\" ino=[0-9]\\+%s$",
+ extra ?: "");
+ if (chunk_len < 0 || chunk_len >= log_match_remaining)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ return audit_match_record(audit_fd, AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS, log_match,
+ NULL);
+}
+
+static int matches_log_fs(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, int audit_fd,
+ const char *const blockers, const char *const path)
+{
+ return matches_log_fs_extra(_metadata, audit_fd, blockers, path, NULL);
+}
+
+FIXTURE(audit_layout1)
+{
+ struct audit_filter audit_filter;
+ int audit_fd;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(audit_layout1)
+{
+ prepare_layout(_metadata);
+
+ create_layout1(_metadata);
+
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+ self->audit_fd = audit_init_with_exe_filter(&self->audit_filter);
+ EXPECT_LE(0, self->audit_fd);
+ disable_caps(_metadata);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN_PARENT(audit_layout1)
+{
+ remove_layout1(_metadata);
+
+ cleanup_layout(_metadata);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_cleanup(-1, NULL));
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_make)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ copy_file(_metadata, bin_true, file1_s1d1);
+ test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
+ test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata,
+ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+ });
+
+ test_execute(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.execute",
+ file1_s1d1));
+ test_check_exec(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.execute",
+ file1_s1d1));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Using a set of handled/denied access rights make it possible to check that
+ * only the blocked ones are logged.
+ */
+
+/* clang-format off */
+static const __u64 access_fs_16 =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+/* clang-format on */
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_read)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ copy_file(_metadata, bin_true, file1_s1d1);
+ test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
+ test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ /*
+ * The only difference with the previous audit_layout1.execute_read test is
+ * the extra ",fs\\.read_file" blocked by the executable file.
+ */
+ test_execute(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.execute,fs\\.read_file", file1_s1d1));
+ test_check_exec(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.execute,fs\\.read_file", file1_s1d1));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, write_file)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.write_file", file1_s1d1));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, read_file)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.read_file",
+ file1_s1d1));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, read_dir)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_DIRECTORY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.read_dir",
+ dir_s1d1));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, remove_dir)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, rmdir(dir_s1d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_dir", dir_s1d2));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, unlinkat(AT_FDCWD, dir_s1d3, AT_REMOVEDIR));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_dir", dir_s1d2));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, remove_file)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_file", dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_char)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFCHR | 0644, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.make_char",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_dir)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mkdir(file1_s1d3, 0755));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.make_dir",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_reg)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFREG | 0644, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.make_reg",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_sock)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFSOCK | 0644, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.make_sock",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_fifo)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFIFO | 0644, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.make_fifo",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_block)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFBLK | 0644, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.make_block", dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_sym)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, symlink("target", file1_s1d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.make_sym",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_handled)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, link(file1_s1d1, file1_s1d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EXDEV, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s1d1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0,
+ matches_log_domain_allocated(self->audit_fd, getpid(), NULL));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_make)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata,
+ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, link(file1_s1d1, file1_s1d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s1d1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.make_reg,fs\\.refer", dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_rename)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_rename(file1_s1d2, file1_s2d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_file,fs\\.refer", dir_s1d2));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_file,fs\\.make_reg,fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s2d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_exchange)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ /*
+ * The only difference with the previous audit_layout1.refer_rename test is
+ * the extra ",fs\\.make_reg" blocked by the source directory.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_exchange(file1_s1d2, file1_s2d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_file,fs\\.make_reg,fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s1d2));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_file,fs\\.make_reg,fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s2d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This test checks that the audit record is correctly generated when the
+ * operation is only partially denied. This is the case for rename(2) when the
+ * source file is allowed to be referenced but the destination directory is not.
+ *
+ * This is also a regression test for commit d617f0d72d80 ("landlock: Optimize
+ * file path walks and prepare for audit support") and commit 058518c20920
+ * ("landlock: Align partial refer access checks with final ones").
+ */
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_rename_half)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+ const struct rule layer1[] = {
+ {
+ .path = dir_s2d2,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd =
+ create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, layer1);
+
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(dir_s1d2, dir_s2d3));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno);
+
+ /* Only half of the request is denied. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s1d1));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, truncate)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, truncate(file1_s1d3, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.truncate",
+ file1_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, ioctl_dev)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+ int fd;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata,
+ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs =
+ access_fs_16 &
+ ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
+ });
+
+ fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FIONREAD));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs_extra(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.ioctl_dev", "/dev/null",
+ " ioctlcmd=0x541b"));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, mount)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata,
+ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+ });
+
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mount(NULL, dir_s3d2, NULL, MS_RDONLY, NULL));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.change_topology", dir_s3d2));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN