diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
32 files changed, 1336 insertions, 848 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 53a0070ff5df..38650e52ef57 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size, /* high level check about policy management - fine grained in * below after unpack */ - error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, mask); + error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, ns, mask); if (error) goto end_section; @@ -486,7 +486,8 @@ static ssize_t profile_remove(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, /* high level check about policy management - fine grained in * below after unpack */ - error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY); + error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, ns, + AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY); if (error) goto out; @@ -618,23 +619,23 @@ static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, if (profile_unconfined(profile)) return; - if (rules->file.dfa && *match_str == AA_CLASS_FILE) { - state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, - rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE], + if (rules->file->dfa && *match_str == AA_CLASS_FILE) { + state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file->dfa, + rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE], match_str + 1, match_len - 1); if (state) { struct path_cond cond = { }; - tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond)); + tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(rules->file, state, &cond)); } - } else if (rules->policy.dfa) { + } else if (rules->policy->dfa) { if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, *match_str)) return; /* no change to current perms */ - state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, - rules->policy.start[0], + state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, + rules->policy->start[0], match_str, match_len); if (state) - tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state); + tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); } aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); aa_perms_accum_raw(perms, &tmp); @@ -1095,7 +1096,7 @@ static int seq_profile_attach_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label); if (profile->attach.xmatch_str) seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->attach.xmatch_str); - else if (profile->attach.xmatch.dfa) + else if (profile->attach.xmatch->dfa) seq_puts(seq, "<unknown>\n"); else seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->base.name); @@ -1314,7 +1315,6 @@ SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(compressed_size); static int decompress_zstd(char *src, size_t slen, char *dst, size_t dlen) { -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY if (slen < dlen) { const size_t wksp_len = zstd_dctx_workspace_bound(); zstd_dctx *ctx; @@ -1341,7 +1341,6 @@ cleanup: kvfree(wksp); return ret; } -#endif if (dlen < slen) return -EINVAL; @@ -1806,7 +1805,8 @@ static int ns_mkdir_op(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, int error; label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY); + error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, NULL, + AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY); end_current_label_crit_section(label); if (error) return error; @@ -1855,7 +1855,8 @@ static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) int error; label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY); + error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, NULL, + AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY); end_current_label_crit_section(label); if (error) return error; @@ -2339,10 +2340,16 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("post_nnp_subset", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("computed_longest_left", 1), AA_SFS_DIR("attach_conditions", aa_sfs_entry_attach), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("disconnected.path", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("version", "1.2"), { } }; +static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_unconfined[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile", 1), + { } +}; + static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v5", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v6", 1), @@ -2352,11 +2359,15 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = { { } }; +#define PERMS32STR "allow deny subtree cond kill complain prompt audit quiet hide xindex tag label" static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_policy[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("versions", aa_sfs_entry_versions), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load", 1), /* number of out of band transitions supported */ AA_SFS_FILE_U64("outofband", MAX_OOB_SUPPORTED), + AA_SFS_FILE_U64("permstable32_version", 1), + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("permstable32", PERMS32STR), + AA_SFS_DIR("unconfined_restrictions", aa_sfs_entry_unconfined), { } }; @@ -2368,6 +2379,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_mount[] = { static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_ns[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root", 0), + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "userns_create"), { } }; @@ -2382,6 +2394,12 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_query[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("label", aa_sfs_entry_query_label), { } }; + +static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_io_uring[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "sqpoll override_creds"), + { } +}; + static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("policy", aa_sfs_entry_policy), AA_SFS_DIR("domain", aa_sfs_entry_domain), @@ -2395,6 +2413,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("ptrace", aa_sfs_entry_ptrace), AA_SFS_DIR("signal", aa_sfs_entry_signal), AA_SFS_DIR("query", aa_sfs_entry_query), + AA_SFS_DIR("io_uring", aa_sfs_entry_io_uring), { } }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 5a7978aa4b19..45beb1c5f747 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ static const char *const aa_class_names[] = { "io_uring", "module", "lsm", - "unknown", - "unknown", + "namespace", + "io_uring", "unknown", "unknown", "unknown", @@ -85,37 +85,36 @@ static const char *const aa_class_names[] = { /** * audit_pre() - core AppArmor function. * @ab: audit buffer to fill (NOT NULL) - * @ca: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL) + * @va: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL) * - * Record common AppArmor audit data from @sa + * Record common AppArmor audit data from @va */ -static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) +static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { - struct common_audit_data *sa = ca; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va); if (aa_g_audit_header) { audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=\"%s\"", - aa_audit_type[aad(sa)->type]); + aa_audit_type[ad->type]); } - if (aad(sa)->op) { - audit_log_format(ab, " operation=\"%s\"", aad(sa)->op); - } + if (ad->op) + audit_log_format(ab, " operation=\"%s\"", ad->op); - if (aad(sa)->class) + if (ad->class) audit_log_format(ab, " class=\"%s\"", - aad(sa)->class <= AA_CLASS_LAST ? - aa_class_names[aad(sa)->class] : + ad->class <= AA_CLASS_LAST ? + aa_class_names[ad->class] : "unknown"); - if (aad(sa)->info) { - audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", aad(sa)->info); - if (aad(sa)->error) - audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", aad(sa)->error); + if (ad->info) { + audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", ad->info); + if (ad->error) + audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", ad->error); } - if (aad(sa)->label) { - struct aa_label *label = aad(sa)->label; + if (ad->subj_label) { + struct aa_label *label = ad->subj_label; if (label_isprofile(label)) { struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label); @@ -134,42 +133,44 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) } } - if (aad(sa)->name) { + if (ad->name) { audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->name); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->name); } } /** * aa_audit_msg - Log a message to the audit subsystem - * @sa: audit event structure (NOT NULL) + * @type: audit type for the message + * @ad: audit event structure (NOT NULL) * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) */ -void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa, +void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { - aad(sa)->type = type; - common_lsm_audit(sa, audit_pre, cb); + ad->type = type; + common_lsm_audit(&ad->common, audit_pre, cb); } /** * aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem * @type: audit type for the message * @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL) - * @sa: audit event (NOT NULL) + * @ad: audit event (NOT NULL) * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) * * Handle default message switching based off of audit mode flags * * Returns: error on failure */ -int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, +int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { AA_BUG(!profile); if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) { - if (likely(!aad(sa)->error)) { + if (likely(!ad->error)) { if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) return 0; type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; @@ -181,24 +182,24 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET || (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED && AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED)) - return aad(sa)->error; + return ad->error; if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED) type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; - aad(sa)->label = &profile->label; + ad->subj_label = &profile->label; - aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb); + aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb); - if (aad(sa)->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) + if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, - sa->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && sa->u.tsk ? - sa->u.tsk : current); + ad->common.type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && + ad->common.u.tsk ? ad->common.u.tsk : current); - if (aad(sa)->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) - return complain_error(aad(sa)->error); + if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) + return complain_error(ad->error); - return aad(sa)->error; + return ad->error; } struct aa_audit_rule { diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c index 326a51838ef2..9934df16c843 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct audit_cache, audit_cache); /** * audit_cb - call back for capability components of audit struct - * @ab - audit buffer (NOT NULL) - * @va - audit struct to audit data from (NOT NULL) + * @ab: audit buffer (NOT NULL) + * @va: audit struct to audit data from (NOT NULL) */ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) /** * audit_caps - audit a capability - * @sa: audit data + * @ad: audit data * @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL) * @cap: capability tested * @error: error code returned by test @@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) * Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching * and duplicate message elimination. * - * Returns: 0 or sa->error on success, error code on failure + * Returns: 0 or ad->error on success, error code on failure */ -static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, +static int audit_caps(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, struct audit_cache *ent; int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; - aad(sa)->error = error; + ad->error = error; if (likely(!error)) { /* test if auditing is being forced */ @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, } put_cpu_var(audit_cache); - return aa_audit(type, profile, sa, audit_cb); + return aa_audit(type, profile, ad, audit_cb); } /** @@ -109,12 +109,12 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined) * @cap: capability to test if allowed * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated - * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing) + * @ad: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing) * * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM */ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, - unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa) + unsigned int opts, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); @@ -132,14 +132,15 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, /* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it * should be optional. */ - aad(sa)->info = "optional: no audit"; + ad->info = "optional: no audit"; } - return audit_caps(sa, profile, cap, error); + return audit_caps(ad, profile, cap, error); } /** * aa_capable - test permission to use capability + * @subj_cred: cred we are testing capability against * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL) * @cap: capability to be tested * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated @@ -148,15 +149,17 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, * * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code. */ -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts) +int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct aa_profile *profile; int error = 0; - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE); + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE); - sa.u.cap = cap; + ad.subj_cred = subj_cred; + ad.common.u.cap = cap; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &sa)); + profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &ad)); return error; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index f3715cda59c5..89fbeab4b33b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ /** * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task + * @to_cred: cred of task changing domain * @to_label: profile to change to (NOT NULL) * @info: message if there is an error * @@ -39,28 +40,34 @@ * * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed */ -static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_label *to_label, +static int may_change_ptraced_domain(const struct cred *to_cred, + struct aa_label *to_label, const char **info) { struct task_struct *tracer; struct aa_label *tracerl = NULL; + const struct cred *tracer_cred = NULL; + int error = 0; rcu_read_lock(); tracer = ptrace_parent(current); - if (tracer) + if (tracer) { /* released below */ tracerl = aa_get_task_label(tracer); - + tracer_cred = get_task_cred(tracer); + } /* not ptraced */ if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerl)) goto out; - error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); + error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer_cred, tracerl, to_cred, to_label, + PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); out: rcu_read_unlock(); aa_put_label(tracerl); + put_cred(tracer_cred); if (error) *info = "ptrace prevents transition"; @@ -70,7 +77,7 @@ out: /**** TODO: dedup to aa_label_match - needs perm and dfa, merging * specifically this is an exact copy of aa_label_match except * aa_compute_perms is replaced with aa_compute_fperms - * and policy.dfa with file.dfa + * and policy->dfa with file->dfa ****/ /* match a profile and its associated ns component if needed * Assumes visibility test has already been done. @@ -86,16 +93,16 @@ static inline aa_state_t match_component(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *ns_name; if (stack) - state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, "&"); + state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, "&"); if (profile->ns == tp->ns) - return aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname); + return aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, tp->base.hname); /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */ ns_name = aa_ns_name(profile->ns, tp->ns, true); - state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, state, ":", 1); - state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, ns_name); - state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, state, ":", 1); - return aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname); + state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file->dfa, state, ":", 1); + state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, ns_name); + state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file->dfa, state, ":", 1); + return aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, tp->base.hname); } /** @@ -143,12 +150,12 @@ next: label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) { if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns)) continue; - state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, "//&"); + state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, "//&"); state = match_component(profile, tp, false, state); if (!state) goto fail; } - *perms = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond)); + *perms = *(aa_lookup_fperms(rules->file, state, &cond)); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, perms); if ((perms->allow & request) != request) return -EACCES; @@ -203,7 +210,7 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile, return 0; next: - tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond)); + tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(rules->file, state, &cond)); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp); label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) { @@ -212,7 +219,7 @@ next: state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, start); if (!state) goto fail; - tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond)); + tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(rules->file, state, &cond)); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp); } @@ -265,6 +272,7 @@ static int label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label, * @stack: whether this is a stacking request * @request: requested perms * @start: state to start matching in + * @perms: Returns computed perms (NOT NULL) * * * Returns: permission set @@ -309,7 +317,7 @@ static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, might_sleep(); /* transition from exec match to xattr set */ - state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa, state); + state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch->dfa, state); d = bprm->file->f_path.dentry; for (i = 0; i < attach->xattr_count; i++) { @@ -323,20 +331,20 @@ static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, * that not present xattr can be distinguished from a 0 * length value or rule that matches any value */ - state = aa_dfa_null_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa, + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(attach->xmatch->dfa, state); /* Check xattr value */ - state = aa_dfa_match_len(attach->xmatch.dfa, state, + state = aa_dfa_match_len(attach->xmatch->dfa, state, value, size); - index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch.dfa)[state]; - perm = attach->xmatch.perms[index].allow; + index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch->dfa)[state]; + perm = attach->xmatch->perms[index].allow; if (!(perm & MAY_EXEC)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } } /* transition to next element */ - state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa, state); + state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch->dfa, state); if (size < 0) { /* * No xattr match, so verify if transition to @@ -359,11 +367,11 @@ out: /** * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes - * @bprm - binprm structure of transitioning task + * @bprm: binprm structure of transitioning task * @ns: the current namespace (NOT NULL) - * @head - profile list to walk (NOT NULL) - * @name - to match against (NOT NULL) - * @info - info message if there was an error (NOT NULL) + * @head: profile list to walk (NOT NULL) + * @name: to match against (NOT NULL) + * @info: info message if there was an error (NOT NULL) * * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list. There is a matching * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses @@ -405,16 +413,16 @@ restart: * as another profile, signal a conflict and refuse to * match. */ - if (attach->xmatch.dfa) { + if (attach->xmatch->dfa) { unsigned int count; aa_state_t state; u32 index, perm; - state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(attach->xmatch.dfa, - attach->xmatch.start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH], + state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(attach->xmatch->dfa, + attach->xmatch->start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH], name, &count); - index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch.dfa)[state]; - perm = attach->xmatch.perms[index].allow; + index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch->dfa)[state]; + perm = attach->xmatch->perms[index].allow; /* any accepting state means a valid match. */ if (perm & MAY_EXEC) { int ret = 0; @@ -517,7 +525,7 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, /* TODO: move lookup parsing to unpack time so this is a straight * index into the resultant label */ - for (*name = rules->file.trans.table[index]; !label && *name; + for (*name = rules->file->trans.table[index]; !label && *name; *name = next_name(xtype, *name)) { if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) { struct aa_profile *new_profile; @@ -545,6 +553,7 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL) * @xindex: index into x transition table * @lookupname: returns: name used in lookup if one was specified (NOT NULL) + * @info: info message if there was an error (NOT NULL) * * find label for a transition index * @@ -570,7 +579,7 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, break; case AA_X_TABLE: /* TODO: fix when perm mapping done at unload */ - stack = rules->file.trans.table[xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK]; + stack = rules->file->trans.table[xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK]; if (*stack != '&') { /* released by caller */ new = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex, lookupname); @@ -619,7 +628,8 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, return new; } -static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, +static struct aa_label *profile_transition(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, const struct linux_binprm *bprm, char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond, bool *secure_exec) @@ -628,7 +638,7 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, typeof(*rules), list); struct aa_label *new = NULL; const char *info = NULL, *name = NULL, *target = NULL; - aa_state_t state = rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE]; + aa_state_t state = rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE]; struct aa_perms perms = {}; bool nonewprivs = false; int error = 0; @@ -662,7 +672,7 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, } /* find exec permissions for name */ - state = aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), state, name, cond, &perms); + state = aa_str_perms(rules->file, state, name, cond, &perms); if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) { /* exec permission determine how to transition */ new = x_to_label(profile, bprm, name, perms.xindex, &target, @@ -709,7 +719,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, } audit: - aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name, target, new, + aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name, + target, new, cond->uid, info, error); if (!new || nonewprivs) { aa_put_label(new); @@ -719,14 +730,15 @@ audit: return new; } -static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec, +static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec, bool stack, const struct linux_binprm *bprm, char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond, bool *secure_exec) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); - aa_state_t state = rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE]; + aa_state_t state = rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE]; struct aa_perms perms = {}; const char *xname = NULL, *info = "change_profile onexec"; int error = -EACCES; @@ -759,7 +771,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec, } /* find exec permissions for name */ - state = aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), state, xname, cond, &perms); + state = aa_str_perms(rules->file, state, xname, cond, &perms); if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) { info = "no change_onexec valid for executable"; goto audit; @@ -768,7 +780,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec, * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing * exec\0change_profile */ - state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file.dfa, state); + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file->dfa, state); error = change_profile_perms(profile, onexec, stack, AA_MAY_ONEXEC, state, &perms); if (error) { @@ -787,13 +799,15 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec, } audit: - return aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, AA_MAY_ONEXEC, xname, + return aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, + AA_MAY_ONEXEC, xname, NULL, onexec, cond->uid, info, error); } /* ensure none ns domain transitions are correctly applied with onexec */ -static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label, +static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct aa_label *onexec, bool stack, const struct linux_binprm *bprm, char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond, @@ -810,26 +824,28 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label, if (!stack) { error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, - profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack, + profile_onexec(subj_cred, profile, onexec, stack, bprm, buffer, cond, unsafe)); if (error) return ERR_PTR(error); new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL, aa_get_newest_label(onexec), - profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer, + profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm, + buffer, cond, unsafe)); } else { /* TODO: determine how much we want to loosen this */ error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, - profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack, bprm, + profile_onexec(subj_cred, profile, onexec, stack, bprm, buffer, cond, unsafe)); if (error) return ERR_PTR(error); new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL, aa_label_merge(&profile->label, onexec, GFP_KERNEL), - profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer, + profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm, + buffer, cond, unsafe)); } @@ -838,7 +854,8 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label, /* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */ error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, - aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC, + aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms, + OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC, AA_MAY_ONEXEC, bprm->filename, NULL, onexec, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, "failed to build target label", -ENOMEM)); @@ -857,6 +874,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct aa_task_ctx *ctx; struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL; + const struct cred *subj_cred; struct aa_profile *profile; char *buffer = NULL; const char *info = NULL; @@ -869,6 +887,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode }; + subj_cred = current_cred(); ctx = task_ctx(current); AA_BUG(!cred_label(bprm->cred)); AA_BUG(!ctx); @@ -895,11 +914,12 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* Test for onexec first as onexec override other x transitions. */ if (ctx->onexec) - new = handle_onexec(label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token, + new = handle_onexec(subj_cred, label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token, bprm, buffer, &cond, &unsafe); else new = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL, - profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer, + profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm, + buffer, &cond, &unsafe)); AA_BUG(!new); @@ -934,7 +954,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)) { /* TODO: test needs to be profile of label to new */ - error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new, &info); + error = may_change_ptraced_domain(bprm->cred, new, &info); if (error) goto audit; } @@ -971,7 +991,8 @@ done: audit: error = fn_for_each(label, profile, - aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, + aa_audit_file(current_cred(), profile, &nullperms, + OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, bprm->filename, NULL, new, vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid), info, error)); aa_put_label(new); @@ -987,7 +1008,8 @@ audit: * * Returns: label for hat transition OR ERR_PTR. Does NOT return NULL */ -static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, +static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name, bool sibling) { struct aa_profile *root, *hat = NULL; @@ -1019,7 +1041,8 @@ static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, aa_put_profile(root); audit: - aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, + aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT, + AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, name, hat ? hat->base.hname : NULL, hat ? &hat->label : NULL, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error); @@ -1035,7 +1058,8 @@ audit: * * Returns: label for hat transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL */ -static struct aa_label *change_hat(struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[], +static struct aa_label *change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[], int count, int flags) { struct aa_profile *profile, *root, *hat = NULL; @@ -1111,7 +1135,8 @@ fail: */ /* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */ if (count > 1 || COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { - aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT, + aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms, + OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, name, NULL, NULL, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error); } @@ -1120,7 +1145,8 @@ fail: build: new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL, - build_change_hat(profile, name, sibling), + build_change_hat(subj_cred, profile, name, + sibling), aa_get_label(&profile->label)); if (!new) { info = "label build failed"; @@ -1150,7 +1176,7 @@ build: */ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags) { - const struct cred *cred; + const struct cred *subj_cred; struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); struct aa_label *label, *previous, *new = NULL, *target = NULL; struct aa_profile *profile; @@ -1159,8 +1185,8 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags) int error = 0; /* released below */ - cred = get_current_cred(); - label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); + subj_cred = get_current_cred(); + label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(subj_cred); previous = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous); /* @@ -1180,7 +1206,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags) } if (count) { - new = change_hat(label, hats, count, flags); + new = change_hat(subj_cred, label, hats, count, flags); AA_BUG(!new); if (IS_ERR(new)) { error = PTR_ERR(new); @@ -1189,7 +1215,8 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags) goto out; } - error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new, &info); + /* target cred is the same as current except new label */ + error = may_change_ptraced_domain(subj_cred, new, &info); if (error) goto fail; @@ -1242,7 +1269,7 @@ out: aa_put_label(new); aa_put_label(previous); aa_put_label(label); - put_cred(cred); + put_cred(subj_cred); return error; @@ -1252,7 +1279,7 @@ kill: fail: fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, - aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_CHANGE_HAT, + aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL, NULL, target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error)); @@ -1261,6 +1288,7 @@ fail: static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name, + const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *target, bool stack, u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms) @@ -1272,16 +1300,19 @@ static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name, if (!error) error = change_profile_perms(profile, target, stack, request, - rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE], + rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE], perms); if (error) - error = aa_audit_file(profile, perms, op, request, name, + error = aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, perms, op, request, + name, NULL, target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error); return error; } +const char *stack_msg = "change_profile unprivileged unconfined converted to stacking"; + /** * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition * @fqname: name of profile may include namespace (NOT NULL) @@ -1304,6 +1335,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags) const char *auditname = fqname; /* retain leading & if stack */ bool stack = flags & AA_CHANGE_STACK; struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); + const struct cred *subj_cred = get_current_cred(); int error = 0; char *op; u32 request; @@ -1340,6 +1372,28 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags) op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE; } + /* This should move to a per profile test. Requires pushing build + * into callback + */ + if (!stack && unconfined(label) && + label == &labels_ns(label)->unconfined->label && + aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted && + /* TODO: refactor so this check is a fn */ + cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) { + /* regardless of the request in this case apparmor + * stacks against unconfined so admin set policy can't be + * by-passed + */ + stack = true; + perms.audit = request; + (void) fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, + aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, op, + request, auditname, NULL, target, + GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, stack_msg, 0)); + perms.audit = 0; + } + if (*fqname == '&') { stack = true; /* don't have label_parse() do stacking */ @@ -1381,6 +1435,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags) */ error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, change_profile_perms_wrapper(op, auditname, + subj_cred, profile, target, stack, request, &perms)); if (error) @@ -1391,7 +1446,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags) check: /* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */ - error = may_change_ptraced_domain(target, &info); + error = may_change_ptraced_domain(subj_cred, target, &info); if (error && !fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))) goto audit; @@ -1446,12 +1501,13 @@ check: } /* full transition will be built in exec path */ - error = aa_set_current_onexec(target, stack); + aa_set_current_onexec(target, stack); } audit: error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, - aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, op, request, auditname, + aa_audit_file(subj_cred, + profile, &perms, op, request, auditname, NULL, new ? new : target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error)); @@ -1459,6 +1515,7 @@ out: aa_put_label(new); aa_put_label(target); aa_put_label(label); + put_cred(subj_cred); return error; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index 698b124e649f..c03eb7c19f16 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -44,38 +44,40 @@ static u32 map_mask_to_chr_mask(u32 mask) static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; - kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid(); + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa); + kuid_t fsuid = ad->subj_cred ? ad->subj_cred->fsuid : current_fsuid(); char str[10]; - if (aad(sa)->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + if (ad->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), aa_file_perm_chrs, - map_mask_to_chr_mask(aad(sa)->request)); + map_mask_to_chr_mask(ad->request)); audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"", str); } - if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + if (ad->denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), aa_file_perm_chrs, - map_mask_to_chr_mask(aad(sa)->denied)); + map_mask_to_chr_mask(ad->denied)); audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"", str); } - if (aad(sa)->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + if (ad->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, fsuid)); audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", - from_kuid(&init_user_ns, aad(sa)->fs.ouid)); + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, ad->fs.ouid)); } - if (aad(sa)->peer) { + if (ad->peer) { audit_log_format(ab, " target="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer, FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, GFP_KERNEL); - } else if (aad(sa)->fs.target) { + } else if (ad->fs.target) { audit_log_format(ab, " target="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->fs.target); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->fs.target); } } /** * aa_audit_file - handle the auditing of file operations + * @subj_cred: cred of the subject * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL) * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL) * @op: operation being mediated @@ -89,59 +91,74 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) * * Returns: %0 or error on failure */ -int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, +int aa_audit_file(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, const char *op, u32 request, const char *name, const char *target, struct aa_label *tlabel, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error) { int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_FILE, op); - - sa.u.tsk = NULL; - aad(&sa)->request = request; - aad(&sa)->name = name; - aad(&sa)->fs.target = target; - aad(&sa)->peer = tlabel; - aad(&sa)->fs.ouid = ouid; - aad(&sa)->info = info; - aad(&sa)->error = error; - sa.u.tsk = NULL; - - if (likely(!aad(&sa)->error)) { + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_FILE, op); + + ad.subj_cred = subj_cred; + ad.request = request; + ad.name = name; + ad.fs.target = target; + ad.peer = tlabel; + ad.fs.ouid = ouid; + ad.info = info; + ad.error = error; + ad.common.u.tsk = NULL; + + if (likely(!ad.error)) { u32 mask = perms->audit; if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL)) mask = 0xffff; /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */ - aad(&sa)->request &= mask; + ad.request &= mask; - if (likely(!aad(&sa)->request)) + if (likely(!ad.request)) return 0; type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; } else { /* only report permissions that were denied */ - aad(&sa)->request = aad(&sa)->request & ~perms->allow; - AA_BUG(!aad(&sa)->request); + ad.request = ad.request & ~perms->allow; + AA_BUG(!ad.request); - if (aad(&sa)->request & perms->kill) + if (ad.request & perms->kill) type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */ - if ((aad(&sa)->request & perms->quiet) && + if ((ad.request & perms->quiet) && AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET && AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) - aad(&sa)->request &= ~perms->quiet; + ad.request &= ~perms->quiet; - if (!aad(&sa)->request) - return aad(&sa)->error; + if (!ad.request) + return ad.error; } - aad(&sa)->denied = aad(&sa)->request & ~perms->allow; - return aa_audit(type, profile, &sa, file_audit_cb); + ad.denied = ad.request & ~perms->allow; + return aa_audit(type, profile, &ad, file_audit_cb); } -static int path_name(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, +/** + * is_deleted - test if a file has been completely unlinked + * @dentry: dentry of file to test for deletion (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: true if deleted else false + */ +static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (d_unlinked(dentry) && d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_nlink == 0) + return true; + return false; +} + +static int path_name(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer, const char **name, struct path_cond *cond, u32 request) { @@ -153,7 +170,8 @@ static int path_name(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, labels_profile(label)->disconnected); if (error) { fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, op, request, *name, + aa_audit_file(subj_cred, + profile, &nullperms, op, request, *name, NULL, NULL, cond->uid, info, error)); return error; } @@ -164,7 +182,7 @@ static int path_name(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct aa_perms default_perms = {}; /** * aa_lookup_fperms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms - * @dfa: dfa to lookup perms for (NOT NULL) + * @file_rules: the aa_policydb to lookup perms for (NOT NULL) * @state: state in dfa * @cond: conditions to consider (NOT NULL) * @@ -188,8 +206,8 @@ struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_fperms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, /** * aa_str_perms - find permission that match @name - * @dfa: to match against (MAYBE NULL) - * @state: state to start matching in + * @file_rules: the aa_policydb to match against (NOT NULL) + * @start: state to start matching in * @name: string to match against dfa (NOT NULL) * @cond: conditions to consider for permission set computation (NOT NULL) * @perms: Returns - the permissions found when matching @name @@ -207,9 +225,9 @@ aa_state_t aa_str_perms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, aa_state_t start, return state; } -static int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, - const char *name, u32 request, - struct path_cond *cond, int flags, +static int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name, + u32 request, struct path_cond *cond, int flags, struct aa_perms *perms) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, @@ -218,16 +236,18 @@ static int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, if (profile_unconfined(profile)) return 0; - aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE], + aa_str_perms(rules->file, rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE], name, cond, perms); if (request & ~perms->allow) e = -EACCES; - return aa_audit_file(profile, perms, op, request, name, NULL, NULL, + return aa_audit_file(subj_cred, + profile, perms, op, request, name, NULL, NULL, cond->uid, NULL, e); } -static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, +static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path, char *buffer, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond, int flags, struct aa_perms *perms) @@ -238,18 +258,19 @@ static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, if (profile_unconfined(profile)) return 0; - error = path_name(op, &profile->label, path, + error = path_name(op, subj_cred, &profile->label, path, flags | profile->path_flags, buffer, &name, cond, request); if (error) return error; - return __aa_path_perm(op, profile, name, request, cond, flags, - perms); + return __aa_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile, name, request, cond, + flags, perms); } /** * aa_path_perm - do permissions check & audit for @path * @op: operation being checked + * @subj_cred: subject cred * @label: profile being enforced (NOT NULL) * @path: path to check permissions of (NOT NULL) * @flags: any additional path flags beyond what the profile specifies @@ -258,7 +279,8 @@ static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, * * Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error */ -int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, +int aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond) { @@ -273,8 +295,8 @@ int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, if (!buffer) return -ENOMEM; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - profile_path_perm(op, profile, path, buffer, request, - cond, flags, &perms)); + profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, + request, cond, flags, &perms)); aa_put_buffer(buffer); @@ -301,7 +323,8 @@ static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target) return true; } -static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, +static int profile_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *link, char *buffer, const struct path *target, char *buffer2, struct path_cond *cond) @@ -315,29 +338,31 @@ static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, aa_state_t state; int error; - error = path_name(OP_LINK, &profile->label, link, profile->path_flags, + error = path_name(OP_LINK, subj_cred, &profile->label, link, + profile->path_flags, buffer, &lname, cond, AA_MAY_LINK); if (error) goto audit; /* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */ - error = path_name(OP_LINK, &profile->label, target, profile->path_flags, + error = path_name(OP_LINK, subj_cred, &profile->label, target, + profile->path_flags, buffer2, &tname, cond, AA_MAY_LINK); if (error) goto audit; error = -EACCES; /* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */ - state = aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), - rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE], lname, + state = aa_str_perms(rules->file, + rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE], lname, cond, &lperms); if (!(lperms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK)) goto audit; /* test to see if target can be paired with link */ - state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file.dfa, state); - aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), state, tname, cond, &perms); + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file->dfa, state); + aa_str_perms(rules->file, state, tname, cond, &perms); /* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry * in the link pair. @@ -359,7 +384,7 @@ static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, /* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are * a subset of the allowed permissions on target. */ - aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE], + aa_str_perms(rules->file, rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE], tname, cond, &perms); /* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */ @@ -381,12 +406,14 @@ done_tests: error = 0; audit: - return aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, OP_LINK, request, lname, tname, + return aa_audit_file(subj_cred, + profile, &lperms, OP_LINK, request, lname, tname, NULL, cond->uid, info, error); } /** * aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check + * @subj_cred: subject cred * @label: the label being enforced (NOT NULL) * @old_dentry: the target dentry (NOT NULL) * @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in (NOT NULL) @@ -403,7 +430,8 @@ audit: * * Returns: %0 if allowed else error */ -int aa_path_link(struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry, +int aa_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { struct path link = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = new_dentry }; @@ -424,8 +452,8 @@ int aa_path_link(struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry, goto out; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - profile_path_link(profile, &link, buffer, &target, - buffer2, &cond)); + profile_path_link(subj_cred, profile, &link, buffer, + &target, buffer2, &cond)); out: aa_put_buffer(buffer); aa_put_buffer(buffer2); @@ -453,7 +481,8 @@ static void update_file_ctx(struct aa_file_ctx *fctx, struct aa_label *label, spin_unlock(&fctx->lock); } -static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, +static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file, u32 request, u32 denied, bool in_atomic) { @@ -480,7 +509,8 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, /* check every profile in task label not in current cache */ error = fn_for_each_not_in_set(flabel, label, profile, - profile_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, buffer, + profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile, + &file->f_path, buffer, request, &cond, flags, &perms)); if (denied && !error) { /* @@ -493,12 +523,14 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, */ if (label == flabel) error = fn_for_each(label, profile, - profile_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, + profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred, + profile, &file->f_path, buffer, request, &cond, flags, &perms)); else error = fn_for_each_not_in_set(label, flabel, profile, - profile_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, + profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred, + profile, &file->f_path, buffer, request, &cond, flags, &perms)); } @@ -510,7 +542,8 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, return error; } -static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, +static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file, u32 request, u32 denied) { @@ -524,11 +557,12 @@ static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, return 0; /* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */ - error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock); + error = aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock); if (denied) { /* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */ /* check every profile in file label to is cached */ - last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock)); + last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, flabel, op, + request, sock)); } if (!error) update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request); @@ -539,6 +573,7 @@ static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, /** * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file * @op: operation being checked + * @subj_cred: subject cred * @label: label being enforced (NOT NULL) * @file: file to revalidate access permissions on (NOT NULL) * @request: requested permissions @@ -546,7 +581,8 @@ static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, * * Returns: %0 if access allowed else error */ -int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file, +int aa_file_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct file *file, u32 request, bool in_atomic) { struct aa_file_ctx *fctx; @@ -582,19 +618,19 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file, /* TODO: label cross check */ if (file->f_path.mnt && path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry)) - error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request, - denied, in_atomic); + error = __file_path_perm(op, subj_cred, label, flabel, file, + request, denied, in_atomic); else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) - error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request, - denied); + error = __file_sock_perm(op, subj_cred, label, flabel, file, + request, denied); aa_put_label(flabel); done: return error; } -static void revalidate_tty(struct aa_label *label) +static void revalidate_tty(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label) { struct tty_struct *tty; int drop_tty = 0; @@ -612,8 +648,8 @@ static void revalidate_tty(struct aa_label *label) struct tty_file_private, list); file = file_priv->file; - if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, label, file, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, - IN_ATOMIC)) + if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, subj_cred, label, file, + MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, IN_ATOMIC)) drop_tty = 1; } spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock); @@ -623,12 +659,17 @@ static void revalidate_tty(struct aa_label *label) no_tty(); } +struct cred_label { + const struct cred *cred; + struct aa_label *label; +}; + static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned int fd) { - struct aa_label *label = (struct aa_label *)p; + struct cred_label *cl = (struct cred_label *)p; - if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, label, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file), - IN_ATOMIC)) + if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, cl->cred, cl->label, file, + aa_map_file_to_perms(file), IN_ATOMIC)) return fd + 1; return 0; } @@ -638,13 +679,17 @@ static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned int fd) void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files) { struct aa_label *label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); + struct cred_label cl = { + .cred = cred, + .label = label, + }; struct file *devnull = NULL; unsigned int n; - revalidate_tty(label); + revalidate_tty(cred, label); /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ - n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, label); + n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, &cl); if (!n) /* none found? */ goto out; @@ -654,7 +699,7 @@ void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files) /* replace all the matching ones with this */ do { replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0); - } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, label)) != 0); + } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, &cl)) != 0); if (devnull) fput(devnull); out: diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h index 8a81557c9d59..f83934913b0f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h @@ -30,9 +30,10 @@ #define AA_CLASS_NET 14 #define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16 #define AA_CLASS_POSIX_MQUEUE 17 -#define AA_CLASS_IO_URING 18 #define AA_CLASS_MODULE 19 #define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 20 +#define AA_CLASS_NS 21 +#define AA_CLASS_IO_URING 22 #define AA_CLASS_X 31 #define AA_CLASS_DBUS 32 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index c328f07f11cd..acbb03b9bd25 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -103,13 +103,18 @@ enum audit_type { #define OP_PROF_LOAD "profile_load" #define OP_PROF_RM "profile_remove" +#define OP_USERNS_CREATE "userns_create" + +#define OP_URING_OVERRIDE "uring_override" +#define OP_URING_SQPOLL "uring_sqpoll" struct apparmor_audit_data { int error; int type; u16 class; const char *op; - struct aa_label *label; + const struct cred *subj_cred; + struct aa_label *subj_label; const char *name; const char *info; u32 request; @@ -151,34 +156,39 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { const char *data; unsigned long flags; } mnt; + struct { + struct aa_label *target; + } uring; }; + + struct common_audit_data common; }; /* macros for dealing with apparmor_audit_data structure */ -#define aad(SA) ((SA)->apparmor_audit_data) +#define aad(SA) (container_of(SA, struct apparmor_audit_data, common)) +#define aad_of_va(VA) aad((struct common_audit_data *)(VA)) + #define DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, T, C, X) \ /* TODO: cleanup audit init so we don't need _aad = {0,} */ \ - struct apparmor_audit_data NAME ## _aad = { \ + struct apparmor_audit_data NAME = { \ .class = (C), \ .op = (X), \ - }; \ - struct common_audit_data NAME = \ - { \ - .type = (T), \ - .u.tsk = NULL, \ - }; \ - NAME.apparmor_audit_data = &(NAME ## _aad) - -void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa, + .common.type = (T), \ + .common.u.tsk = NULL, \ + .common.apparmor_audit_data = &NAME, \ + }; + +void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)); -int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, +int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)); -#define aa_audit_error(ERROR, SA, CB) \ +#define aa_audit_error(ERROR, AD, CB) \ ({ \ - aad((SA))->error = (ERROR); \ - aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR, (SA), (CB)); \ - aad((SA))->error; \ + (AD)->error = (ERROR); \ + aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR, (AD), (CB)); \ + (AD)->error; \ }) diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h index d420e2d10b31..d6dcc604ec0c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h @@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ struct aa_caps { extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[]; -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts); +int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + int cap, unsigned int opts); static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps) { diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h index 5be620af33ba..6e8f2aa66cd6 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h @@ -45,43 +45,6 @@ struct aa_file_ctx { u32 allow; }; -/** - * aa_alloc_file_ctx - allocate file_ctx - * @label: initial label of task creating the file - * @gfp: gfp flags for allocation - * - * Returns: file_ctx or NULL on failure - */ -static inline struct aa_file_ctx *aa_alloc_file_ctx(struct aa_label *label, - gfp_t gfp) -{ - struct aa_file_ctx *ctx; - - ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), gfp); - if (ctx) { - spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); - rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); - } - return ctx; -} - -/** - * aa_free_file_ctx - free a file_ctx - * @ctx: file_ctx to free (MAYBE_NULL) - */ -static inline void aa_free_file_ctx(struct aa_file_ctx *ctx) -{ - if (ctx) { - aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label)); - kfree_sensitive(ctx); - } -} - -static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_file_label(struct aa_file_ctx *ctx) -{ - return aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->label); -} - /* * The xindex is broken into 3 parts * - index - an index into either the exec name table or the variable table @@ -108,7 +71,8 @@ struct path_cond { #define COMBINED_PERM_MASK(X) ((X).allow | (X).audit | (X).quiet | (X).kill) -int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, +int aa_audit_file(const struct cred *cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, const char *op, u32 request, const char *name, const char *target, struct aa_label *tlabel, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error); @@ -119,14 +83,16 @@ aa_state_t aa_str_perms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, aa_state_t start, const char *name, struct path_cond *cond, struct aa_perms *perms); -int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, - const struct path *path, int flags, u32 request, - struct path_cond *cond); +int aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond); -int aa_path_link(struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry, - const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry); +int aa_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry); -int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file, +int aa_file_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct file *file, u32 request, bool in_atomic); void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h index a1ac6ffb95e9..74d17052f76b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> -int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig); +int aa_may_signal(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *sender, + const struct cred *target_cred, struct aa_label *target, + int sig); #endif /* __AA_IPC_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h index 73c8a32c6861..d7a894b1031f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ #include "match.h" +extern struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa; + /* * DEBUG remains global (no per profile flag) since it is mostly used in sysctl * which is not related to profile accesses. diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h index 58fbf67139b9..4bb0405c9190 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h @@ -102,9 +102,6 @@ struct aa_dfa { struct table_header *tables[YYTD_ID_TSIZE]; }; -extern struct aa_dfa *nulldfa; -extern struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa; - #define byte_to_byte(X) (X) #define UNPACK_ARRAY(TABLE, BLOB, LEN, TTYPE, BTYPE, NTOHX) \ @@ -122,9 +119,6 @@ static inline size_t table_size(size_t len, size_t el_size) return ALIGN(sizeof(struct table_header) + len * el_size, 8); } -int aa_setup_dfa_engine(void); -void aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void); - #define aa_state_t unsigned int struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h index a710683b2496..46834f828179 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h @@ -25,26 +25,36 @@ #define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN) -int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, +int aa_remount(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, unsigned long flags, void *data); -int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, +int aa_bind_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, const char *old_name, unsigned long flags); -int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, +int aa_mount_change_type(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, unsigned long flags); -int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, - const char *old_name); +int aa_move_mount_old(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + const char *old_name); +int aa_move_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *from_path, + const struct path *to_path); -int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name, +int aa_new_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data); -int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags); +int aa_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags); -int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path, +int aa_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path); #endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h index 6fa440b5daed..67bf888c3bd6 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h @@ -52,7 +52,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx { }; #define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security) -#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security +static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk) +{ + return sk->sk_security; +} + #define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \ struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \ .family = (F)}; \ @@ -61,9 +65,9 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx { LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \ AA_CLASS_NET, \ OP); \ - NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net); \ - aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T); \ - aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P) + NAME.common.u.net = &(NAME ## _net); \ + NAME.net.type = (T); \ + NAME.net.protocol = (P) #define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK) \ DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, \ @@ -90,21 +94,24 @@ struct aa_secmark { extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[]; void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va); -int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, +int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request, u16 family, int type); -int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, +int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol); static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, - struct common_audit_data *sa, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request, struct sock *sk) { - return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family, + return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, ad, request, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type); } int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk); -int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, +int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock); int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h index 797a7a00644d..0f7e913c3fc2 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h @@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ #define AA_LINK_SUBSET AA_MAY_LOCK /* overlaid */ +#define AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL AA_MAY_CREATE +#define AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED AA_MAY_APPEND +#define AA_URING_PERM_MASK (AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED | AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL) #define PERMS_CHRS_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \ AA_MAY_DELETE | AA_MAY_LINK | AA_MAY_LOCK | \ @@ -212,8 +215,8 @@ void aa_profile_match_label(struct aa_profile *profile, int type, u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms); int aa_profile_label_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target, u32 request, int type, u32 *deny, - struct common_audit_data *sa); + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad); int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, - u32 request, struct common_audit_data *sa, + u32 request, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *)); #endif /* __AA_PERM_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h index 545f791cabda..75088cc310b6 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct aa_ns; extern int unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy; +extern int aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted; extern const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[]; #define APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 4 @@ -74,12 +75,14 @@ enum profile_mode { /* struct aa_policydb - match engine for a policy + * count: refcount for the pdb * dfa: dfa pattern match * perms: table of permissions * strs: table of strings, index by x * start: set of start states for the different classes of data */ struct aa_policydb { + struct kref count; struct aa_dfa *dfa; struct { struct aa_perms *perms; @@ -89,13 +92,36 @@ struct aa_policydb { aa_state_t start[AA_CLASS_LAST + 1]; }; -static inline void aa_destroy_policydb(struct aa_policydb *policy) +extern struct aa_policydb *nullpdb; + +struct aa_policydb *aa_alloc_pdb(gfp_t gfp); +void aa_pdb_free_kref(struct kref *kref); + +/** + * aa_get_pdb - increment refcount on @pdb + * @pdb: policydb (MAYBE NULL) + * + * Returns: pointer to @pdb if @pdb is NULL will return NULL + * Requires: @pdb must be held with valid refcount when called + */ +static inline struct aa_policydb *aa_get_pdb(struct aa_policydb *pdb) { - aa_put_dfa(policy->dfa); - if (policy->perms) - kvfree(policy->perms); - aa_free_str_table(&policy->trans); + if (pdb) + kref_get(&(pdb->count)); + + return pdb; +} +/** + * aa_put_pdb - put a pdb refcount + * @pdb: pdb to put refcount (MAYBE NULL) + * + * Requires: if @pdb != NULL that a valid refcount be held + */ +static inline void aa_put_pdb(struct aa_policydb *pdb) +{ + if (pdb) + kref_put(&pdb->count, aa_pdb_free_kref); } static inline struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_perms(struct aa_policydb *policy, @@ -139,8 +165,8 @@ struct aa_ruleset { int size; /* TODO: merge policy and file */ - struct aa_policydb policy; - struct aa_policydb file; + struct aa_policydb *policy; + struct aa_policydb *file; struct aa_caps caps; struct aa_rlimit rlimits; @@ -159,7 +185,7 @@ struct aa_ruleset { */ struct aa_attachment { const char *xmatch_str; - struct aa_policydb xmatch; + struct aa_policydb *xmatch; unsigned int xmatch_len; int xattr_count; char **xattrs; @@ -227,10 +253,6 @@ extern enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode; #define profiles_ns(P) ((P)->ns) #define name_is_shared(A, B) ((A)->hname && (A)->hname == (B)->hname) -void aa_add_profile(struct aa_policy *common, struct aa_profile *profile); - - -void aa_free_proxy_kref(struct kref *kref); struct aa_ruleset *aa_alloc_ruleset(gfp_t gfp); struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *name, struct aa_proxy *proxy, gfp_t gfp); @@ -239,14 +261,12 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_null(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name, struct aa_profile *aa_new_learning_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat, const char *base, gfp_t gfp); void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile); -void aa_free_profile_kref(struct kref *kref); struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name); struct aa_profile *aa_lookupn_profile(struct aa_ns *ns, const char *hname, size_t n); struct aa_profile *aa_lookup_profile(struct aa_ns *ns, const char *name); struct aa_profile *aa_fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base, const char *fqname, size_t n); -struct aa_profile *aa_match_profile(struct aa_ns *ns, const char *name); ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_label *label, u32 mask, struct aa_loaddata *udata); @@ -254,9 +274,6 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_label *label, char *name, size_t size); void __aa_profile_list_release(struct list_head *head); -#define PROF_ADD 1 -#define PROF_REPLACE 0 - #define profile_unconfined(X) ((X)->mode == APPARMOR_UNCONFINED) /** @@ -276,10 +293,10 @@ static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES(struct aa_ruleset *rules, unsigned char class) { if (class <= AA_CLASS_LAST) - return rules->policy.start[class]; + return rules->policy->start[class]; else - return aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, - rules->policy.start[0], &class, 1); + return aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, + rules->policy->start[0], &class, 1); } static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_ruleset *rules, u16 AF) @@ -289,7 +306,7 @@ static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_ruleset *rules, u16 AF) if (!state) return DFA_NOMATCH; - return aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2); + return aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2); } static inline aa_state_t ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(struct list_head *head, @@ -370,9 +387,12 @@ static inline int AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile) return profile->audit; } -bool aa_policy_view_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns); -bool aa_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns); -int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, +bool aa_policy_view_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns); +bool aa_policy_admin_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns); +int aa_may_manage_policy(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask); bool aa_current_policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns); bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h index 33d665516fc1..d646070fd966 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h @@ -86,10 +86,7 @@ const char *aa_ns_name(struct aa_ns *parent, struct aa_ns *child, bool subns); void aa_free_ns(struct aa_ns *ns); int aa_alloc_root_ns(void); void aa_free_root_ns(void); -void aa_free_ns_kref(struct kref *kref); -struct aa_ns *aa_find_ns(struct aa_ns *root, const char *name); -struct aa_ns *aa_findn_ns(struct aa_ns *root, const char *name, size_t n); struct aa_ns *__aa_lookupn_ns(struct aa_ns *view, const char *hname, size_t n); struct aa_ns *aa_lookupn_ns(struct aa_ns *view, const char *name, size_t n); struct aa_ns *__aa_find_or_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name, @@ -151,15 +148,4 @@ static inline struct aa_ns *__aa_find_ns(struct list_head *head, return __aa_findn_ns(head, name, strlen(name)); } -static inline struct aa_ns *__aa_lookup_ns(struct aa_ns *base, - const char *hname) -{ - return __aa_lookupn_ns(base, hname, strlen(hname)); -} - -static inline struct aa_ns *aa_lookup_ns(struct aa_ns *view, const char *name) -{ - return aa_lookupn_ns(view, name, strlen(name)); -} - #endif /* AA_NAMESPACE_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h index 961d85d328ea..ad2c0da8e64f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h @@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ struct aa_rlimit { extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_rlimit[]; int aa_map_resource(int resource); -int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task, +int aa_task_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + struct task_struct *task, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim); void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_label *old, struct aa_label *new); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h index 13437d62c70f..b1aaaf60fa8b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/task.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct aa_task_ctx { }; int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label); -int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack); +void aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack); int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token); int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie); struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task); @@ -91,8 +91,15 @@ static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx) "segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \ "xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost" -int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, +int aa_may_ptrace(const struct cred *tracer_cred, struct aa_label *tracer, + const struct cred *tracee_cred, struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request); + +#define AA_USERNS_CREATE 8 + +int aa_profile_ns_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request); + #endif /* __AA_TASK_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 5acde746775f..0cdf4340b02d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -52,31 +52,33 @@ static const char *audit_signal_mask(u32 mask) static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa); - if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { + if (ad->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"", - audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->request)); - if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { + audit_signal_mask(ad->request)); + if (ad->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"", - audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->denied)); + audit_signal_mask(ad->denied)); } } - if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN) + if (ad->signal == SIGUNKNOWN) audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)", - aad(sa)->unmappedsig); - else if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME) - audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]); + ad->unmappedsig); + else if (ad->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME) + audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[ad->signal]); else audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d", - aad(sa)->signal - SIGRT_BASE); + ad->signal - SIGRT_BASE); audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer, FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); } -static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, +static int profile_signal_perm(const struct cred *cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *peer, u32 request, - struct common_audit_data *sa) + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); @@ -87,24 +89,29 @@ static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, !ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&profile->rules, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL)) return 0; - aad(sa)->peer = peer; + ad->subj_cred = cred; + ad->peer = peer; /* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */ - state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa, - rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL], - aad(sa)->signal); + state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, + rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL], + ad->signal); aa_label_match(profile, rules, peer, state, false, request, &perms); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); - return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_signal_cb); } -int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig) +int aa_may_signal(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *sender, + const struct cred *target_cred, struct aa_label *target, + int sig) { struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL, OP_SIGNAL); + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL, OP_SIGNAL); - aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig); - aad(&sa)->unmappedsig = sig; + ad.signal = map_signal_num(sig); + ad.unmappedsig = sig; return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile, - profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa), - profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa)); + profile_signal_perm(subj_cred, profile, target, + MAY_WRITE, &ad), + profile_signal_perm(target_cred, profile, sender, + MAY_READ, &ad)); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c index 8a2af96f4da5..c71e4615dd46 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/label.c +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c @@ -154,13 +154,14 @@ static int profile_cmp(struct aa_profile *a, struct aa_profile *b) /** * vec_cmp - label comparison for set ordering - * @a: label to compare (NOT NULL) - * @vec: vector of profiles to compare (NOT NULL) - * @n: length of @vec - * - * Returns: <0 if a < vec - * ==0 if a == vec - * >0 if a > vec + * @a: aa_profile to compare (NOT NULL) + * @an: length of @a + * @b: aa_profile to compare (NOT NULL) + * @bn: length of @b + * + * Returns: <0 if @a < @b + * ==0 if @a == @b + * >0 if @a > @b */ static int vec_cmp(struct aa_profile **a, int an, struct aa_profile **b, int bn) { @@ -256,6 +257,7 @@ static inline int unique(struct aa_profile **vec, int n) * aa_vec_unique - canonical sort and unique a list of profiles * @n: number of refcounted profiles in the list (@n > 0) * @vec: list of profiles to sort and merge + * @flags: null terminator flags of @vec * * Returns: the number of duplicates eliminated == references put * @@ -584,7 +586,7 @@ bool aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(struct aa_label *set, struct aa_label *sub) /** * __label_remove - remove @label from the label set - * @l: label to remove + * @label: label to remove * @new: label to redirect to * * Requires: labels_set(@label)->lock write_lock @@ -917,8 +919,8 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_find(struct aa_label *label) /** * aa_label_insert - insert label @label into @ls or return existing label - * @ls - labelset to insert @label into - * @label - label to insert + * @ls: labelset to insert @label into + * @label: label to insert * * Requires: caller to hold a valid ref on @label * @@ -1204,7 +1206,6 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_find_merge(struct aa_label *a, struct aa_label *b) /** * aa_label_merge - attempt to insert new merged label of @a and @b - * @ls: set of labels to insert label into (NOT NULL) * @a: label to merge with @b (NOT NULL) * @b: label to merge with @a (NOT NULL) * @gfp: memory allocation type @@ -1269,21 +1270,22 @@ static inline aa_state_t match_component(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *ns_name; if (profile->ns == tp->ns) - return aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa, state, tp->base.hname); + return aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa, state, tp->base.hname); /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */ ns_name = aa_ns_name(profile->ns, tp->ns, true); - state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, state, ":", 1); - state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa, state, ns_name); - state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, state, ":", 1); - return aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa, state, tp->base.hname); + state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, ":", 1); + state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa, state, ns_name); + state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, ":", 1); + return aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa, state, tp->base.hname); } /** * label_compound_match - find perms for full compound label * @profile: profile to find perms for + * @rules: ruleset to search * @label: label to check access permissions for - * @start: state to start match in + * @state: state to start match in * @subns: whether to do permission checks on components in a subns * @request: permissions to request * @perms: perms struct to set @@ -1321,12 +1323,12 @@ next: label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) { if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns)) continue; - state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa, state, "//&"); + state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa, state, "//&"); state = match_component(profile, rules, tp, state); if (!state) goto fail; } - *perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state); + *perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, perms); if ((perms->allow & request) != request) return -EACCES; @@ -1379,7 +1381,7 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile, return 0; next: - tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state); + tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp); label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) { @@ -1388,7 +1390,7 @@ next: state = match_component(profile, rules, tp, start); if (!state) goto fail; - tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state); + tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp); } @@ -2037,7 +2039,7 @@ out: /** * __label_update - insert updated version of @label into labelset - * @label - the label to update/replace + * @label: the label to update/replace * * Returns: new label that is up to date * else NULL on failure diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index a630c951bb3b..4c198d273f09 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ struct aa_perms allperms = { .allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK, /** * aa_free_str_table - free entries str table - * @str: the string table to free (MAYBE NULL) + * @t: the string table to free (MAYBE NULL) */ void aa_free_str_table(struct aa_str_table *t) { @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ char *aa_split_fqname(char *fqname, char **ns_name) /** * skipn_spaces - Removes leading whitespace from @str. * @str: The string to be stripped. + * @n: length of str to parse, will stop at \0 if encountered before n * * Returns a pointer to the first non-whitespace character in @str. * if all whitespace will return NULL @@ -143,10 +144,10 @@ const char *aa_splitn_fqname(const char *fqname, size_t n, const char **ns_name, void aa_info_message(const char *str) { if (audit_enabled) { - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, NULL); + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, NULL); - aad(&sa)->info = str; - aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, NULL); + ad.info = str; + aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &ad, NULL); } printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str); } @@ -281,21 +282,22 @@ void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, static void aa_audit_perms_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa); - if (aad(sa)->request) { + if (ad->request) { audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); - aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, aa_file_perm_chrs, + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->request, aa_file_perm_chrs, PERMS_CHRS_MASK, aa_file_perm_names, PERMS_NAMES_MASK); } - if (aad(sa)->denied) { + if (ad->denied) { audit_log_format(ab, "denied_mask="); - aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, aa_file_perm_chrs, + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->denied, aa_file_perm_chrs, PERMS_CHRS_MASK, aa_file_perm_names, PERMS_NAMES_MASK); } audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer, FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); } @@ -339,8 +341,8 @@ void aa_profile_match_label(struct aa_profile *profile, /* TODO: doesn't yet handle extended types */ aa_state_t state; - state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa, - rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_LABEL], + state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, + rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_LABEL], type); aa_label_match(profile, rules, label, state, false, request, perms); } @@ -349,21 +351,20 @@ void aa_profile_match_label(struct aa_profile *profile, /* currently unused */ int aa_profile_label_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target, u32 request, int type, u32 *deny, - struct common_audit_data *sa) + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); struct aa_perms perms; - aad(sa)->label = &profile->label; - aad(sa)->peer = &target->label; - aad(sa)->request = request; + ad->peer = &target->label; + ad->request = request; aa_profile_match_label(profile, rules, &target->label, type, request, &perms); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); *deny |= request & perms.deny; - return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, aa_audit_perms_cb); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, aa_audit_perms_cb); } /** @@ -371,8 +372,7 @@ int aa_profile_label_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target, * @profile: profile being checked * @perms: perms computed for the request * @request: requested perms - * @deny: Returns: explicit deny set - * @sa: initialized audit structure (MAY BE NULL if not auditing) + * @ad: initialized audit structure (MAY BE NULL if not auditing) * @cb: callback fn for type specific fields (MAY BE NULL) * * Returns: 0 if permission else error code @@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ int aa_profile_label_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target, * with a positive value. */ int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, - u32 request, struct common_audit_data *sa, + u32 request, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { int type, error; @@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, if (likely(!denied)) { /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */ request &= perms->audit; - if (!request || !sa) + if (!request || !ad) return 0; type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; @@ -413,16 +413,16 @@ int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, error = -ENOENT; denied &= ~perms->quiet; - if (!sa || !denied) + if (!ad || !denied) return error; } - if (sa) { - aad(sa)->label = &profile->label; - aad(sa)->request = request; - aad(sa)->denied = denied; - aad(sa)->error = error; - aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb); + if (ad) { + ad->subj_label = &profile->label; + ad->request = request; + ad->denied = denied; + ad->error = error; + aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb); } if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 3fa325d5efac..4981bdf02993 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -49,12 +49,19 @@ union aa_buffer { DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(char, buffer); }; +struct aa_local_cache { + unsigned int hold; + unsigned int count; + struct list_head head; +}; + #define RESERVE_COUNT 2 static int reserve_count = RESERVE_COUNT; static int buffer_count; static LIST_HEAD(aa_global_buffers); static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(aa_buffers_lock); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_local_cache, aa_local_buffers); /* * LSM hook functions @@ -116,15 +123,17 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; + const struct cred *cred; int error; + cred = get_task_cred(child); + tracee = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */ tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); - tracee = aa_get_task_label(child); - error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, + error = aa_may_ptrace(current_cred(), tracer, cred, tracee, (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ : AA_PTRACE_TRACE); - aa_put_label(tracee); __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer); + put_cred(cred); return error; } @@ -132,12 +141,15 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; + const struct cred *cred; int error; tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); - tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent); - error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE); - aa_put_label(tracer); + cred = get_task_cred(parent); + tracer = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */ + error = aa_may_ptrace(cred, tracer, current_cred(), tracee, + AA_PTRACE_TRACE); + put_cred(cred); __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee); return error; @@ -188,7 +200,7 @@ static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); if (!unconfined(label)) - error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts); + error = aa_capable(cred, label, cap, opts); aa_put_label(label); return error; @@ -211,7 +223,8 @@ static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask, label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); if (!unconfined(label)) - error = aa_path_perm(op, label, path, 0, mask, cond); + error = aa_path_perm(op, current_cred(), label, path, 0, mask, + cond); __end_current_label_crit_section(label); return error; @@ -357,7 +370,8 @@ static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_ label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); if (!unconfined(label)) - error = aa_path_link(label, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); + error = aa_path_link(current_cred(), label, old_dentry, new_dir, + new_dentry); end_current_label_crit_section(label); return error; @@ -396,23 +410,27 @@ static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_d vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry)); cond_exchange.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); - error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &new_path, 0, + error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(), + label, &new_path, 0, MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, &cond_exchange); if (!error) - error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &old_path, + error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(), + label, &old_path, 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond_exchange); } if (!error) - error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &old_path, 0, + error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(), + label, &old_path, 0, MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, &cond); if (!error) - error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &new_path, + error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(), + label, &new_path, 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond); @@ -467,7 +485,8 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode); cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); - error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0, + error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, file->f_cred, + label, &file->f_path, 0, aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond); /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */ fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file); @@ -507,7 +526,7 @@ static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask, return -EACCES; label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); - error = aa_file_perm(op, label, file, mask, in_atomic); + error = aa_file_perm(op, current_cred(), label, file, mask, in_atomic); __end_current_label_crit_section(label); return error; @@ -570,6 +589,114 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, false); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING +static const char *audit_uring_mask(u32 mask) +{ + if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL) + return "sqpoll"; + if (mask & AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED) + return "override_creds"; + return ""; +} + +static void audit_uring_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va); + + if (ad->request & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " requested=\"%s\"", + audit_uring_mask(ad->request)); + if (ad->denied & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " denied=\"%s\"", + audit_uring_mask(ad->denied)); + } + } + if (ad->uring.target) { + audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext="); + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), + ad->uring.target, + FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); + } +} + +static int profile_uring(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, + struct aa_label *new, int cap, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) +{ + unsigned int state; + struct aa_ruleset *rules; + int error = 0; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + + rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); + state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_IO_URING); + if (state) { + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + + if (new) { + aa_label_match(profile, rules, new, state, + false, request, &perms); + } else { + perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); + } + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + error = aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, + audit_uring_cb); + } + + return error; +} + +/** + * apparmor_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override + * @new: the target creds + * + * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials + * to service an io_uring operation. + */ +static int apparmor_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + struct aa_label *label; + int error; + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING, + OP_URING_OVERRIDE); + + ad.uring.target = cred_label(new); + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + error = fn_for_each(label, profile, + profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED, + cred_label(new), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad)); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +/** + * apparmor_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created + * + * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring + * kernel polling thread. + */ +static int apparmor_uring_sqpoll(void) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + struct aa_label *label; + int error; + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING, + OP_URING_SQPOLL); + + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + error = fn_for_each(label, profile, + profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL, + NULL, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad)); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ + static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { @@ -585,23 +712,42 @@ static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); if (!unconfined(label)) { if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) - error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data); + error = aa_remount(current_cred(), label, path, flags, + data); else if (flags & MS_BIND) - error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags); + error = aa_bind_mount(current_cred(), label, path, + dev_name, flags); else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE)) - error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags); + error = aa_mount_change_type(current_cred(), label, + path, flags); else if (flags & MS_MOVE) - error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name); + error = aa_move_mount_old(current_cred(), label, path, + dev_name); else - error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type, - flags, data); + error = aa_new_mount(current_cred(), label, dev_name, + path, type, flags, data); } __end_current_label_crit_section(label); return error; } +static int apparmor_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, + const struct path *to_path) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + if (!unconfined(label)) + error = aa_move_mount(current_cred(), label, from_path, + to_path); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) { struct aa_label *label; @@ -609,7 +755,7 @@ static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); if (!unconfined(label)) - error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags); + error = aa_umount(current_cred(), label, mnt, flags); __end_current_label_crit_section(label); return error; @@ -623,7 +769,7 @@ static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, label = aa_get_current_label(); if (!unconfined(label)) - error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path); + error = aa_pivotroot(current_cred(), label, old_path, new_path); aa_put_label(label); return error; @@ -662,7 +808,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value; size_t arg_size; int error; - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, OP_SETPROCATTR); if (size == 0) @@ -722,11 +868,11 @@ out: return error; fail: - aad(&sa)->label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - aad(&sa)->info = name; - aad(&sa)->error = error = -EINVAL; - aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL); - end_current_label_crit_section(aad(&sa)->label); + ad.subj_label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + ad.info = name; + ad.error = error = -EINVAL; + aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &ad, NULL); + end_current_label_crit_section(ad.subj_label); goto out; } @@ -766,9 +912,9 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) { - struct aa_label *label = aa_get_current_label(); + struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); *secid = label->secid; - aa_put_label(label); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label); } static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) @@ -785,7 +931,8 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, int error = 0; if (!unconfined(label)) - error = aa_task_setrlimit(label, task, resource, new_rlim); + error = aa_task_setrlimit(current_cred(), label, task, + resource, new_rlim); __end_current_label_crit_section(label); return error; @@ -794,26 +941,48 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info, int sig, const struct cred *cred) { + const struct cred *tc; struct aa_label *cl, *tl; int error; + tc = get_task_cred(target); + tl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(tc); if (cred) { /* * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior */ cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); - tl = aa_get_task_label(target); - error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig); + error = aa_may_signal(cred, cl, tc, tl, sig); aa_put_label(cl); - aa_put_label(tl); return error; + } else { + cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + error = aa_may_signal(current_cred(), cl, tc, tl, sig); + __end_current_label_crit_section(cl); } - - cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); - tl = aa_get_task_label(target); - error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig); aa_put_label(tl); - __end_current_label_crit_section(cl); + put_cred(tc); + + return error; +} + +static int apparmor_userns_create(const struct cred *cred) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + struct aa_profile *profile; + int error = 0; + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_NS, + OP_USERNS_CREATE); + + ad.subj_cred = current_cred(); + + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + if (!unconfined(label)) { + error = fn_for_each(label, profile, + aa_profile_ns_perm(profile, &ad, + AA_USERNS_CREATE)); + } + end_current_label_crit_section(label); return error; } @@ -829,7 +998,7 @@ static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags) if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; - SK_CTX(sk) = ctx; + sk->sk_security = ctx; return 0; } @@ -839,9 +1008,9 @@ static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags) */ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) { - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); - SK_CTX(sk) = NULL; + sk->sk_security = NULL; aa_put_label(ctx->label); aa_put_label(ctx->peer); kfree(ctx); @@ -853,8 +1022,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); - struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk); if (new->label) aa_put_label(new->label); @@ -879,7 +1048,8 @@ static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) if (!(kern || unconfined(label))) error = af_select(family, create_perm(label, family, type, protocol), - aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, + aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label, + OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type, protocol)); end_current_label_crit_section(label); @@ -907,7 +1077,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, label = aa_get_current_label(); if (sock->sk) { - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk); aa_put_label(ctx->label); ctx->label = aa_get_label(label); @@ -1092,7 +1262,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) */ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); if (!skb->secmark) return 0; @@ -1105,7 +1275,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk) { - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); if (ctx->peer) return ctx->peer; @@ -1186,7 +1356,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, */ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) { - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); if (!ctx->label) ctx->label = aa_get_current_label(); @@ -1196,7 +1366,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) { - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); if (!skb->secmark) return 0; @@ -1221,6 +1391,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, apparmor_move_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot), @@ -1294,6 +1465,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create), #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, aa_audit_rule_init), @@ -1305,6 +1477,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx), + +#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING + LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, apparmor_uring_override_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, apparmor_uring_sqpoll), +#endif }; /* @@ -1635,11 +1812,32 @@ static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) char *aa_get_buffer(bool in_atomic) { union aa_buffer *aa_buf; + struct aa_local_cache *cache; bool try_again = true; gfp_t flags = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN); + /* use per cpu cached buffers first */ + cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); + if (!list_empty(&cache->head)) { + aa_buf = list_first_entry(&cache->head, union aa_buffer, list); + list_del(&aa_buf->list); + cache->hold--; + cache->count--; + put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); + return &aa_buf->buffer[0]; + } + put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); + + if (!spin_trylock(&aa_buffers_lock)) { + cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); + cache->hold += 1; + put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); + spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); + } else { + cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); + put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); + } retry: - spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); if (buffer_count > reserve_count || (in_atomic && !list_empty(&aa_global_buffers))) { aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer, @@ -1665,6 +1863,7 @@ retry: if (!aa_buf) { if (try_again) { try_again = false; + spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); goto retry; } pr_warn_once("AppArmor: Failed to allocate a memory buffer.\n"); @@ -1676,15 +1875,34 @@ retry: void aa_put_buffer(char *buf) { union aa_buffer *aa_buf; + struct aa_local_cache *cache; if (!buf) return; aa_buf = container_of(buf, union aa_buffer, buffer[0]); - spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); - list_add(&aa_buf->list, &aa_global_buffers); - buffer_count++; - spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); + cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); + if (!cache->hold) { + put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); + + if (spin_trylock(&aa_buffers_lock)) { + /* put back on global list */ + list_add(&aa_buf->list, &aa_global_buffers); + buffer_count++; + spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); + cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); + put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); + return; + } + /* contention on global list, fallback to percpu */ + cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); + cache->hold += 1; + } + + /* cache in percpu list */ + list_add(&aa_buf->list, &cache->head); + cache->count++; + put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); } /* @@ -1727,6 +1945,15 @@ static int __init alloc_buffers(void) int i, num; /* + * per cpu set of cached allocated buffers used to help reduce + * lock contention + */ + for_each_possible_cpu(i) { + per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).hold = 0; + per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).count = 0; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).head); + } + /* * A function may require two buffers at once. Usually the buffers are * used for a short period of time and are shared. On UP kernel buffers * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more @@ -1765,6 +1992,7 @@ static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, } static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = { +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS { .procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy", .data = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy, @@ -1772,6 +2000,7 @@ static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = { .mode = 0600, .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, }, +#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */ { .procname = "apparmor_display_secid_mode", .data = &apparmor_display_secid_mode, @@ -1779,7 +2008,13 @@ static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = { .mode = 0600, .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, }, - + { + .procname = "apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_unconfined", + .data = &aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, + }, { } }; @@ -1809,7 +2044,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv, if (sk == NULL) return NF_ACCEPT; - ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + ctx = aa_sock(sk); if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, skb->secmark, sk)) return NF_ACCEPT; @@ -1868,6 +2103,69 @@ static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void) __initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init); #endif +static char nulldfa_src[] = { + #include "nulldfa.in" +}; +struct aa_dfa *nulldfa; + +static char stacksplitdfa_src[] = { + #include "stacksplitdfa.in" +}; +struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa; +struct aa_policydb *nullpdb; + +static int __init aa_setup_dfa_engine(void) +{ + int error = -ENOMEM; + + nullpdb = aa_alloc_pdb(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!nullpdb) + return -ENOMEM; + + nulldfa = aa_dfa_unpack(nulldfa_src, sizeof(nulldfa_src), + TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | + TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32)); + if (IS_ERR(nulldfa)) { + error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa); + goto fail; + } + nullpdb->dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); + nullpdb->perms = kcalloc(2, sizeof(struct aa_perms), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!nullpdb->perms) + goto fail; + nullpdb->size = 2; + + stacksplitdfa = aa_dfa_unpack(stacksplitdfa_src, + sizeof(stacksplitdfa_src), + TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | + TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32)); + if (IS_ERR(stacksplitdfa)) { + error = PTR_ERR(stacksplitdfa); + goto fail; + } + + return 0; + +fail: + aa_put_pdb(nullpdb); + aa_put_dfa(nulldfa); + nullpdb = NULL; + nulldfa = NULL; + stacksplitdfa = NULL; + + return error; +} + +static void __init aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void) +{ + aa_put_dfa(stacksplitdfa); + aa_put_dfa(nulldfa); + aa_put_pdb(nullpdb); + nullpdb = NULL; + stacksplitdfa = NULL; + nulldfa = NULL; +} + static int __init apparmor_init(void) { int error; diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c index b97ef5e1db73..517d77d3c34c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/match.c +++ b/security/apparmor/match.c @@ -21,50 +21,6 @@ #define base_idx(X) ((X) & 0xffffff) -static char nulldfa_src[] = { - #include "nulldfa.in" -}; -struct aa_dfa *nulldfa; - -static char stacksplitdfa_src[] = { - #include "stacksplitdfa.in" -}; -struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa; - -int __init aa_setup_dfa_engine(void) -{ - int error; - - nulldfa = aa_dfa_unpack(nulldfa_src, sizeof(nulldfa_src), - TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | - TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32)); - if (IS_ERR(nulldfa)) { - error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa); - nulldfa = NULL; - return error; - } - - stacksplitdfa = aa_dfa_unpack(stacksplitdfa_src, - sizeof(stacksplitdfa_src), - TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | - TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32)); - if (IS_ERR(stacksplitdfa)) { - aa_put_dfa(nulldfa); - nulldfa = NULL; - error = PTR_ERR(stacksplitdfa); - stacksplitdfa = NULL; - return error; - } - - return 0; -} - -void __init aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void) -{ - aa_put_dfa(stacksplitdfa); - aa_put_dfa(nulldfa); -} - /** * unpack_table - unpack a dfa table (one of accept, default, base, next check) * @blob: data to unpack (NOT NULL) @@ -136,7 +92,7 @@ fail: /** * verify_table_headers - verify that the tables headers are as expected - * @tables - array of dfa tables to check (NOT NULL) + * @tables: array of dfa tables to check (NOT NULL) * @flags: flags controlling what type of accept table are acceptable * * Assumes dfa has gone through the first pass verification done by unpacking @@ -283,7 +239,7 @@ static void dfa_free(struct aa_dfa *dfa) /** * aa_dfa_free_kref - free aa_dfa by kref (called by aa_put_dfa) - * @kr: kref callback for freeing of a dfa (NOT NULL) + * @kref: kref callback for freeing of a dfa (NOT NULL) */ void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref) { diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c index cdfa430ae216..fb30204c761a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/mount.c +++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c @@ -86,32 +86,34 @@ static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags) static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa); - if (aad(sa)->mnt.type) { + if (ad->mnt.type) { audit_log_format(ab, " fstype="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.type); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.type); } - if (aad(sa)->mnt.src_name) { + if (ad->mnt.src_name) { audit_log_format(ab, " srcname="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.src_name); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.src_name); } - if (aad(sa)->mnt.trans) { + if (ad->mnt.trans) { audit_log_format(ab, " trans="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.trans); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.trans); } - if (aad(sa)->mnt.flags) { + if (ad->mnt.flags) { audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\""); - audit_mnt_flags(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.flags); + audit_mnt_flags(ab, ad->mnt.flags); audit_log_format(ab, "\""); } - if (aad(sa)->mnt.data) { + if (ad->mnt.data) { audit_log_format(ab, " options="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.data); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.data); } } /** * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations + * @subj_cred: cred of the subject * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL) * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL) * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL) @@ -127,14 +129,15 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) * * Returns: %0 or error on failure */ -static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, +static int audit_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, const char *name, const char *src_name, const char *type, const char *trans, unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms, const char *info, int error) { int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_MOUNT, op); + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_MOUNT, op); if (likely(!error)) { u32 mask = perms->audit; @@ -165,17 +168,18 @@ static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, return error; } - aad(&sa)->name = name; - aad(&sa)->mnt.src_name = src_name; - aad(&sa)->mnt.type = type; - aad(&sa)->mnt.trans = trans; - aad(&sa)->mnt.flags = flags; + ad.subj_cred = subj_cred; + ad.name = name; + ad.mnt.src_name = src_name; + ad.mnt.type = type; + ad.mnt.trans = trans; + ad.mnt.flags = flags; if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA)) - aad(&sa)->mnt.data = data; - aad(&sa)->info = info; - aad(&sa)->error = error; + ad.mnt.data = data; + ad.info = info; + ad.error = error; - return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, &sa, audit_cb); + return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, &ad, audit_cb); } /** @@ -283,6 +287,7 @@ static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path) /** * match_mnt_path_str - handle path matching for mount + * @subj_cred: cred of confined subject * @profile: the confining profile * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL) * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath @@ -295,7 +300,8 @@ static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path) * * Returns: 0 on success else error */ -static int match_mnt_path_str(struct aa_profile *profile, +static int match_mnt_path_str(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *mntpath, char *buffer, const char *devname, const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary, @@ -326,8 +332,8 @@ static int match_mnt_path_str(struct aa_profile *profile, } error = -EACCES; - pos = do_match_mnt(&rules->policy, - rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], + pos = do_match_mnt(rules->policy, + rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, &perms); if (pos) { info = mnt_info_table[pos]; @@ -336,12 +342,14 @@ static int match_mnt_path_str(struct aa_profile *profile, error = 0; audit: - return audit_mount(profile, OP_MOUNT, mntpnt, devname, type, NULL, + return audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_MOUNT, mntpnt, devname, + type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info, error); } /** * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount + * @subj_cred: cred of the subject * @profile: the confining profile * @path: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL) * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath @@ -354,7 +362,8 @@ audit: * * Returns: 0 on success else error */ -static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path, +static int match_mnt(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path, char *buffer, const struct path *devpath, char *devbuffer, const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary) @@ -378,11 +387,12 @@ static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path, devname = ERR_PTR(error); } - return match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer, devname, type, flags, - data, binary, info); + return match_mnt_path_str(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, devname, + type, flags, data, binary, info); } -int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, +int aa_remount(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, unsigned long flags, void *data) { struct aa_profile *profile; @@ -399,14 +409,16 @@ int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, if (!buffer) return -ENOMEM; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL, + match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, NULL, + NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary)); aa_put_buffer(buffer); return error; } -int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, +int aa_bind_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags) { struct aa_profile *profile; @@ -433,8 +445,8 @@ int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, goto out; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, &old_path, old_buffer, - NULL, flags, NULL, false)); + match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, &old_path, + old_buffer, NULL, flags, NULL, false)); out: aa_put_buffer(buffer); aa_put_buffer(old_buffer); @@ -443,7 +455,8 @@ out: return error; } -int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, +int aa_mount_change_type(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, unsigned long flags) { struct aa_profile *profile; @@ -461,50 +474,63 @@ int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, if (!buffer) return -ENOMEM; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL, + match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, NULL, + NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, false)); aa_put_buffer(buffer); return error; } -int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, - const char *orig_name) +int aa_move_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *from_path, + const struct path *to_path) { struct aa_profile *profile; - char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL; - struct path old_path; + char *to_buffer = NULL, *from_buffer = NULL; int error; AA_BUG(!label); - AA_BUG(!path); + AA_BUG(!from_path); + AA_BUG(!to_path); + + to_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false); + from_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false); + error = -ENOMEM; + if (!to_buffer || !from_buffer) + goto out; + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, to_path, to_buffer, + from_path, from_buffer, + NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, false)); +out: + aa_put_buffer(to_buffer); + aa_put_buffer(from_buffer); + + return error; +} + +int aa_move_mount_old(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + const struct path *path, const char *orig_name) +{ + struct path old_path; + int error; if (!orig_name || !*orig_name) return -EINVAL; - error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path); if (error) return error; - buffer = aa_get_buffer(false); - old_buffer = aa_get_buffer(false); - error = -ENOMEM; - if (!buffer || !old_buffer) - goto out; - error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, &old_path, old_buffer, - NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, false)); -out: - aa_put_buffer(buffer); - aa_put_buffer(old_buffer); + error = aa_move_mount(subj_cred, label, &old_path, path); path_put(&old_path); return error; } -int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name, - const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, - void *data) +int aa_new_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { struct aa_profile *profile; char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL; @@ -549,12 +575,14 @@ int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name, goto out; } error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, dev_path, dev_buffer, + match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, + dev_path, dev_buffer, type, flags, data, binary)); } else { error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer, dev_name, - type, flags, data, binary, NULL)); + match_mnt_path_str(subj_cred, profile, path, + buffer, dev_name, + type, flags, data, binary, NULL)); } out: @@ -566,7 +594,8 @@ out: return error; } -static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path, +static int profile_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path, char *buffer) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, @@ -587,19 +616,21 @@ static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path, if (error) goto audit; - state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa, - rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], + state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa, + rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], name); - perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state); + perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow) error = -EACCES; audit: - return audit_mount(profile, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, + return audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error); } -int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) +int aa_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) { struct aa_profile *profile; char *buffer = NULL; @@ -614,7 +645,7 @@ int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) return -ENOMEM; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - profile_umount(profile, &path, buffer)); + profile_umount(subj_cred, profile, &path, buffer)); aa_put_buffer(buffer); return error; @@ -624,7 +655,8 @@ int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) * * Returns: label for transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL */ -static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, +static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *new_path, char *new_buffer, const struct path *old_path, @@ -658,18 +690,19 @@ static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, goto audit; error = -EACCES; - state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa, - rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], + state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa, + rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], new_name); - state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->policy.dfa, state); - state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa, state, old_name); - perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state); + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->policy->dfa, state); + state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy->dfa, state, old_name); + perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) error = 0; audit: - error = audit_mount(profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name, old_name, + error = audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name, + old_name, NULL, trans_name, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error); if (error) @@ -678,7 +711,8 @@ audit: return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label); } -int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path, +int aa_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path) { struct aa_profile *profile; @@ -696,7 +730,8 @@ int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path, if (!old_buffer || !new_buffer) goto out; target = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL, - build_pivotroot(profile, new_path, new_buffer, + build_pivotroot(subj_cred, profile, new_path, + new_buffer, old_path, old_buffer)); if (!target) { info = "label build failed"; @@ -722,7 +757,8 @@ out: fail: /* TODO: add back in auditing of new_name and old_name */ error = fn_for_each(label, profile, - audit_mount(profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, NULL /*new_name */, + audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, + NULL /*new_name */, NULL /* old_name */, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &nullperms, info, diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c index 788be1609a86..87e934b2b548 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/net.c +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ static const char * const net_mask_names[] = { void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa); if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"", @@ -78,35 +79,36 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) else audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family); - if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]) + if (sock_type_names[ad->net.type]) audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"", - sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]); + sock_type_names[ad->net.type]); else audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"unknown(%d)\"", - aad(sa)->net.type); - audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol); + ad->net.type); + audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", ad->net.protocol); - if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) { + if (ad->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); - aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0, + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->request, NULL, 0, net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); - if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) { + if (ad->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); - aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0, + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->denied, NULL, 0, net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); } } - if (aad(sa)->peer) { + if (ad->peer) { audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer, FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); } } /* Generic af perm */ -int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, - u32 request, u16 family, int type) +int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request, u16 family, + int type) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); @@ -125,26 +127,28 @@ int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family); buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type); - state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, + state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, 4); - perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state); + perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); - return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb); } -int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, - int type, int protocol) +int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol) { struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol); + DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, NULL, family, type, protocol); return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family, + aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &ad, request, family, type)); } -static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, +static int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, + const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk) { struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); @@ -155,10 +159,11 @@ static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, if (ctx->label != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) { struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk); + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk); + ad.subj_cred = subj_cred; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk)); + aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &ad, request, sk)); } return error; @@ -174,21 +179,21 @@ int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk) /* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */ label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk); + error = aa_label_sk_perm(current_cred(), label, op, request, sk); end_current_label_crit_section(label); return error; } -int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, - struct socket *sock) +int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) { AA_BUG(!label); AA_BUG(!sock); AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk); + return aa_label_sk_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock->sk); } #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK @@ -214,7 +219,7 @@ static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark) } static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid, - struct common_audit_data *sa) + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { int i, ret; struct aa_perms perms = { }; @@ -245,17 +250,17 @@ static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid, aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); - return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb); } int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request, u32 secid, const struct sock *sk) { struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk); + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk); return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid, - &sa)); + &ad)); } #endif diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index b38f7b2a5e1d..ed4c9803c8fa 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ #include "include/resource.h" int unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy = 1; +int aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted; const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[] = { "enforce", @@ -98,6 +99,41 @@ const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[] = { }; +static void aa_free_pdb(struct aa_policydb *policy) +{ + if (policy) { + aa_put_dfa(policy->dfa); + if (policy->perms) + kvfree(policy->perms); + aa_free_str_table(&policy->trans); + } +} + +/** + * aa_pdb_free_kref - free aa_policydb by kref (called by aa_put_pdb) + * @kref: kref callback for freeing of a dfa (NOT NULL) + */ +void aa_pdb_free_kref(struct kref *kref) +{ + struct aa_policydb *pdb = container_of(kref, struct aa_policydb, count); + + aa_free_pdb(pdb); +} + + +struct aa_policydb *aa_alloc_pdb(gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct aa_policydb *pdb = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_policydb), gfp); + + if (!pdb) + return NULL; + + kref_init(&pdb->count); + + return pdb; +} + + /** * __add_profile - add a profiles to list and label tree * @list: list to add it to (NOT NULL) @@ -200,15 +236,15 @@ static void free_attachment(struct aa_attachment *attach) for (i = 0; i < attach->xattr_count; i++) kfree_sensitive(attach->xattrs[i]); kfree_sensitive(attach->xattrs); - aa_destroy_policydb(&attach->xmatch); + aa_put_pdb(attach->xmatch); } static void free_ruleset(struct aa_ruleset *rules) { int i; - aa_destroy_policydb(&rules->file); - aa_destroy_policydb(&rules->policy); + aa_put_pdb(rules->file); + aa_put_pdb(rules->policy); aa_free_cap_rules(&rules->caps); aa_free_rlimit_rules(&rules->rlimits); @@ -255,6 +291,7 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) aa_put_ns(profile->ns); kfree_sensitive(profile->rename); + kfree_sensitive(profile->disconnected); free_attachment(&profile->attach); @@ -285,6 +322,7 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) /** * aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile * @hname: name of the profile (NOT NULL) + * @proxy: proxy to use OR null if to allocate a new one * @gfp: allocation type * * Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure @@ -588,16 +626,8 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_null(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name, /* TODO: ideally we should inherit abi from parent */ profile->label.flags |= FLAG_NULL; rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); - rules->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); - rules->file.perms = kcalloc(2, sizeof(struct aa_perms), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rules->file.perms) - goto fail; - rules->file.size = 2; - rules->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); - rules->policy.perms = kcalloc(2, sizeof(struct aa_perms), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rules->policy.perms) - goto fail; - rules->policy.size = 2; + rules->file = aa_get_pdb(nullpdb); + rules->policy = aa_get_pdb(nullpdb); if (parent) { profile->path_flags = parent->path_flags; @@ -608,11 +638,6 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_null(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name, } return profile; - -fail: - aa_free_profile(profile); - - return NULL; } /** @@ -721,16 +746,17 @@ static int replacement_allowed(struct aa_profile *profile, int noreplace, static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa); - if (aad(sa)->iface.ns) { + if (ad->iface.ns) { audit_log_format(ab, " ns="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.ns); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->iface.ns); } } /** * audit_policy - Do auditing of policy changes - * @label: label to check if it can manage policy + * @subj_label: label to check if it can manage policy * @op: policy operation being performed * @ns_name: name of namespace being manipulated * @name: name of profile being manipulated (NOT NULL) @@ -739,19 +765,19 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) * * Returns: the error to be returned after audit is done */ -static int audit_policy(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, +static int audit_policy(struct aa_label *subj_label, const char *op, const char *ns_name, const char *name, const char *info, int error) { - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, op); + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, op); - aad(&sa)->iface.ns = ns_name; - aad(&sa)->name = name; - aad(&sa)->info = info; - aad(&sa)->error = error; - aad(&sa)->label = label; + ad.iface.ns = ns_name; + ad.name = name; + ad.info = info; + ad.error = error; + ad.subj_label = subj_label; - aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, audit_cb); + aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &ad, audit_cb); return error; } @@ -759,31 +785,35 @@ static int audit_policy(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, /* don't call out to other LSMs in the stack for apparmor policy admin * permissions */ -static int policy_ns_capable(struct aa_label *label, +static int policy_ns_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct user_namespace *userns, int cap) { int err; /* check for MAC_ADMIN cap in cred */ - err = cap_capable(current_cred(), userns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); + err = cap_capable(subj_cred, userns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); if (!err) - err = aa_capable(label, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); + err = aa_capable(subj_cred, label, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); return err; } /** * aa_policy_view_capable - check if viewing policy in at @ns is allowed - * label: label that is trying to view policy in ns - * ns: namespace being viewed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns) + * @subj_cred: cred of subject + * @label: label that is trying to view policy in ns + * @ns: namespace being viewed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns) + * * Returns: true if viewing policy is allowed * * If @ns is NULL then the namespace being viewed is assumed to be the * tasks current namespace. */ -bool aa_policy_view_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns) +bool aa_policy_view_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns) { - struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); + struct user_namespace *user_ns = subj_cred->user_ns; struct aa_ns *view_ns = labels_view(label); bool root_in_user_ns = uid_eq(current_euid(), make_kuid(user_ns, 0)) || in_egroup_p(make_kgid(user_ns, 0)); @@ -800,15 +830,17 @@ bool aa_policy_view_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns) return response; } -bool aa_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns) +bool aa_policy_admin_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns) { - struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); - bool capable = policy_ns_capable(label, user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN) == 0; + struct user_namespace *user_ns = subj_cred->user_ns; + bool capable = policy_ns_capable(subj_cred, label, user_ns, + CAP_MAC_ADMIN) == 0; AA_DEBUG("cap_mac_admin? %d\n", capable); AA_DEBUG("policy locked? %d\n", aa_g_lock_policy); - return aa_policy_view_capable(label, ns) && capable && + return aa_policy_view_capable(subj_cred, label, ns) && capable && !aa_g_lock_policy; } @@ -818,7 +850,7 @@ bool aa_current_policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns) bool res; label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); - res = aa_policy_view_capable(label, ns); + res = aa_policy_view_capable(current_cred(), label, ns); __end_current_label_crit_section(label); return res; @@ -830,7 +862,7 @@ bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns) bool res; label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); - res = aa_policy_admin_capable(label, ns); + res = aa_policy_admin_capable(current_cred(), label, ns); __end_current_label_crit_section(label); return res; @@ -838,12 +870,15 @@ bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns) /** * aa_may_manage_policy - can the current task manage policy + * @subj_cred: subjects cred * @label: label to check if it can manage policy + * @ns: namespace being managed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns) * @mask: contains the policy manipulation operation being done * * Returns: 0 if the task is allowed to manipulate policy else error */ -int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask) +int aa_may_manage_policy(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask) { const char *op; @@ -859,7 +894,7 @@ int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask) return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "policy_locked", -EACCES); - if (!aa_policy_admin_capable(label, ns)) + if (!aa_policy_admin_capable(subj_cred, label, ns)) return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "not policy admin", -EACCES); @@ -950,11 +985,11 @@ static void __replace_profile(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new) /** * __lookup_replace - lookup replacement information for a profile - * @ns - namespace the lookup occurs in - * @hname - name of profile to lookup - * @noreplace - true if not replacing an existing profile - * @p - Returns: profile to be replaced - * @info - Returns: info string on why lookup failed + * @ns: namespace the lookup occurs in + * @hname: name of profile to lookup + * @noreplace: true if not replacing an existing profile + * @p: Returns - profile to be replaced + * @info: Returns - info string on why lookup failed * * Returns: profile to replace (no ref) on success else ptr error */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c b/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c index 0cb02da8a319..423227670e68 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static struct aa_perms compute_fperms_other(struct aa_dfa *dfa, * compute_fperms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms and store * them so they can be retrieved later. * @dfa: a dfa using fperms to remap to internal permissions + * @size: Returns the permission table size * * Returns: remapped perm table */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c index fd5b7afbcb48..1f02cfe1d974 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c @@ -160,43 +160,6 @@ void aa_free_ns(struct aa_ns *ns) } /** - * aa_findn_ns - look up a profile namespace on the namespace list - * @root: namespace to search in (NOT NULL) - * @name: name of namespace to find (NOT NULL) - * @n: length of @name - * - * Returns: a refcounted namespace on the list, or NULL if no namespace - * called @name exists. - * - * refcount released by caller - */ -struct aa_ns *aa_findn_ns(struct aa_ns *root, const char *name, size_t n) -{ - struct aa_ns *ns = NULL; - - rcu_read_lock(); - ns = aa_get_ns(__aa_findn_ns(&root->sub_ns, name, n)); - rcu_read_unlock(); - - return ns; -} - -/** - * aa_find_ns - look up a profile namespace on the namespace list - * @root: namespace to search in (NOT NULL) - * @name: name of namespace to find (NOT NULL) - * - * Returns: a refcounted namespace on the list, or NULL if no namespace - * called @name exists. - * - * refcount released by caller - */ -struct aa_ns *aa_find_ns(struct aa_ns *root, const char *name) -{ - return aa_findn_ns(root, name, strlen(name)); -} - -/** * __aa_lookupn_ns - lookup the namespace matching @hname * @view: namespace to search in (NOT NULL) * @hname: hierarchical ns name (NOT NULL) diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 913ec8d0eb63..47ec097d6741 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -34,17 +34,18 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa); - if (aad(sa)->iface.ns) { + if (ad->iface.ns) { audit_log_format(ab, " ns="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.ns); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->iface.ns); } - if (aad(sa)->name) { + if (ad->name) { audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->name); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->name); } - if (aad(sa)->iface.pos) - audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", aad(sa)->iface.pos); + if (ad->iface.pos) + audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", ad->iface.pos); } /** @@ -63,18 +64,18 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *ns_name, int error) { struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(aa_current_raw_label()); - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, NULL); + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, NULL); if (e) - aad(&sa)->iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; - aad(&sa)->iface.ns = ns_name; + ad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; + ad.iface.ns = ns_name; if (new) - aad(&sa)->name = new->base.hname; + ad.name = new->base.hname; else - aad(&sa)->name = name; - aad(&sa)->info = info; - aad(&sa)->error = error; + ad.name = name; + ad.info = info; + ad.error = error; - return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, &sa, audit_cb); + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, &ad, audit_cb); } void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision) @@ -705,24 +706,29 @@ fail_reset: return -EPROTO; } -static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb *policy, +static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb **policy, bool required_dfa, bool required_trans, const char **info) { + struct aa_policydb *pdb; void *pos = e->pos; int i, flags, error = -EPROTO; ssize_t size; - size = unpack_perms_table(e, &policy->perms); + pdb = aa_alloc_pdb(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pdb) + return -ENOMEM; + + size = unpack_perms_table(e, &pdb->perms); if (size < 0) { error = size; - policy->perms = NULL; + pdb->perms = NULL; *info = "failed to unpack - perms"; goto fail; } - policy->size = size; + pdb->size = size; - if (policy->perms) { + if (pdb->perms) { /* perms table present accept is index */ flags = TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32); } else { @@ -731,13 +737,13 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb *policy, TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32); } - policy->dfa = unpack_dfa(e, flags); - if (IS_ERR(policy->dfa)) { - error = PTR_ERR(policy->dfa); - policy->dfa = NULL; + pdb->dfa = unpack_dfa(e, flags); + if (IS_ERR(pdb->dfa)) { + error = PTR_ERR(pdb->dfa); + pdb->dfa = NULL; *info = "failed to unpack - dfa"; goto fail; - } else if (!policy->dfa) { + } else if (!pdb->dfa) { if (required_dfa) { *info = "missing required dfa"; goto fail; @@ -751,18 +757,18 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb *policy, * sadly start was given different names for file and policydb * but since it is optional we can try both */ - if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &policy->start[0], "start")) + if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &pdb->start[0], "start")) /* default start state */ - policy->start[0] = DFA_START; - if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &policy->start[AA_CLASS_FILE], "dfa_start")) { + pdb->start[0] = DFA_START; + if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &pdb->start[AA_CLASS_FILE], "dfa_start")) { /* default start state for xmatch and file dfa */ - policy->start[AA_CLASS_FILE] = DFA_START; + pdb->start[AA_CLASS_FILE] = DFA_START; } /* setup class index */ for (i = AA_CLASS_FILE + 1; i <= AA_CLASS_LAST; i++) { - policy->start[i] = aa_dfa_next(policy->dfa, policy->start[0], + pdb->start[i] = aa_dfa_next(pdb->dfa, pdb->start[0], i); } - if (!unpack_trans_table(e, &policy->trans) && required_trans) { + if (!unpack_trans_table(e, &pdb->trans) && required_trans) { *info = "failed to unpack profile transition table"; goto fail; } @@ -770,9 +776,11 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb *policy, /* TODO: move compat mapping here, requires dfa merging first */ /* TODO: move verify here, it has to be done after compat mappings */ out: + *policy = pdb; return 0; fail: + aa_put_pdb(pdb); e->pos = pos; return error; } @@ -807,7 +815,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) const char *info = "failed to unpack profile"; size_t ns_len; struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 }; - char *key = NULL; + char *key = NULL, *disconnected = NULL; struct aa_data *data; int error = -EPROTO; kernel_cap_t tmpcap; @@ -856,15 +864,15 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) } /* neither xmatch_len not xmatch_perms are optional if xmatch is set */ - if (profile->attach.xmatch.dfa) { + if (profile->attach.xmatch->dfa) { if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) { info = "missing xmatch len"; goto fail; } profile->attach.xmatch_len = tmp; - profile->attach.xmatch.start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH] = DFA_START; - if (!profile->attach.xmatch.perms) { - error = aa_compat_map_xmatch(&profile->attach.xmatch); + profile->attach.xmatch->start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH] = DFA_START; + if (!profile->attach.xmatch->perms) { + error = aa_compat_map_xmatch(profile->attach.xmatch); if (error) { info = "failed to convert xmatch permission table"; goto fail; @@ -873,7 +881,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) } /* disconnected attachment string is optional */ - (void) aa_unpack_str(e, &profile->disconnected, "disconnected"); + (void) aa_unpack_strdup(e, &disconnected, "disconnected"); + profile->disconnected = disconnected; /* per profile debug flags (complain, audit) */ if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "flags")) { @@ -980,16 +989,16 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) if (error) goto fail; /* Fixup: drop when we get rid of start array */ - if (aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa, rules->policy.start[0], + if (aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, rules->policy->start[0], AA_CLASS_FILE)) - rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_FILE] = - aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa, - rules->policy.start[0], + rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_FILE] = + aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, + rules->policy->start[0], AA_CLASS_FILE); if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) goto fail; - if (!rules->policy.perms) { - error = aa_compat_map_policy(&rules->policy, + if (!rules->policy->perms) { + error = aa_compat_map_policy(rules->policy, e->version); if (error) { info = "failed to remap policydb permission table"; @@ -997,44 +1006,25 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) } } } else { - rules->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); - rules->policy.perms = kcalloc(2, sizeof(struct aa_perms), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rules->policy.perms) - goto fail; - rules->policy.size = 2; + rules->policy = aa_get_pdb(nullpdb); } /* get file rules */ error = unpack_pdb(e, &rules->file, false, true, &info); if (error) { goto fail; - } else if (rules->file.dfa) { - if (!rules->file.perms) { - error = aa_compat_map_file(&rules->file); + } else if (rules->file->dfa) { + if (!rules->file->perms) { + error = aa_compat_map_file(rules->file); if (error) { info = "failed to remap file permission table"; goto fail; } } - } else if (rules->policy.dfa && - rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_FILE]) { - rules->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(rules->policy.dfa); - rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE] = rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_FILE]; - rules->file.perms = kcalloc(rules->policy.size, - sizeof(struct aa_perms), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rules->file.perms) - goto fail; - memcpy(rules->file.perms, rules->policy.perms, - rules->policy.size * sizeof(struct aa_perms)); - rules->file.size = rules->policy.size; + } else if (rules->policy->dfa && + rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_FILE]) { + rules->file = aa_get_pdb(rules->policy); } else { - rules->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); - rules->file.perms = kcalloc(2, sizeof(struct aa_perms), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rules->file.perms) - goto fail; - rules->file.size = 2; + rules->file = aa_get_pdb(nullpdb); } error = -EPROTO; if (aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "data")) { @@ -1170,7 +1160,7 @@ static int verify_header(struct aa_ext *e, int required, const char **ns) /** * verify_dfa_accept_index - verify accept indexes are in range of perms table * @dfa: the dfa to check accept indexes are in range - * table_size: the permission table size the indexes should be within + * @table_size: the permission table size the indexes should be within */ static bool verify_dfa_accept_index(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int table_size) { @@ -1241,26 +1231,32 @@ static int verify_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) if (!rules) return 0; - if ((rules->file.dfa && !verify_dfa_accept_index(rules->file.dfa, - rules->file.size)) || - (rules->policy.dfa && - !verify_dfa_accept_index(rules->policy.dfa, rules->policy.size))) { + if (rules->file->dfa && !verify_dfa_accept_index(rules->file->dfa, + rules->file->size)) { + audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL, + "Unpack: file Invalid named transition", NULL, + -EPROTO); + return -EPROTO; + } + if (rules->policy->dfa && + !verify_dfa_accept_index(rules->policy->dfa, rules->policy->size)) { audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL, - "Unpack: Invalid named transition", NULL, -EPROTO); + "Unpack: policy Invalid named transition", NULL, + -EPROTO); return -EPROTO; } - if (!verify_perms(&rules->file)) { + if (!verify_perms(rules->file)) { audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL, "Unpack: Invalid perm index", NULL, -EPROTO); return -EPROTO; } - if (!verify_perms(&rules->policy)) { + if (!verify_perms(rules->policy)) { audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL, "Unpack: Invalid perm index", NULL, -EPROTO); return -EPROTO; } - if (!verify_perms(&profile->attach.xmatch)) { + if (!verify_perms(profile->attach.xmatch)) { audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL, "Unpack: Invalid perm index", NULL, -EPROTO); return -EPROTO; diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index e85948164896..dcc94c3153d5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -30,18 +30,20 @@ struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_rlimit[] = { static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa); audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%s value=%lu", - rlim_names[aad(sa)->rlim.rlim], aad(sa)->rlim.max); - if (aad(sa)->peer) { + rlim_names[ad->rlim.rlim], ad->rlim.max); + if (ad->peer) { audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer, FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); } } /** * audit_resource - audit setting resource limit + * @subj_cred: cred setting the resource * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL) * @resource: rlimit being auditing * @value: value being set @@ -49,22 +51,24 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) * @info: info being auditing * @error: error value * - * Returns: 0 or sa->error else other error code on failure + * Returns: 0 or ad->error else other error code on failure */ -static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, +static int audit_resource(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, unsigned long value, struct aa_label *peer, const char *info, int error) { - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_RLIMITS, + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_RLIMITS, OP_SETRLIMIT); - aad(&sa)->rlim.rlim = resource; - aad(&sa)->rlim.max = value; - aad(&sa)->peer = peer; - aad(&sa)->info = info; - aad(&sa)->error = error; + ad.subj_cred = subj_cred; + ad.rlim.rlim = resource; + ad.rlim.max = value; + ad.peer = peer; + ad.info = info; + ad.error = error; - return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, &sa, audit_cb); + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, &ad, audit_cb); } /** @@ -81,7 +85,8 @@ int aa_map_resource(int resource) return rlim_map[resource]; } -static int profile_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, +static int profile_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, @@ -91,22 +96,24 @@ static int profile_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, if (rules->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && new_rlim->rlim_max > rules->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max) e = -EACCES; - return audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, NULL, NULL, - e); + return audit_resource(subj_cred, profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, + NULL, NULL, e); } /** * aa_task_setrlimit - test permission to set an rlimit - * @label - label confining the task (NOT NULL) - * @task - task the resource is being set on - * @resource - the resource being set - * @new_rlim - the new resource limit (NOT NULL) + * @subj_cred: cred setting the limit + * @label: label confining the task (NOT NULL) + * @task: task the resource is being set on + * @resource: the resource being set + * @new_rlim: the new resource limit (NOT NULL) * * Control raising the processes hard limit. * * Returns: 0 or error code if setting resource failed */ -int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task, +int aa_task_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + struct task_struct *task, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { struct aa_profile *profile; @@ -125,14 +132,15 @@ int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task, */ if (label != peer && - aa_capable(label, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0) + aa_capable(subj_cred, label, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0) error = fn_for_each(label, profile, - audit_resource(profile, resource, + audit_resource(subj_cred, profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, peer, "cap_sys_resource", -EACCES)); else error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - profile_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim)); + profile_setrlimit(subj_cred, profile, resource, + new_rlim)); aa_put_label(peer); return error; diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c index 84d16a29bfcb..f29a2e80e6bf 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/task.c +++ b/security/apparmor/task.c @@ -93,9 +93,8 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label) * aa_set_current_onexec - set the tasks change_profile to happen onexec * @label: system label to set at exec (MAYBE NULL to clear value) * @stack: whether stacking should be done - * Returns: 0 or error on failure */ -int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack) +void aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack) { struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); @@ -103,8 +102,6 @@ int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack) aa_put_label(ctx->onexec); ctx->onexec = label; ctx->token = stack; - - return 0; } /** @@ -208,70 +205,75 @@ static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask) static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa); - if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { + if (ad->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"", - audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request)); + audit_ptrace_mask(ad->request)); - if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { + if (ad->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"", - audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied)); + audit_ptrace_mask(ad->denied)); } } audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer, FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); } /* assumes check for RULE_MEDIATES is already done */ /* TODO: conditionals */ -static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, - struct aa_label *peer, u32 request, - struct common_audit_data *sa) +static int profile_ptrace_perm(const struct cred *cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_label *peer, u32 request, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); struct aa_perms perms = { }; - aad(sa)->peer = peer; + ad->subj_cred = cred; + ad->peer = peer; aa_profile_match_label(profile, rules, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request, &perms); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); - return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_ptrace_cb); } -static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee, +static int profile_tracee_perm(const struct cred *cred, + struct aa_profile *tracee, struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request, - struct common_audit_data *sa) + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) || !ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&tracee->rules, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) return 0; - return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa); + return profile_ptrace_perm(cred, tracee, tracer, request, ad); } -static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, +static int profile_tracer_perm(const struct cred *cred, + struct aa_profile *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request, - struct common_audit_data *sa) + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { if (profile_unconfined(tracer)) return 0; if (ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&tracer->rules, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) - return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa); + return profile_ptrace_perm(cred, tracer, tracee, request, ad); /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */ if (&tracer->label == tracee) return 0; - aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label; - aad(sa)->peer = tracee; - aad(sa)->request = 0; - aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, - CAP_OPT_NONE); + ad->subj_label = &tracer->label; + ad->peer = tracee; + ad->request = 0; + ad->error = aa_capable(cred, &tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, + CAP_OPT_NONE); - return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, ad, audit_ptrace_cb); } /** @@ -282,7 +284,8 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, * * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error */ -int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, +int aa_may_ptrace(const struct cred *tracer_cred, struct aa_label *tracer, + const struct cred *tracee_cred, struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request) { struct aa_profile *profile; @@ -290,6 +293,49 @@ int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, OP_PTRACE); return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile, - profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa), - profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa)); + profile_tracer_perm(tracer_cred, profile, tracee, + request, &sa), + profile_tracee_perm(tracee_cred, profile, tracer, + xrequest, &sa)); +} + +/* call back to audit ptrace fields */ +static void audit_ns_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va); + + if (ad->request & AA_USERNS_CREATE) + audit_log_format(ab, " requested=\"userns_create\""); + + if (ad->denied & AA_USERNS_CREATE) + audit_log_format(ab, " denied=\"userns_create\""); +} + +int aa_profile_ns_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, + u32 request) +{ + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + int error = 0; + + ad->subj_label = &profile->label; + ad->request = request; + + if (!profile_unconfined(profile)) { + struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, + typeof(*rules), + list); + aa_state_t state; + + state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, ad->class); + if (!state) + /* TODO: add flag to complain about unmediated */ + return 0; + perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + error = aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, + audit_ns_cb); + } + + return error; } |