diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 28 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index cf787eaca755..7138083c5bef 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2313,19 +2313,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; - /* - * Before policy is loaded, label any task outside kernel space - * as SECINITSID_INIT, so that any userspace tasks surviving from - * early boot end up with a label different from SECINITSID_KERNEL - * (if the policy chooses to set SECINITSID_INIT != SECINITSID_KERNEL). - */ - if (!selinux_initialized()) { - new_tsec->sid = SECINITSID_INIT; - /* also clear the exec_sid just in case */ - new_tsec->exec_sid = 0; - return 0; - } - if (old_tsec->exec_sid) { new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid; /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ @@ -4542,21 +4529,6 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) return 0; - /* - * Before POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT, sockets that - * inherited the kernel context from early boot used to be skipped - * here, so preserve that behavior unless the capability is set. - * - * By setting the capability the policy signals that it is ready - * for this quirk to be fixed. Note that sockets created by a kernel - * thread or a usermode helper executed without a transition will - * still be skipped in this check regardless of the policycap - * setting. - */ - if (!selinux_policycap_userspace_initial_context() && - sksec->sid == SECINITSID_INIT) - return 0; - ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk); return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, |