diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 485 |
1 files changed, 314 insertions, 171 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index e97917b97b3f..07c0259dfc1a 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ struct bpf_call_arg_meta { struct btf *ret_btf; u32 ret_btf_id; u32 subprogno; - struct bpf_map_value_off_desc *kptr_off_desc; + struct btf_field *kptr_field; u8 uninit_dynptr_regno; }; @@ -454,14 +454,7 @@ static bool reg_type_not_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) { return reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && - map_value_has_spin_lock(reg->map_ptr); -} - -static bool reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) -{ - type = base_type(type); - return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || - type == PTR_TO_MEM || type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID; + btf_record_has_field(reg->map_ptr->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK); } static bool type_is_rdonly_mem(u32 type) @@ -511,6 +504,15 @@ static bool is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) return func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data; } +static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) +{ + return func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || + func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback || + func_id == BPF_FUNC_find_vma || + func_id == BPF_FUNC_loop || + func_id == BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain; +} + static bool helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_map *map) { @@ -875,7 +877,7 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (reg->id) verbose_a("id=%d", reg->id); - if (reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(t) && reg->ref_obj_id) + if (reg->ref_obj_id) verbose_a("ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id); if (t != SCALAR_VALUE) verbose_a("off=%d", reg->off); @@ -1400,7 +1402,7 @@ static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) /* transfer reg's id which is unique for every map_lookup_elem * as UID of the inner map. */ - if (map_value_has_timer(map->inner_map_meta)) + if (btf_record_has_field(map->inner_map_meta->record, BPF_TIMER)) reg->map_uid = reg->id; } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; @@ -1689,7 +1691,7 @@ static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; reg->frameno = 0; - reg->precise = env->subprog_cnt > 1 || !env->bpf_capable; + reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable; __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); } @@ -2658,6 +2660,11 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) return -ENOTSUPP; + /* BPF helpers that invoke callback subprogs are + * equivalent to BPF_PSEUDO_CALL above + */ + if (insn->src_reg == 0 && is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) + return -ENOTSUPP; /* regular helper call sets R0 */ *reg_mask &= ~1; if (*reg_mask & 0x3f) { @@ -2747,8 +2754,11 @@ static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path. * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars. + * We also skip current state and go straight to first parent state, + * because precision markings in current non-checkpointed state are + * not needed. See why in the comment in __mark_chain_precision below. */ - for (; st; st = st->parent) + for (st = st->parent; st; st = st->parent) { for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { func = st->frame[i]; for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { @@ -2766,9 +2776,122 @@ static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, reg->precise = true; } } + } } -static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, +static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) +{ + struct bpf_func_state *func; + struct bpf_reg_state *reg; + int i, j; + + for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { + func = st->frame[i]; + for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { + reg = &func->regs[j]; + if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) + continue; + reg->precise = false; + } + for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { + if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) + continue; + reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; + if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) + continue; + reg->precise = false; + } + } +} + +/* + * __mark_chain_precision() backtracks BPF program instruction sequence and + * chain of verifier states making sure that register *regno* (if regno >= 0) + * and/or stack slot *spi* (if spi >= 0) are marked as precisely tracked + * SCALARS, as well as any other registers and slots that contribute to + * a tracked state of given registers/stack slots, depending on specific BPF + * assembly instructions (see backtrack_insns() for exact instruction handling + * logic). This backtracking relies on recorded jmp_history and is able to + * traverse entire chain of parent states. This process ends only when all the + * necessary registers/slots and their transitive dependencies are marked as + * precise. + * + * One important and subtle aspect is that precise marks *do not matter* in + * the currently verified state (current state). It is important to understand + * why this is the case. + * + * First, note that current state is the state that is not yet "checkpointed", + * i.e., it is not yet put into env->explored_states, and it has no children + * states as well. It's ephemeral, and can end up either a) being discarded if + * compatible explored state is found at some point or BPF_EXIT instruction is + * reached or b) checkpointed and put into env->explored_states, branching out + * into one or more children states. + * + * In the former case, precise markings in current state are completely + * ignored by state comparison code (see regsafe() for details). Only + * checkpointed ("old") state precise markings are important, and if old + * state's register/slot is precise, regsafe() assumes current state's + * register/slot as precise and checks value ranges exactly and precisely. If + * states turn out to be compatible, current state's necessary precise + * markings and any required parent states' precise markings are enforced + * after the fact with propagate_precision() logic, after the fact. But it's + * important to realize that in this case, even after marking current state + * registers/slots as precise, we immediately discard current state. So what + * actually matters is any of the precise markings propagated into current + * state's parent states, which are always checkpointed (due to b) case above). + * As such, for scenario a) it doesn't matter if current state has precise + * markings set or not. + * + * Now, for the scenario b), checkpointing and forking into child(ren) + * state(s). Note that before current state gets to checkpointing step, any + * processed instruction always assumes precise SCALAR register/slot + * knowledge: if precise value or range is useful to prune jump branch, BPF + * verifier takes this opportunity enthusiastically. Similarly, when + * register's value is used to calculate offset or memory address, exact + * knowledge of SCALAR range is assumed, checked, and enforced. So, similar to + * what we mentioned above about state comparison ignoring precise markings + * during state comparison, BPF verifier ignores and also assumes precise + * markings *at will* during instruction verification process. But as verifier + * assumes precision, it also propagates any precision dependencies across + * parent states, which are not yet finalized, so can be further restricted + * based on new knowledge gained from restrictions enforced by their children + * states. This is so that once those parent states are finalized, i.e., when + * they have no more active children state, state comparison logic in + * is_state_visited() would enforce strict and precise SCALAR ranges, if + * required for correctness. + * + * To build a bit more intuition, note also that once a state is checkpointed, + * the path we took to get to that state is not important. This is crucial + * property for state pruning. When state is checkpointed and finalized at + * some instruction index, it can be correctly and safely used to "short + * circuit" any *compatible* state that reaches exactly the same instruction + * index. I.e., if we jumped to that instruction from a completely different + * code path than original finalized state was derived from, it doesn't + * matter, current state can be discarded because from that instruction + * forward having a compatible state will ensure we will safely reach the + * exit. States describe preconditions for further exploration, but completely + * forget the history of how we got here. + * + * This also means that even if we needed precise SCALAR range to get to + * finalized state, but from that point forward *that same* SCALAR register is + * never used in a precise context (i.e., it's precise value is not needed for + * correctness), it's correct and safe to mark such register as "imprecise" + * (i.e., precise marking set to false). This is what we rely on when we do + * not set precise marking in current state. If no child state requires + * precision for any given SCALAR register, it's safe to dictate that it can + * be imprecise. If any child state does require this register to be precise, + * we'll mark it precise later retroactively during precise markings + * propagation from child state to parent states. + * + * Skipping precise marking setting in current state is a mild version of + * relying on the above observation. But we can utilize this property even + * more aggressively by proactively forgetting any precise marking in the + * current state (which we inherited from the parent state), right before we + * checkpoint it and branch off into new child state. This is done by + * mark_all_scalars_imprecise() to hopefully get more permissive and generic + * finalized states which help in short circuiting more future states. + */ +static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int regno, int spi) { struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state; @@ -2785,18 +2908,18 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, if (!env->bpf_capable) return 0; - func = st->frame[st->curframe]; + /* Do sanity checks against current state of register and/or stack + * slot, but don't set precise flag in current state, as precision + * tracking in the current state is unnecessary. + */ + func = st->frame[frame]; if (regno >= 0) { reg = &func->regs[regno]; if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse"); return -EFAULT; } - if (!reg->precise) - new_marks = true; - else - reg_mask = 0; - reg->precise = true; + new_marks = true; } while (spi >= 0) { @@ -2809,11 +2932,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, stack_mask = 0; break; } - if (!reg->precise) - new_marks = true; - else - stack_mask = 0; - reg->precise = true; + new_marks = true; break; } @@ -2821,12 +2940,42 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, return 0; if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) return 0; + for (;;) { DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) verbose(env, "last_idx %d first_idx %d\n", last_idx, first_idx); + + if (last_idx < 0) { + /* we are at the entry into subprog, which + * is expected for global funcs, but only if + * requested precise registers are R1-R5 + * (which are global func's input arguments) + */ + if (st->curframe == 0 && + st->frame[0]->subprogno > 0 && + st->frame[0]->callsite == BPF_MAIN_FUNC && + stack_mask == 0 && (reg_mask & ~0x3e) == 0) { + bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); + for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { + reg = &st->frame[0]->regs[i]; + if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { + reg_mask &= ~(1u << i); + continue; + } + reg->precise = true; + } + return 0; + } + + verbose(env, "BUG backtracing func entry subprog %d reg_mask %x stack_mask %llx\n", + st->frame[0]->subprogno, reg_mask, stack_mask); + WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); + return -EFAULT; + } + for (i = last_idx;;) { if (skip_first) { err = 0; @@ -2866,7 +3015,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, break; new_marks = false; - func = st->frame[st->curframe]; + func = st->frame[frame]; bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { reg = &func->regs[i]; @@ -2932,12 +3081,17 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) { - return __mark_chain_precision(env, regno, -1); + return __mark_chain_precision(env, env->cur_state->curframe, regno, -1); +} + +static int mark_chain_precision_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int regno) +{ + return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, regno, -1); } -static int mark_chain_precision_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int spi) +static int mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int spi) { - return __mark_chain_precision(env, -1, spi); + return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, -1, spi); } static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) @@ -3186,14 +3340,17 @@ static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); - if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks - && *stype != NOT_INIT - && *stype != SCALAR_VALUE) { - /* Reject the write if there's are spilled pointers in - * range. If we didn't reject here, the ptr status - * would be erased below (even though not all slots are - * actually overwritten), possibly opening the door to - * leaks. + if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && *stype != STACK_MISC && *stype != STACK_ZERO) { + /* Reject the write if range we may write to has not + * been initialized beforehand. If we didn't reject + * here, the ptr status would be erased below (even + * though not all slots are actually overwritten), + * possibly opening the door to leaks. + * + * We do however catch STACK_INVALID case below, and + * only allow reading possibly uninitialized memory + * later for CAP_PERFMON, as the write may not happen to + * that slot. */ verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d", insn_idx, i); @@ -3683,15 +3840,15 @@ int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - struct bpf_map_value_off_desc *off_desc, + struct btf_field *kptr_field, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno) { - const char *targ_name = kernel_type_name(off_desc->kptr.btf, off_desc->kptr.btf_id); + const char *targ_name = kernel_type_name(kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id); int perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL; const char *reg_name = ""; /* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */ - if (off_desc->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) + if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags)) @@ -3738,15 +3895,15 @@ static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * strict mode to true for type match. */ if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, - off_desc->kptr.btf, off_desc->kptr.btf_id, - off_desc->type == BPF_KPTR_REF)) + kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, + kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF)) goto bad_type; return 0; bad_type: verbose(env, "invalid kptr access, R%d type=%s%s ", regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type), reg_name); verbose(env, "expected=%s%s", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name); - if (off_desc->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) + if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) verbose(env, " or %s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED), targ_name); else @@ -3756,7 +3913,7 @@ bad_type: static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int value_regno, int insn_idx, - struct bpf_map_value_off_desc *off_desc) + struct btf_field *kptr_field) { struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); @@ -3766,7 +3923,7 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, * - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr * - size of access (must be BPF_DW) * - tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) - * - off_desc->offset == off + reg->var_off.value + * - kptr_field->offset == off + reg->var_off.value */ /* Only BPF_[LDX,STX,ST] | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW is supported */ if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { @@ -3777,7 +3934,7 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, /* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as * untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr. */ - if (class != BPF_LDX && off_desc->type == BPF_KPTR_REF) { + if (class != BPF_LDX && kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF) { verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n"); return -EACCES; } @@ -3787,19 +3944,19 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, /* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type. */ - mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, off_desc->kptr.btf, - off_desc->kptr.btf_id, PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED); + mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, kptr_field->kptr.btf, + kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED); /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg */ val_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; } else if (class == BPF_STX) { val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); if (!register_is_null(val_reg) && - map_kptr_match_type(env, off_desc, val_reg, value_regno)) + map_kptr_match_type(env, kptr_field, val_reg, value_regno)) return -EACCES; } else if (class == BPF_ST) { if (insn->imm) { verbose(env, "BPF_ST imm must be 0 when storing to kptr at off=%u\n", - off_desc->offset); + kptr_field->offset); return -EACCES; } } else { @@ -3818,45 +3975,30 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; - int err; + struct btf_record *rec; + int err, i; err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, map->value_size, zero_size_allowed); if (err) return err; - if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { - u32 lock = map->spin_lock_off; + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record)) + return 0; + rec = map->record; + for (i = 0; i < rec->cnt; i++) { + struct btf_field *field = &rec->fields[i]; + u32 p = field->offset; - /* if any part of struct bpf_spin_lock can be touched by - * load/store reject this program. - * To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2) + /* If any part of a field can be touched by load/store, reject + * this program. To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2), * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2. */ - if (reg->smin_value + off < lock + sizeof(struct bpf_spin_lock) && - lock < reg->umax_value + off + size) { - verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n"); - return -EACCES; - } - } - if (map_value_has_timer(map)) { - u32 t = map->timer_off; - - if (reg->smin_value + off < t + sizeof(struct bpf_timer) && - t < reg->umax_value + off + size) { - verbose(env, "bpf_timer cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n"); - return -EACCES; - } - } - if (map_value_has_kptrs(map)) { - struct bpf_map_value_off *tab = map->kptr_off_tab; - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < tab->nr_off; i++) { - u32 p = tab->off[i].offset; - - if (reg->smin_value + off < p + sizeof(u64) && - p < reg->umax_value + off + size) { + if (reg->smin_value + off < p + btf_field_type_size(field->type) && + p < reg->umax_value + off + size) { + switch (field->type) { + case BPF_KPTR_UNREF: + case BPF_KPTR_REF: if (src != ACCESS_DIRECT) { verbose(env, "kptr cannot be accessed indirectly by helper\n"); return -EACCES; @@ -3875,10 +4017,14 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, return -EACCES; } break; + default: + verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n", + btf_field_type_name(field->type)); + return -EACCES; } } } - return err; + return 0; } #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff @@ -4751,7 +4897,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn if (value_regno >= 0) mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { - struct bpf_map_value_off_desc *kptr_off_desc = NULL; + struct btf_field *kptr_field = NULL; if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { @@ -4765,11 +4911,10 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn if (err) return err; if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) - kptr_off_desc = bpf_map_kptr_off_contains(reg->map_ptr, - off + reg->var_off.value); - if (kptr_off_desc) { - err = check_map_kptr_access(env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx, - kptr_off_desc); + kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record, + off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR); + if (kptr_field) { + err = check_map_kptr_access(env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx, kptr_field); } else if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; @@ -5160,10 +5305,6 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized( } if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && - base_type(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) - goto mark; - - if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE || env->allow_ptr_leaks)) { if (clobber) { @@ -5193,6 +5334,11 @@ mark: mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); + /* We do not set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN for stack slot, as we can not + * be sure that whether stack slot is written to or not. Hence, + * we must still conservatively propagate reads upwards even if + * helper may write to the entire memory range. + */ } return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off); } @@ -5442,24 +5588,13 @@ static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, map->name); return -EINVAL; } - if (!map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { - if (map->spin_lock_off == -E2BIG) - verbose(env, - "map '%s' has more than one 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n", - map->name); - else if (map->spin_lock_off == -ENOENT) - verbose(env, - "map '%s' doesn't have 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n", - map->name); - else - verbose(env, - "map '%s' is not a struct type or bpf_spin_lock is mangled\n", - map->name); + if (!btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { + verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid bpf_spin_lock\n", map->name); return -EINVAL; } - if (map->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) { - verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n", - val + reg->off); + if (map->record->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) { + verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock' that is at %d\n", + val + reg->off, map->record->spin_lock_off); return -EINVAL; } if (is_lock) { @@ -5502,24 +5637,13 @@ static int process_timer_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, map->name); return -EINVAL; } - if (!map_value_has_timer(map)) { - if (map->timer_off == -E2BIG) - verbose(env, - "map '%s' has more than one 'struct bpf_timer'\n", - map->name); - else if (map->timer_off == -ENOENT) - verbose(env, - "map '%s' doesn't have 'struct bpf_timer'\n", - map->name); - else - verbose(env, - "map '%s' is not a struct type or bpf_timer is mangled\n", - map->name); + if (!btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { + verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid bpf_timer\n", map->name); return -EINVAL; } - if (map->timer_off != val + reg->off) { + if (map->record->timer_off != val + reg->off) { verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_timer' that is at %d\n", - val + reg->off, map->timer_off); + val + reg->off, map->record->timer_off); return -EINVAL; } if (meta->map_ptr) { @@ -5535,10 +5659,9 @@ static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) { struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; - struct bpf_map_value_off_desc *off_desc; struct bpf_map *map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; + struct btf_field *kptr_field; u32 kptr_off; - int ret; if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { verbose(env, @@ -5551,30 +5674,23 @@ static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, map_ptr->name); return -EINVAL; } - if (!map_value_has_kptrs(map_ptr)) { - ret = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(map_ptr->kptr_off_tab); - if (ret == -E2BIG) - verbose(env, "map '%s' has more than %d kptr\n", map_ptr->name, - BPF_MAP_VALUE_OFF_MAX); - else if (ret == -EEXIST) - verbose(env, "map '%s' has repeating kptr BTF tags\n", map_ptr->name); - else - verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid kptr\n", map_ptr->name); + if (!btf_record_has_field(map_ptr->record, BPF_KPTR)) { + verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid kptr\n", map_ptr->name); return -EINVAL; } meta->map_ptr = map_ptr; kptr_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; - off_desc = bpf_map_kptr_off_contains(map_ptr, kptr_off); - if (!off_desc) { + kptr_field = btf_record_find(map_ptr->record, kptr_off, BPF_KPTR); + if (!kptr_field) { verbose(env, "off=%d doesn't point to kptr\n", kptr_off); return -EACCES; } - if (off_desc->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) { + if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) { verbose(env, "off=%d kptr isn't referenced kptr\n", kptr_off); return -EACCES; } - meta->kptr_off_desc = off_desc; + meta->kptr_field = kptr_field; return 0; } @@ -5796,7 +5912,7 @@ found: } if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { - if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_off_desc, reg, regno)) + if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) return -EACCES; } else { if (arg_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { @@ -6651,6 +6767,10 @@ typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx); +static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_func_state *caller, + struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx); + static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx, int subprog, set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) @@ -6701,6 +6821,16 @@ static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn } } + /* set_callee_state is used for direct subprog calls, but we are + * interested in validating only BPF helpers that can call subprogs as + * callbacks + */ + if (set_callee_state_cb != set_callee_state && !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { + verbose(env, "verifier bug: helper %s#%d is not marked as callback-calling\n", + func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); + return -EFAULT; + } + if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && insn->src_reg == 0 && insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { @@ -7484,7 +7614,7 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn regs[BPF_REG_0].map_uid = meta.map_uid; regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag; if (!type_may_be_null(ret_type) && - map_value_has_spin_lock(meta.map_ptr)) { + btf_record_has_field(meta.map_ptr->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; } break; @@ -7548,8 +7678,8 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { - ret_btf = meta.kptr_off_desc->kptr.btf; - ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_off_desc->kptr.btf_id; + ret_btf = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf; + ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf_id; } else { if (fn->ret_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); @@ -9207,6 +9337,11 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return err; return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, src_reg); + } else if (dst_reg->precise) { + /* if dst_reg is precise, src_reg should be precise as well */ + err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); + if (err) + return err; } } else { /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only @@ -10395,7 +10530,7 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE) { dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; dst_reg->off = aux->map_off; - if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) + if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { @@ -11520,7 +11655,7 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, if (env->explore_alu_limits) return false; if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { - if (!rold->precise && !rcur->precise) + if (!rold->precise) return true; /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ return range_within(rold, rcur) && @@ -11843,34 +11978,36 @@ static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, { struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; struct bpf_func_state *state; - int i, err = 0; + int i, err = 0, fr; - state = old->frame[old->curframe]; - state_reg = state->regs; - for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { - if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || - !state_reg->precise) - continue; - if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) - verbose(env, "propagating r%d\n", i); - err = mark_chain_precision(env, i); - if (err < 0) - return err; - } + for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { + state = old->frame[fr]; + state_reg = state->regs; + for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { + if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || + !state_reg->precise) + continue; + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) + verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating r%d\n", i, fr); + err = mark_chain_precision_frame(env, fr, i); + if (err < 0) + return err; + } - for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { - if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) - continue; - state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; - if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || - !state_reg->precise) - continue; - if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) - verbose(env, "propagating fp%d\n", - (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); - err = mark_chain_precision_stack(env, i); - if (err < 0) - return err; + for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { + if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) + continue; + state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; + if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || + !state_reg->precise) + continue; + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) + verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating fp%d\n", + (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE, fr); + err = mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(env, fr, i); + if (err < 0) + return err; + } } return 0; } @@ -12065,6 +12202,10 @@ next: env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed; env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed; + /* forget precise markings we inherited, see __mark_chain_precision */ + if (env->bpf_capable) + mark_all_scalars_imprecise(env, cur); + /* add new state to the head of linked list */ new = &new_sl->state; err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur); @@ -12673,7 +12814,7 @@ static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, { enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); - if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { + if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) { verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); return -EINVAL; @@ -12690,7 +12831,7 @@ static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } } - if (map_value_has_timer(map)) { + if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_timer yet\n"); return -EINVAL; @@ -14613,6 +14754,8 @@ static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 0 /* frameno */, subprog); + state->first_insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start; + state->last_insn_idx = -1; regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs; if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { |