diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/init.c | 25 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 20 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c | 2 |
8 files changed, 50 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c index 7456df985d96..8bf6ad4b9400 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ * We need to define the tracepoints somewhere, and tlb.c * is only compiled when SMP=y. */ +#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <trace/events/tlb.h> #include "mm_internal.h" @@ -1063,13 +1064,9 @@ unsigned long arch_max_swapfile_size(void) static struct execmem_info execmem_info __ro_after_init; #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_EXECMEM_ROX -void execmem_fill_trapping_insns(void *ptr, size_t size, bool writeable) +void execmem_fill_trapping_insns(void *ptr, size_t size) { - /* fill memory with INT3 instructions */ - if (writeable) - memset(ptr, INT3_INSN_OPCODE, size); - else - text_poke_set(ptr, INT3_INSN_OPCODE, size); + memset(ptr, INT3_INSN_OPCODE, size); } #endif @@ -1102,7 +1099,21 @@ struct execmem_info __init *execmem_arch_setup(void) .pgprot = pgprot, .alignment = MODULE_ALIGN, }, - [EXECMEM_KPROBES ... EXECMEM_BPF] = { + [EXECMEM_KPROBES] = { + .flags = flags, + .start = start, + .end = MODULES_END, + .pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL_ROX, + .alignment = MODULE_ALIGN, + }, + [EXECMEM_FTRACE] = { + .flags = flags, + .start = start, + .end = MODULES_END, + .pgprot = pgprot, + .alignment = MODULE_ALIGN, + }, + [EXECMEM_BPF] = { .flags = EXECMEM_KASAN_SHADOW, .start = start, .end = MODULES_END, diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c index 76e33bd7c556..0e4270e20fad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c @@ -224,6 +224,24 @@ static void sync_global_pgds(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) } /* + * Make kernel mappings visible in all page tables in the system. + * This is necessary except when the init task populates kernel mappings + * during the boot process. In that case, all processes originating from + * the init task copies the kernel mappings, so there is no issue. + * Otherwise, missing synchronization could lead to kernel crashes due + * to missing page table entries for certain kernel mappings. + * + * Synchronization is performed at the top level, which is the PGD in + * 5-level paging systems. But in 4-level paging systems, however, + * pgd_populate() is a no-op, so synchronization is done at the P4D level. + * sync_global_pgds() handles this difference between paging levels. + */ +void arch_sync_kernel_mappings(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) +{ + sync_global_pgds(start, end); +} + +/* * NOTE: This function is marked __ref because it calls __init function * (alloc_bootmem_pages). It's safe to do it ONLY when after_bootmem == 0. */ @@ -1013,7 +1031,7 @@ static void __meminit free_pagetable(struct page *page, int order) free_reserved_pages(page, nr_pages); #endif } else { - free_pages((unsigned long)page_address(page), order); + __free_pages(page, order); } } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c index 0539efd0d216..998b6010d6d3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c @@ -451,5 +451,5 @@ void __init kasan_init(void) __flush_tlb_all(); init_task.kasan_depth = 0; - pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n"); + kasan_init_generic(); } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c index faf3a13fb6ba..2f8c32173972 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c @@ -536,12 +536,6 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void) x86_init.resources.dmi_setup = snp_dmi_setup; } - /* - * Switch the SVSM CA mapping (if active) from identity mapped to - * kernel mapped. - */ - snp_update_svsm_ca(); - if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE); } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S index f8a33b25ae86..edbf9c998848 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ .text .code64 -SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute) +SYM_FUNC_START(__pi_sme_encrypt_execute) /* * Entry parameters: @@ -69,9 +69,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute) ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ret int3 -SYM_FUNC_END(sme_encrypt_execute) +SYM_FUNC_END(__pi_sme_encrypt_execute) -SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy) +SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__enc_copy) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR /* * Routine used to encrypt memory in place. diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c index 5ed2109211da..82f3a987f7cf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void) } static unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd, unsigned long task_size, - struct rlimit *rlim_stack) + const struct rlimit *rlim_stack) { unsigned long gap = rlim_stack->rlim_cur; unsigned long pad = stack_maxrandom_size(task_size) + stack_guard_gap; @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static unsigned long mmap_legacy_base(unsigned long rnd, */ static void arch_pick_mmap_base(unsigned long *base, unsigned long *legacy_base, unsigned long random_factor, unsigned long task_size, - struct rlimit *rlim_stack) + const struct rlimit *rlim_stack) { *legacy_base = mmap_legacy_base(random_factor, task_size); if (mmap_is_legacy()) @@ -119,12 +119,12 @@ static void arch_pick_mmap_base(unsigned long *base, unsigned long *legacy_base, *base = mmap_base(random_factor, task_size, rlim_stack); } -void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm, struct rlimit *rlim_stack) +void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm, const struct rlimit *rlim_stack) { if (mmap_is_legacy()) - clear_bit(MMF_TOPDOWN, &mm->flags); + mm_flags_clear(MMF_TOPDOWN, mm); else - set_bit(MMF_TOPDOWN, &mm->flags); + mm_flags_set(MMF_TOPDOWN, mm); arch_pick_mmap_base(&mm->mmap_base, &mm->mmap_legacy_base, arch_rnd(mmap64_rnd_bits), task_size_64bit(0), diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c index 2e7923844afe..b68200a0e0c6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ #include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/ioport.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> -#include <linux/pfn_t.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/mm.h> @@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ __setup("debugpat", pat_debug_setup); static inline enum page_cache_mode get_page_memtype(struct page *pg) { - unsigned long pg_flags = pg->flags & _PGMT_MASK; + unsigned long pg_flags = pg->flags.f & _PGMT_MASK; if (pg_flags == _PGMT_WB) return _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WB; @@ -162,10 +161,10 @@ static inline void set_page_memtype(struct page *pg, break; } - old_flags = READ_ONCE(pg->flags); + old_flags = READ_ONCE(pg->flags.f); do { new_flags = (old_flags & _PGMT_CLEAR_MASK) | memtype_flags; - } while (!try_cmpxchg(&pg->flags, &old_flags, new_flags)); + } while (!try_cmpxchg(&pg->flags.f, &old_flags, new_flags)); } #else static inline enum page_cache_mode get_page_memtype(struct page *pg) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c index c84bd9540b16..dc1afd5c839d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgprot.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ void add_encrypt_protection_map(void) protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]); } -pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags) +pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags_t vm_flags) { unsigned long val = pgprot_val(protection_map[vm_flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC|VM_SHARED)]); |