diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h | 27 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 37 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 8 |
7 files changed, 60 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index ee176236c2be..286d509f9363 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0) /* No Nested Data Breakpoints */ #define X86_FEATURE_WRMSR_XX_BASE_NS (20*32+ 1) /* WRMSR to {FS,GS,KERNEL_GS}_BASE is non-serializing */ #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC (20*32+ 2) /* LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */ +#define X86_FEATURE_VERW_CLEAR (20*32+ 5) /* The memory form of VERW mitigates TSA */ #define X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE (20*32+ 6) /* Null Selector Clears Base */ #define X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS (20*32+ 8) /* Automatic IBRS */ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR (20*32+ 9) /* SMM_CTL MSR is not present */ @@ -487,6 +488,9 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PREFER_YMM (21*32+ 8) /* Avoid ZMM registers due to downclocking */ #define X86_FEATURE_APX (21*32+ 9) /* Advanced Performance Extensions */ #define X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_THUNK_ITS (21*32+10) /* Use thunk for indirect branches in lower half of cacheline */ +#define X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO (21*32+11) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-SQ */ +#define X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO (21*32+12) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-L1 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM (21*32+13) /* Clear CPU buffers using VERW before VMRUN */ /* * BUG word(s) @@ -542,5 +546,5 @@ #define X86_BUG_OLD_MICROCODE X86_BUG( 1*32+ 6) /* "old_microcode" CPU has old microcode, it is surely vulnerable to something */ #define X86_BUG_ITS X86_BUG( 1*32+ 7) /* "its" CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */ #define X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY X86_BUG( 1*32+ 8) /* "its_native_only" CPU is affected by ITS, VMX is not affected */ - +#define X86_BUG_TSA X86_BUG( 1*32+ 9) /* "tsa" CPU is affected by Transient Scheduler Attacks */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h index 9a9b21b78905..b30e5474c18e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h @@ -44,13 +44,13 @@ static __always_inline void native_irq_enable(void) static __always_inline void native_safe_halt(void) { - mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(); + x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(); asm volatile("sti; hlt": : :"memory"); } static __always_inline void native_halt(void) { - mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(); + x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(); asm volatile("hlt": : :"memory"); } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 639d9bcee842..f7af967aa16f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -700,8 +700,13 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_hv { struct kvm_vcpu_hv_tlb_flush_fifo tlb_flush_fifo[HV_NR_TLB_FLUSH_FIFOS]; - /* Preallocated buffer for handling hypercalls passing sparse vCPU set */ + /* + * Preallocated buffers for handling hypercalls that pass sparse vCPU + * sets (for high vCPU counts, they're too large to comfortably fit on + * the stack). + */ u64 sparse_banks[HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_BANKS]; + DECLARE_BITMAP(vcpu_mask, KVM_MAX_VCPUS); struct hv_vp_assist_page vp_assist_page; @@ -764,6 +769,7 @@ enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs { CPUID_8000_0022_EAX, CPUID_7_2_EDX, CPUID_24_0_EBX, + CPUID_8000_0021_ECX, NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS, NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS, diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h index dd2b129b0418..6ca6516c7492 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h @@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ static __always_inline void __monitorx(const void *eax, u32 ecx, u32 edx) static __always_inline void __mwait(u32 eax, u32 ecx) { - mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(); - /* * Use the instruction mnemonic with implicit operands, as the LLVM * assembler fails to assemble the mnemonic with explicit operands: @@ -80,7 +78,7 @@ static __always_inline void __mwait(u32 eax, u32 ecx) */ static __always_inline void __mwaitx(u32 eax, u32 ebx, u32 ecx) { - /* No MDS buffer clear as this is AMD/HYGON only */ + /* No need for TSA buffer clearing on AMD */ /* "mwaitx %eax, %ebx, %ecx" */ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfb" @@ -98,7 +96,6 @@ static __always_inline void __mwaitx(u32 eax, u32 ebx, u32 ecx) */ static __always_inline void __sti_mwait(u32 eax, u32 ecx) { - mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(); asm volatile("sti; mwait" :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx)); } @@ -115,21 +112,29 @@ static __always_inline void __sti_mwait(u32 eax, u32 ecx) */ static __always_inline void mwait_idle_with_hints(u32 eax, u32 ecx) { + if (need_resched()) + return; + + x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(); + if (static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MONITOR) || !current_set_polling_and_test()) { const void *addr = ¤t_thread_info()->flags; alternative_input("", "clflush (%[addr])", X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR, [addr] "a" (addr)); __monitor(addr, 0, 0); - if (!need_resched()) { - if (ecx & 1) { - __mwait(eax, ecx); - } else { - __sti_mwait(eax, ecx); - raw_local_irq_disable(); - } + if (need_resched()) + goto out; + + if (ecx & 1) { + __mwait(eax, ecx); + } else { + __sti_mwait(eax, ecx); + raw_local_irq_disable(); } } + +out: current_clr_polling(); } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 20d754b98f3f..10f261678749 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -302,25 +302,31 @@ .endm /* - * Macro to execute VERW instruction that mitigate transient data sampling - * attacks such as MDS. On affected systems a microcode update overloaded VERW - * instruction to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers CFLAGS.ZF. - * + * Macro to execute VERW insns that mitigate transient data sampling + * attacks such as MDS or TSA. On affected systems a microcode update + * overloaded VERW insns to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers + * CFLAGS.ZF. * Note: Only the memory operand variant of VERW clears the CPU buffers. */ -.macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS +.macro __CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS feature #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - ALTERNATIVE "", "verw mds_verw_sel(%rip)", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF + ALTERNATIVE "", "verw x86_verw_sel(%rip)", \feature #else /* * In 32bit mode, the memory operand must be a %cs reference. The data * segments may not be usable (vm86 mode), and the stack segment may not * be flat (ESPFIX32). */ - ALTERNATIVE "", "verw %cs:mds_verw_sel", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF + ALTERNATIVE "", "verw %cs:x86_verw_sel", \feature #endif .endm +#define CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS \ + __CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF + +#define VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS \ + __CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 .macro CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP @@ -567,24 +573,24 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_vcpu_ibpb); -DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear); +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_idle_clear); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_vm_clear); -extern u16 mds_verw_sel; +extern u16 x86_verw_sel; #include <asm/segment.h> /** - * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability + * x86_clear_cpu_buffers - Buffer clearing support for different x86 CPU vulns * * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the * instruction is executed. */ -static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void) +static __always_inline void x86_clear_cpu_buffers(void) { static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS; @@ -601,14 +607,15 @@ static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void) } /** - * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability + * x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Buffer clearing support in idle for the MDS + * and TSA vulnerabilities. * * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled */ -static __always_inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void) +static __always_inline void x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void) { - if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear)) - mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); + if (static_branch_likely(&cpu_buf_idle_clear)) + x86_clear_cpu_buffers(); } #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h index d8525e6ef50a..8bc074c8d7c6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ #define TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA 0x10001 #define TDVMCALL_GET_QUOTE 0x10002 #define TDVMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR 0x10003 +#define TDVMCALL_SETUP_EVENT_NOTIFY_INTERRUPT 0x10004ULL /* * TDG.VP.VMCALL Status Codes (returned in R10) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h index 6f3499507c5e..0f15d683817d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h @@ -965,7 +965,13 @@ struct kvm_tdx_cmd { struct kvm_tdx_capabilities { __u64 supported_attrs; __u64 supported_xfam; - __u64 reserved[254]; + + __u64 kernel_tdvmcallinfo_1_r11; + __u64 user_tdvmcallinfo_1_r11; + __u64 kernel_tdvmcallinfo_1_r12; + __u64 user_tdvmcallinfo_1_r12; + + __u64 reserved[250]; /* Configurable CPUID bits for userspace */ struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid; |