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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c299
1 files changed, 263 insertions, 36 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index fc59ce78c477..9ae3b11754e6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -46,6 +46,48 @@
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
+/* Bitmap of SEV features supported by the hypervisor */
+u64 sev_hv_features __ro_after_init;
+SYM_PIC_ALIAS(sev_hv_features);
+
+/* Secrets page physical address from the CC blob */
+u64 sev_secrets_pa __ro_after_init;
+SYM_PIC_ALIAS(sev_secrets_pa);
+
+/* For early boot SVSM communication */
+struct svsm_ca boot_svsm_ca_page __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+SYM_PIC_ALIAS(boot_svsm_ca_page);
+
+/*
+ * SVSM related information:
+ * During boot, the page tables are set up as identity mapped and later
+ * changed to use kernel virtual addresses. Maintain separate virtual and
+ * physical addresses for the CAA to allow SVSM functions to be used during
+ * early boot, both with identity mapped virtual addresses and proper kernel
+ * virtual addresses.
+ */
+u64 boot_svsm_caa_pa __ro_after_init;
+SYM_PIC_ALIAS(boot_svsm_caa_pa);
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svsm_ca *, svsm_caa);
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, svsm_caa_pa);
+
+static inline struct svsm_ca *svsm_get_caa(void)
+{
+ if (sev_cfg.use_cas)
+ return this_cpu_read(svsm_caa);
+ else
+ return rip_rel_ptr(&boot_svsm_ca_page);
+}
+
+static inline u64 svsm_get_caa_pa(void)
+{
+ if (sev_cfg.use_cas)
+ return this_cpu_read(svsm_caa_pa);
+ else
+ return boot_svsm_caa_pa;
+}
+
/* AP INIT values as documented in the APM2 section "Processor Initialization State" */
#define AP_INIT_CS_LIMIT 0xffff
#define AP_INIT_DS_LIMIT 0xffff
@@ -79,6 +121,7 @@ static const char * const sev_status_feat_names[] = {
[MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBS_VIRT_BIT] = "IBSVirt",
[MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT_BIT] = "VMSARegProt",
[MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT] = "SMTProt",
+ [MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT] = "SecureAVIC",
};
/*
@@ -100,6 +143,26 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_save_area *, sev_vmsa);
*/
u8 snp_vmpl __ro_after_init;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_vmpl);
+SYM_PIC_ALIAS(snp_vmpl);
+
+/*
+ * Since feature negotiation related variables are set early in the boot
+ * process they must reside in the .data section so as not to be zeroed
+ * out when the .bss section is later cleared.
+ *
+ * GHCB protocol version negotiated with the hypervisor.
+ */
+u16 ghcb_version __ro_after_init;
+SYM_PIC_ALIAS(ghcb_version);
+
+/* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */
+static struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+/*
+ * Needs to be in the .data section because we need it NULL before bss is
+ * cleared
+ */
+struct ghcb *boot_ghcb __section(".data");
static u64 __init get_snp_jump_table_addr(void)
{
@@ -154,6 +217,73 @@ static u64 __init get_jump_table_addr(void)
return ret;
}
+static int svsm_perform_ghcb_protocol(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct svsm_call *call)
+{
+ struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
+ u8 pending = 0;
+
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in protocol and format specifiers. This can be called very early
+ * in the boot, so use rip-relative references as needed.
+ */
+ ghcb->protocol_version = ghcb_version;
+ ghcb->ghcb_usage = GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE;
+
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_SNP_RUN_VMPL);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
+
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
+
+ svsm_issue_call(call, &pending);
+
+ if (pending)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (verify_exception_info(ghcb, &ctxt)) {
+ case ES_OK:
+ break;
+ case ES_EXCEPTION:
+ vc_forward_exception(&ctxt);
+ fallthrough;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return svsm_process_result_codes(call);
+}
+
+static int svsm_perform_call_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
+{
+ struct ghcb_state state;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+ int ret;
+
+ flags = native_local_irq_save();
+
+ if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
+ ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
+ else if (boot_ghcb)
+ ghcb = boot_ghcb;
+ else
+ ghcb = NULL;
+
+ do {
+ ret = ghcb ? svsm_perform_ghcb_protocol(ghcb, call)
+ : __pi_svsm_perform_msr_protocol(call);
+ } while (ret == -EAGAIN);
+
+ if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
+ __sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+
+ native_local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static inline void __pval_terminate(u64 pfn, bool action, unsigned int page_size,
int ret, u64 svsm_ret)
{
@@ -227,6 +357,7 @@ static u64 svsm_build_ca_from_pfn_range(u64 pfn, u64 pfn_end, bool action,
pe->page_size = RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
pe->action = action;
pe->ignore_cf = 0;
+ pe->rsvd = 0;
pe->pfn = pfn;
pe++;
@@ -257,6 +388,7 @@ static int svsm_build_ca_from_psc_desc(struct snp_psc_desc *desc, unsigned int d
pe->page_size = e->pagesize ? RMP_PG_SIZE_2M : RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
pe->action = e->operation == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE;
pe->ignore_cf = 0;
+ pe->rsvd = 0;
pe->pfn = e->gfn;
pe++;
@@ -358,10 +490,31 @@ static void svsm_pval_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
static void pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
{
+ struct psc_entry *e;
+ unsigned int i;
+
if (snp_vmpl)
svsm_pval_pages(desc);
else
pval_pages(desc);
+
+ /*
+ * If not affected by the cache-coherency vulnerability there is no need
+ * to perform the cache eviction mitigation.
+ */
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO))
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= desc->hdr.end_entry; i++) {
+ e = &desc->entries[i];
+
+ /*
+ * If validating memory (making it private) perform the cache
+ * eviction mitigation.
+ */
+ if (e->operation == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE)
+ sev_evict_cache(pfn_to_kaddr(e->gfn), e->pagesize ? 512 : 1);
+ }
}
static int vmgexit_psc(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
@@ -508,8 +661,11 @@ static void set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long npages, int op)
unsigned long vaddr_end;
/* Use the MSR protocol when a GHCB is not available. */
- if (!boot_ghcb)
- return early_set_pages_state(vaddr, __pa(vaddr), npages, op);
+ if (!boot_ghcb) {
+ struct psc_desc d = { op, svsm_get_caa(), svsm_get_caa_pa() };
+
+ return early_set_pages_state(vaddr, __pa(vaddr), npages, &d);
+ }
vaddr = vaddr & PAGE_MASK;
vaddr_end = vaddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
@@ -950,6 +1106,9 @@ static int wakeup_cpu_via_vmgexit(u32 apic_id, unsigned long start_ip, unsigned
vmsa->x87_ftw = AP_INIT_X87_FTW_DEFAULT;
vmsa->x87_fcw = AP_INIT_X87_FCW_DEFAULT;
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SNP_SECURE_AVIC))
+ vmsa->vintr_ctrl |= V_GIF_MASK | V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK;
+
/* SVME must be set. */
vmsa->efer = EFER_SVME;
@@ -1084,6 +1243,105 @@ int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs_cas(pgd_t *pgd)
return 0;
}
+u64 savic_ghcb_msr_read(u32 reg)
+{
+ u64 msr = APIC_BASE_MSR + (reg >> 4);
+ struct pt_regs regs = { .cx = msr };
+ struct es_em_ctxt ctxt = { .regs = &regs };
+ struct ghcb_state state;
+ enum es_result res;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ guard(irqsave)();
+
+ ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+
+ res = sev_es_ghcb_handle_msr(ghcb, &ctxt, false);
+ if (res != ES_OK) {
+ pr_err("Secure AVIC MSR (0x%llx) read returned error (%d)\n", msr, res);
+ /* MSR read failures are treated as fatal errors */
+ sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_SAVIC_FAIL);
+ }
+
+ __sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+
+ return regs.ax | regs.dx << 32;
+}
+
+void savic_ghcb_msr_write(u32 reg, u64 value)
+{
+ u64 msr = APIC_BASE_MSR + (reg >> 4);
+ struct pt_regs regs = {
+ .cx = msr,
+ .ax = lower_32_bits(value),
+ .dx = upper_32_bits(value)
+ };
+ struct es_em_ctxt ctxt = { .regs = &regs };
+ struct ghcb_state state;
+ enum es_result res;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ guard(irqsave)();
+
+ ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+
+ res = sev_es_ghcb_handle_msr(ghcb, &ctxt, true);
+ if (res != ES_OK) {
+ pr_err("Secure AVIC MSR (0x%llx) write returned error (%d)\n", msr, res);
+ /* MSR writes should never fail. Any failure is fatal error for SNP guest */
+ sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_SAVIC_FAIL);
+ }
+
+ __sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+}
+
+enum es_result savic_register_gpa(u64 gpa)
+{
+ struct ghcb_state state;
+ struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
+ enum es_result res;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ guard(irqsave)();
+
+ ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+
+ ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_SAVIC_SELF_GPA);
+ ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, gpa);
+ res = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, &ctxt, SVM_VMGEXIT_SAVIC,
+ SVM_VMGEXIT_SAVIC_REGISTER_GPA, 0);
+
+ __sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+enum es_result savic_unregister_gpa(u64 *gpa)
+{
+ struct ghcb_state state;
+ struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
+ enum es_result res;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ guard(irqsave)();
+
+ ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+
+ ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_SAVIC_SELF_GPA);
+ res = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, &ctxt, SVM_VMGEXIT_SAVIC,
+ SVM_VMGEXIT_SAVIC_UNREGISTER_GPA, 0);
+ if (gpa && res == ES_OK)
+ *gpa = ghcb->save.rbx;
+
+ __sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+
+ return res;
+}
+
static void snp_register_per_cpu_ghcb(void)
{
struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
@@ -1210,7 +1468,8 @@ static void __init alloc_runtime_data(int cpu)
struct svsm_ca *caa;
/* Allocate the SVSM CA page if an SVSM is present */
- caa = memblock_alloc_or_panic(sizeof(*caa), PAGE_SIZE);
+ caa = cpu ? memblock_alloc_or_panic(sizeof(*caa), PAGE_SIZE)
+ : &boot_svsm_ca_page;
per_cpu(svsm_caa, cpu) = caa;
per_cpu(svsm_caa_pa, cpu) = __pa(caa);
@@ -1264,32 +1523,9 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)
init_ghcb(cpu);
}
- /* If running under an SVSM, switch to the per-cpu CA */
- if (snp_vmpl) {
- struct svsm_call call = {};
- unsigned long flags;
- int ret;
-
- local_irq_save(flags);
-
- /*
- * SVSM_CORE_REMAP_CA call:
- * RAX = 0 (Protocol=0, CallID=0)
- * RCX = New CA GPA
- */
- call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
- call.rax = SVSM_CORE_CALL(SVSM_CORE_REMAP_CA);
- call.rcx = this_cpu_read(svsm_caa_pa);
- ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
- if (ret)
- panic("Can't remap the SVSM CA, ret=%d, rax_out=0x%llx\n",
- ret, call.rax_out);
-
+ if (snp_vmpl)
sev_cfg.use_cas = true;
- local_irq_restore(flags);
- }
-
sev_es_setup_play_dead();
/* Secondary CPUs use the runtime #VC handler */
@@ -1567,15 +1803,6 @@ void sev_show_status(void)
pr_cont("\n");
}
-void __init snp_update_svsm_ca(void)
-{
- if (!snp_vmpl)
- return;
-
- /* Update the CAA to a proper kernel address */
- boot_svsm_caa = &boot_svsm_ca_page;
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
static ssize_t vmpl_show(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)