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author | Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> | 2024-05-01 11:51:56 +0300 |
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committer | Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 2024-05-12 11:09:29 +0300 |
commit | dee5a47cc7a45287ec1137edb745bb4dffbe85f6 (patch) | |
tree | 596d79d8d49bf723537c855cd50e4753a723b18c /tools/perf/scripts/python/stackcollapse.py | |
parent | 136d8bc931c84fbe4c70c2d6e0a4d20a2aa90505 (diff) | |
download | linux-dee5a47cc7a45287ec1137edb745bb4dffbe85f6.tar.xz |
KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command
A key aspect of a launching an SNP guest is initializing it with a
known/measured payload which is then encrypted into guest memory as
pre-validated private pages and then measured into the cryptographic
launch context created with KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START so that the guest
can attest itself after booting.
Since all private pages are provided by guest_memfd, make use of the
kvm_gmem_populate() interface to handle this. The general flow is that
guest_memfd will handle allocating the pages associated with the GPA
ranges being initialized by each particular call of
KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, copying data from userspace into those pages,
and then the post_populate callback will do the work of setting the
RMP entries for these pages to private and issuing the SNP firmware
calls to encrypt/measure them.
For more information see the SEV-SNP specification.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501085210.2213060-7-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/scripts/python/stackcollapse.py')
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