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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-01-23 19:00:16 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-01-23 19:00:16 +0300
commit754916d4a2b970bc1b5104d552b5d16ab54954c0 (patch)
tree081708bdb8205a7a2ad75f9b0ee3079a6b1aa6f9 /security
parent21266b8df5224c4f677acf9f353eecc9094731f0 (diff)
parentd48da4d5ed7b4a022a4e54f210575baac71f58af (diff)
downloadlinux-754916d4a2b970bc1b5104d552b5d16ab54954c0.tar.xz
Merge tag 'caps-6.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux
Pull capabilities updates from Serge Hallyn: - remove the cap_mmap_file() hook, as it simply returned the default return value and so doesn't need to exist (Paul Moore) - add a trace event for cap_capable() (Jordan Rome) * tag 'caps-6.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux: security: add trace event for cap_capable capabilities: remove cap_mmap_file()
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c61
1 files changed, 41 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 52ea01acb453..58a0c1c3e409 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
#include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/capability.h>
+
/*
* If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
* !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
@@ -50,24 +53,24 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
}
/**
- * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
+ * cap_capable_helper - Determine whether a task has a particular effective
+ * capability.
* @cred: The credentials to use
- * @targ_ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
+ * @target_ns: The user namespace of the resource being accessed
+ * @cred_ns: The user namespace of the credentials
* @cap: The capability to check for
- * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h
*
* Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
* its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
*
- * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
- * and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics:
- * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
- * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
+ * See cap_capable for more details.
*/
-int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
- int cap, unsigned int opts)
+static inline int cap_capable_helper(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct user_namespace *target_ns,
+ const struct user_namespace *cred_ns,
+ int cap)
{
- struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns;
+ struct user_namespace *ns = target_ns;
/* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace
* by examining the target user namespace and all of the target
@@ -75,21 +78,21 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
*/
for (;;) {
/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
- if (ns == cred->user_ns)
+ if (likely(ns == cred_ns))
return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
/*
* If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for,
* we're done searching.
*/
- if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level)
+ if (ns->level <= cred_ns->level)
return -EPERM;
/*
* The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the
* user namespace has all caps.
*/
- if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
+ if ((ns->parent == cred_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
return 0;
/*
@@ -103,6 +106,31 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
}
/**
+ * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
+ * @cred: The credentials to use
+ * @target_ns: The user namespace of the resource being accessed
+ * @cap: The capability to check for
+ * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h (unused)
+ *
+ * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
+ * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
+ *
+ * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
+ * and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics:
+ * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
+ * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
+ */
+int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *target_ns,
+ int cap, unsigned int opts)
+{
+ const struct user_namespace *cred_ns = cred->user_ns;
+ int ret = cap_capable_helper(cred, target_ns, cred_ns, cap);
+
+ trace_cap_capable(cred, target_ns, cred_ns, cap, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
* cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock
* @ts: The time to set
* @tz: The timezone to set
@@ -1445,12 +1473,6 @@ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
return ret;
}
-int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
static const struct lsm_id capability_lsmid = {
@@ -1470,7 +1492,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, cap_task_prctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, cap_task_setscheduler),