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authorChristian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>2022-08-29 15:38:43 +0300
committerChristian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>2022-08-31 17:37:58 +0300
commit52edb4080eb9606536c34d5d642ccd9d35ad5d08 (patch)
treedeb0a8a618fa6d40ff89201f5e223b43e5186d85 /security
parent6b70fe0601adb1396ad0b85cdf05d217500b49e7 (diff)
downloadlinux-52edb4080eb9606536c34d5d642ccd9d35ad5d08.tar.xz
acl: move idmapping handling into posix_acl_xattr_set()
The uapi POSIX ACL struct passed through the value argument during setxattr() contains {g,u}id values encoded via ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries that should actually be stored in the form of k{g,u}id_t (See [1] for a long explanation of the issue.). In 0c5fd887d2bb ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()") we took the mount's idmapping into account in order to let overlayfs handle POSIX ACLs on idmapped layers correctly. The fixup is currently performed directly in vfs_setxattr() which piles on top of the earlier hackiness by handling the mount's idmapping and stuff the vfs{g,u}id_t values into the uapi struct as well. While that is all correct and works fine it's just ugly. Now that we have introduced vfs_make_posix_acl() earlier move handling idmapped mounts out of vfs_setxattr() and into the POSIX ACL handler where it belongs. Note that we also need to call vfs_make_posix_acl() for EVM which interpretes POSIX ACLs during security_inode_setxattr(). Leave them a longer comment for future reference. All filesystems that support idmapped mounts via FS_ALLOW_IDMAP use the standard POSIX ACL xattr handlers and are covered by this change. This includes overlayfs which simply calls vfs_{g,s}etxattr(). The following filesystems use custom POSIX ACL xattr handlers: 9p, cifs, ecryptfs, and ntfs3 (and overlayfs but we've covered that in the paragraph above) and none of them support idmapped mounts yet. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org/ [1] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c17
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 2e6fb6e2ffd2..23d484e05e6f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -457,10 +457,21 @@ static int evm_xattr_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
int rc;
/*
- * user_ns is not relevant here, ACL_USER/ACL_GROUP don't have impact
- * on the inode mode (see posix_acl_equiv_mode()).
+ * An earlier comment here mentioned that the idmappings for
+ * ACL_{GROUP,USER} don't matter since EVM is only interested in the
+ * mode stored as part of POSIX ACLs. Nonetheless, if it must translate
+ * from the uapi POSIX ACL representation to the VFS internal POSIX ACL
+ * representation it should do so correctly. There's no guarantee that
+ * we won't change POSIX ACLs in a way that ACL_{GROUP,USER} matters
+ * for the mode at some point and it's difficult to keep track of all
+ * the LSM and integrity modules and what they do to POSIX ACLs.
+ *
+ * Frankly, EVM shouldn't try to interpret the uapi struct for POSIX
+ * ACLs it received. It requires knowledge that only the VFS is
+ * guaranteed to have.
*/
- acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
+ acl = vfs_set_acl_prepare(mnt_userns, i_user_ns(inode),
+ xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acl))
return 1;