Merge tag 'pull-f_path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

Pull file->f_path constification from Al Viro:
 "Only one thing was modifying ->f_path of an opened file - acct(2).

  Massaging that away and constifying a bunch of struct path * arguments
  in functions that might be given &file->f_path ends up with the
  situation where we can turn ->f_path into an anon union of const
  struct path f_path and struct path __f_path, the latter modified only
  in a few places in fs/{file_table,open,namei}.c, all for struct file
  instances that are yet to be opened"

* tag 'pull-f_path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (23 commits)
  Have cc(1) catch attempts to modify ->f_path
  kernel/acct.c: saner struct file treatment
  configfs:get_target() - release path as soon as we grab configfs_item reference
  apparmor/af_unix: constify struct path * arguments
  ovl_is_real_file: constify realpath argument
  ovl_sync_file(): constify path argument
  ovl_lower_dir(): constify path argument
  ovl_get_verity_digest(): constify path argument
  ovl_validate_verity(): constify {meta,data}path arguments
  ovl_ensure_verity_loaded(): constify datapath argument
  ksmbd_vfs_set_init_posix_acl(): constify path argument
  ksmbd_vfs_inherit_posix_acl(): constify path argument
  ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_unlock(): constify path argument
  ksmbd_vfs_path_lookup_locked(): root_share_path can be const struct path *
  check_export(): constify path argument
  export_operations->open(): constify path argument
  rqst_exp_get_by_name(): constify path argument
  nfs: constify path argument of __vfs_getattr()
  bpf...d_path(): constify path argument
  done_path_create(): constify path argument
  ...

1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/af_unix.c b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
index 9129766d1e9c..ac0f4be791ec 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static inline struct sock *aa_unix_sk(struct unix_sock *u)
 }
 
 static int unix_fs_perm(const char *op, u32 mask, const struct cred *subj_cred,
-			struct aa_label *label, struct path *path)
+			struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path)
 {
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 	AA_BUG(!path);
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static int profile_create_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, int family,
 
 static int profile_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
 			   struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
-			   u32 request, struct sock *sk, struct path *path)
+			   u32 request, struct sock *sk, const struct path *path)
 {
 	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
 	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
@@ -386,9 +386,9 @@ static int profile_opt_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
 
 /* null peer_label is allowed, in which case the peer_sk label is used */
 static int profile_peer_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
-			     struct sock *sk, struct path *path,
+			     struct sock *sk, const struct path *path,
 			     struct sockaddr_un *peer_addr,
-			     int peer_addrlen, struct path *peer_path,
+			     int peer_addrlen, const struct path *peer_path,
 			     struct aa_label *peer_label,
 			     struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
 {
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ int aa_unix_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
 static int aa_unix_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 				 struct aa_label *label,
 				 const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk,
-				 struct path *path)
+				 const struct path *path)
 {
 	if (!unconfined(label)) {
 		struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -599,9 +599,9 @@ int aa_unix_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
 
 static int unix_peer_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 			  struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
-			  struct sock *sk, struct path *path,
+			  struct sock *sk, const struct path *path,
 			  struct sockaddr_un *peer_addr, int peer_addrlen,
-			  struct path *peer_path, struct aa_label *peer_label)
+			  const struct path *peer_path, struct aa_label *peer_label)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, subj_cred, sk);