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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-07-29 04:25:57 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-07-29 04:25:57 +0300 |
commit | dffb641bea1d0c5a4017771aafb39513701095be (patch) | |
tree | 2ccbf9c0ec7888f1d0deb9f84a4561a675706f6d /security/selinux/hooks.c | |
parent | 30b9dcae9815ae7e752fe3aa00aa283fadf16c6a (diff) | |
parent | ee79ba39b3d6fdcfa53de6519d7e259e284e78f7 (diff) | |
download | linux-dffb641bea1d0c5a4017771aafb39513701095be.tar.xz |
Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20250725' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Introduce the concept of a SELinux "neveraudit" type which prevents
all auditing of the given type/domain.
Taken by itself, the benefit of marking a SELinux domain with the
"neveraudit" tag is likely not very interesting, especially given the
significant overlap with the "dontaudit" tag.
However, given that the "neveraudit" tag applies to *all* auditing of
the tagged domain, we can do some fairly interesting optimizations
when a SELinux domain is marked as both "permissive" and "dontaudit"
(think of the unconfined_t domain).
While this pull request includes optimized inode permission and
getattr hooks, these optimizations require SELinux policy changes,
therefore the improvements may not be visible on standard downstream
Linux distos for a period of time.
- Continue the deprecation process of /sys/fs/selinux/user.
After removing the associated userspace code in 2020, we marked the
/sys/fs/selinux/user interface as deprecated in Linux v6.13 with
pr_warn() and the usual documention update.
This adds a five second sleep after the pr_warn(), following a
previous deprecation process pattern that has worked well for us in
the past in helping identify any existing users that we haven't yet
reached.
- Add a __GFP_NOWARN flag to our initial hash table allocation.
Fuzzers such a syzbot often attempt abnormally large SELinux policy
loads, which the SELinux code gracefully handles by checking for
allocation failures, but not before the allocator emits a warning
which causes the automated fuzzing to flag this as an error and
report it to the list. While we want to continue to support the work
done by the fuzzing teams, we want to focus on proper issues and not
an error case that is already handled safely. Add a NOWARN flag to
quiet the allocator and prevent syzbot from tripping on this again.
- Remove some unnecessary selinuxfs cleanup code, courtesy of Al.
- Update the SELinux in-kernel documentation with pointers to
additional information.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20250725' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: don't bother with selinuxfs_info_free() on failures
selinux: add __GFP_NOWARN to hashtab_init() allocations
selinux: optimize selinux_inode_getattr/permission() based on neveraudit|permissive
selinux: introduce neveraudit types
documentation: add links to SELinux resources
selinux: add a 5 second sleep to /sys/fs/selinux/user
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 0dadce2267c1..c95a5874bf7d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3181,6 +3181,8 @@ static inline void task_avdcache_update(struct task_security_struct *tsec, tsec->avdcache.dir[spot].audited = audited; tsec->avdcache.dir[spot].allowed = avd->allowed; tsec->avdcache.dir[spot].permissive = avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE; + tsec->avdcache.permissive_neveraudit = + (avd->flags == (AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE|AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT)); } /** @@ -3207,10 +3209,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int requested) if (!mask) return 0; + tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + if (task_avdcache_permnoaudit(tsec)) + return 0; + isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, requested & MAY_NOT_BLOCK); if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); - tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); rc = task_avdcache_search(tsec, isec, &avdc); @@ -3274,6 +3279,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) { + struct task_security_struct *tsec; + + tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + + if (task_avdcache_permnoaudit(tsec)) + return 0; + return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR); } |