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authorFan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>2024-08-03 09:08:30 +0300
committerPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>2024-08-20 21:03:35 +0300
commit31f8c8682f30720be25e9b1021caa43c64e8d9ce (patch)
tree5c210c974594b30fc81a0857beae388e6b9cf6b8 /security/ipe/eval.h
parent7c373e4f1445263728d3eeab7e33e932c8f4a288 (diff)
downloadlinux-31f8c8682f30720be25e9b1021caa43c64e8d9ce.tar.xz
ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider
Enable IPE policy authors to indicate trust for a singular fsverity file, identified by the digest information, through "fsverity_digest" and all files using valid fsverity builtin signatures via "fsverity_signature". This enables file-level integrity claims to be expressed in IPE, allowing individual files to be authorized, giving some flexibility for policy authors. Such file-level claims are important to be expressed for enforcing the integrity of packages, as well as address some of the scalability issues in a sole dm-verity based solution (# of loop back devices, etc). This solution cannot be done in userspace as the minimum threat that IPE should mitigate is an attacker downloads malicious payload with all required dependencies. These dependencies can lack the userspace check, bypassing the protection entirely. A similar attack succeeds if the userspace component is replaced with a version that does not perform the check. As a result, this can only be done in the common entry point - the kernel. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/ipe/eval.h')
-rw-r--r--security/ipe/eval.h12
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h
index 4901df0e1369..fef65a36468c 100644
--- a/security/ipe/eval.h
+++ b/security/ipe/eval.h
@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ struct ipe_bdev {
};
#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG
+struct ipe_inode {
+ bool fs_verity_signed;
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */
+
struct ipe_eval_ctx {
enum ipe_op_type op;
enum ipe_hook_type hook;
@@ -40,6 +46,12 @@ struct ipe_eval_ctx {
#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY
const struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev;
#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY
+ const struct inode *ino;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG
+ const struct ipe_inode *ipe_inode;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */
};
enum ipe_match {