platform/x86/amd/hsmp: Clamp ioctl/send_message indices (Spectre v1)

Although validate_message() checks msg_id, a mispredicted branch can
still allow speculative indexing into hsmp_msg_desc_table[]. Clamp
msg.msg_id with array_index_nospec() at entry to hsmp_ioctl_msg() so
downstream dereferences (including via is_get_msg() and
hsmp_send_message()) see a bounded index.

Similarly, hsmp_send_message() bounds-checks msg->sock_ind before
indexing hsmp_pdev.sock[], but a mispredicted branch can still
speculatively use the raw index (Spectre v1, CVE-2017-5753). Apply
array_index_nospec() after the check so every caller that reaches
hsmp_pdev.sock[] through this helper sees a clamped socket
index—including hsmp_ioctl_msg() and any other path that hands a
user-derived struct hsmp_message to hsmp_send_message().

Reviewed-by: Muthusamy Ramalingam <muthusamy.ramalingam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Muralidhara M K <muralidhara.mk@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612042610.1629037-7-muralidhara.mk@amd.com
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions