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authorShmulik Ladkani <shmulik@metanetworks.com>2020-12-14 16:38:32 +0300
committerSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>2020-12-19 10:12:17 +0300
commit56ce7c25ae1525d83cf80a880cf506ead1914250 (patch)
treebf05f75d9ba2d4e7a81853207ceb918662977ddb /net/xfrm
parent7f376f1917d7461e05b648983e8d2aea9d0712b2 (diff)
downloadlinux-56ce7c25ae1525d83cf80a880cf506ead1914250.tar.xz
xfrm: Fix oops in xfrm_replay_advance_bmp
When setting xfrm replay_window to values higher than 32, a rare page-fault occurs in xfrm_replay_advance_bmp: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8af350ad7920 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD ad001067 P4D ad001067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 30 Comm: ksoftirqd/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.4.52-050452-generic #202007160732 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:xfrm_replay_advance_bmp+0xbb/0x130 RSP: 0018:ffffa1304013ba40 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000000010d RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000ffffff4b RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: 00000000004c234c RDI: 00000000ffb3dbff RBP: ffffa1304013ba50 R08: ffff8af330ad7920 R09: 0000000007fffffa R10: 0000000000000800 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: ffff8af29d6258c0 R13: ffff8af28b95c700 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8af29d6258fc FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8af339ac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff8af350ad7920 CR3: 0000000015ee4000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Call Trace: xfrm_input+0x4e5/0xa10 xfrm4_rcv_encap+0xb5/0xe0 xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv+0x140/0x1c0 Analysis revealed offending code is when accessing: replay_esn->bmp[nr] |= (1U << bitnr); with 'nr' being 0x07fffffa. This happened in an SMP system when reordering of packets was present; A packet arrived with a "too old" sequence number (outside the window, i.e 'diff > replay_window'), and therefore the following calculation: bitnr = replay_esn->replay_window - (diff - pos); yields a negative result, but since bitnr is u32 we get a large unsigned quantity (in crash dump above: 0xffffff4b seen in ecx). This was supposed to be protected by xfrm_input()'s former call to: if (x->repl->check(x, skb, seq)) { However, the state's spinlock x->lock is *released* after '->check()' is performed, and gets re-acquired before '->advance()' - which gives a chance for a different core to update the xfrm state, e.g. by advancing 'replay_esn->seq' when it encounters more packets - leading to a 'diff > replay_window' situation when original core continues to xfrm_replay_advance_bmp(). An attempt to fix this issue was suggested in commit bcf66bf54aab ("xfrm: Perform a replay check after return from async codepaths"), by calling 'x->repl->recheck()' after lock is re-acquired, but fix applied only to asyncronous crypto algorithms. Augment the fix, by *always* calling 'recheck()' - irrespective if we're using async crypto. Fixes: 0ebea8ef3559 ("[IPSEC]: Move state lock into x->type->input") Signed-off-by: Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/xfrm')
-rw-r--r--net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
index 37456d022cfa..61e6220ddd5a 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ resume:
/* only the first xfrm gets the encap type */
encap_type = 0;
- if (async && x->repl->recheck(x, skb, seq)) {
+ if (x->repl->recheck(x, skb, seq)) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATESEQERROR);
goto drop_unlock;
}