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authorHarald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>2017-09-12 08:04:26 +0300
committerMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>2017-09-28 08:29:43 +0300
commit76b3138192e6ffec334269b1426fd0d100ba962b (patch)
tree9cab1644de5f7b0de0d56207c7259eb22a6b8b04 /net/lapb/lapb_timer.c
parent08c6df97d65a1cb24393d2051bf12ab05f8d7fb6 (diff)
downloadlinux-76b3138192e6ffec334269b1426fd0d100ba962b.tar.xz
s390/zcrypt: Explicitly check input data length.
The function to prepare MEX type 50 ap messages did not explicitly check for the data length in case of data > 512 bytes. Instead the function assumes the boundary check done in the ioctl function will always reject requests with invalid data length values. However, screening just the function code may give the illusion, that there may be a gap which could be exploited by userspace for buffer overwrite attacks. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/lapb/lapb_timer.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions