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authorJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>2014-07-17 16:35:38 +0400
committerMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>2014-07-17 16:39:39 +0400
commite7cafc45258c852c5176cd421615846e79a3d307 (patch)
tree8fbc0fa09ea36fc175d57b46a98ae28450628973 /net/bluetooth
parentc1d4fa7aa86e9194724dfff9cb9359edb98d75ac (diff)
downloadlinux-e7cafc45258c852c5176cd421615846e79a3d307.tar.xz
Bluetooth: Pass initiator/acceptor information to hci_conn_security()
We're interested in whether an authentication request is because of a remote or local action. So far hci_conn_security() has been used both for incoming and outgoing actions (e.g. RFCOMM or L2CAP connect requests) so without some modifications it cannot know which peer is responsible for requesting authentication. This patch adds a new "bool initiator" parameter to hci_conn_security() to indicate which side is responsible for the request and updates the current users to pass this information correspondingly. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth')
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c3
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c15
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c2
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/mgmt.c2
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c3
5 files changed, 14 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index ad5f0b819e90..76c5a38e5997 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -973,7 +973,8 @@ static void hci_conn_encrypt(struct hci_conn *conn)
}
/* Enable security */
-int hci_conn_security(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type)
+int hci_conn_security(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type,
+ bool initiator)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index d0f36336b6ce..c8c259f21d80 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ static inline u8 l2cap_get_auth_type(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
}
/* Service level security */
-int l2cap_chan_check_security(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+int l2cap_chan_check_security(struct l2cap_chan *chan, bool initiator)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
__u8 auth_type;
@@ -785,7 +785,8 @@ int l2cap_chan_check_security(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
auth_type = l2cap_get_auth_type(chan);
- return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, chan->sec_level, auth_type);
+ return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, chan->sec_level, auth_type,
+ initiator);
}
static u8 l2cap_get_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
@@ -1278,7 +1279,7 @@ static void l2cap_do_start(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
if (!(conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE))
return;
- if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan) &&
+ if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, true) &&
__l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) {
l2cap_start_connection(chan);
}
@@ -1357,7 +1358,7 @@ static void l2cap_conn_start(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
}
if (chan->state == BT_CONNECT) {
- if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan) ||
+ if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, true) ||
!__l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) {
l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
continue;
@@ -1379,7 +1380,7 @@ static void l2cap_conn_start(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
rsp.scid = cpu_to_le16(chan->dcid);
rsp.dcid = cpu_to_le16(chan->scid);
- if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan)) {
+ if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, false)) {
if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) {
rsp.result = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CR_PEND);
rsp.status = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CS_AUTHOR_PEND);
@@ -3849,7 +3850,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_connect(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
chan->ident = cmd->ident;
if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE) {
- if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan)) {
+ if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, false)) {
if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) {
l2cap_state_change(chan, BT_CONNECT2);
result = L2CAP_CR_PEND;
@@ -7191,7 +7192,7 @@ int l2cap_chan_connect(struct l2cap_chan *chan, __le16 psm, u16 cid,
if (hcon->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
if (chan->chan_type != L2CAP_CHAN_CONN_ORIENTED) {
__clear_chan_timer(chan);
- if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan))
+ if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, true))
l2cap_state_change(chan, BT_CONNECTED);
} else
l2cap_do_start(chan);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
index 0bc67dc5dcce..3bb1cdf34f07 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
} else if ((sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2 &&
test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags)) ||
sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED) {
- if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan))
+ if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, true))
set_bit(BT_SK_SUSPEND, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
else
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
index b981bfb87f86..190668367e42 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
@@ -3202,7 +3202,7 @@ static int pair_device(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
cmd->user_data = conn;
if (conn->state == BT_CONNECTED &&
- hci_conn_security(conn, sec_level, auth_type))
+ hci_conn_security(conn, sec_level, auth_type, true))
pairing_complete(cmd, 0);
err = 0;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c
index 754b6fe4f742..a0690a84f3e9 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c
@@ -227,7 +227,8 @@ static int rfcomm_check_security(struct rfcomm_dlc *d)
break;
}
- return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, d->sec_level, auth_type);
+ return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, d->sec_level, auth_type,
+ d->out);
}
static void rfcomm_session_timeout(unsigned long arg)