Merge tag 'i2c-host-6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/andi.shyti/linux into i2c/for-mergewindow

i2c-host updates for v6.16

Cleanups and refactorings
- Many drivers switched to dev_err_probe()
- Generic cleanups applied to designware, iproc, ismt, mlxbf,
  npcm7xx, qcom-geni, pasemi, and thunderx
- davinci: declare I2C mangling support among I2C features
- designware: clean up DTS handling
- designware: fix PM runtime on driver unregister
- imx: improve error logging during probe
- lpc2k: improve checks in probe error path
- xgene-slimpro: improve PCC shared memory handling
- pasemi: improve error handling in reset, smbus clear, timeouts
- tegra: validate buffer length during transfers
- wmt: convert binding to YAML format

Improvements and extended support:
- microchip-core: add SMBus support
- mlxbf: add support for repeated start in block transfers
- mlxbf: improve timer configuration
- npcm: attempt clock toggle recovery before failing init
- octeon: add support for block mode operations
- pasemi: add support for unjam device feature
- riic: add support for bus recovery

New device support:
- MediaTek Dimensity 1200 (MT6893)
- Sophgo SG2044
- Renesas RZ/V2N (R9A09G056)
- Rockchip RK3528
- AMD ISP (new driver)

Misc changes:
- core: add support for Write Disable-aware SPD

6 files changed, 66 insertions, 38 deletions

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index 28705ae67784..fd404729b115 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -4968,6 +4968,9 @@ union bpf_attr {
  * 		the netns switch takes place from ingress to ingress without
  * 		going through the CPU's backlog queue.
  *
+ * 		*skb*\ **->mark** and *skb*\ **->tstamp** are not cleared during
+ * 		the netns switch.
+ *
  * 		The *flags* argument is reserved and must be 0. The helper is
  * 		currently only supported for tc BPF program types at the
  * 		ingress hook and for veth and netkit target device types. The
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ethtool_netlink_generated.h b/include/uapi/linux/ethtool_netlink_generated.h
index fe24c3459ac0..30c8dad6214e 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/ethtool_netlink_generated.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/ethtool_netlink_generated.h
@@ -31,11 +31,6 @@ enum ethtool_header_flags {
 	ETHTOOL_FLAG_STATS = 4,
 };
 
-enum {
-	ETHTOOL_PHY_UPSTREAM_TYPE_MAC,
-	ETHTOOL_PHY_UPSTREAM_TYPE_PHY,
-};
-
 enum ethtool_tcp_data_split {
 	ETHTOOL_TCP_DATA_SPLIT_UNKNOWN,
 	ETHTOOL_TCP_DATA_SPLIT_DISABLED,
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h b/include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h
index ed2beb4def3f..8f1fc12bac46 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h
@@ -1010,7 +1010,9 @@ struct io_uring_zcrx_ifq_reg {
 	__u64	region_ptr; /* struct io_uring_region_desc * */
 
 	struct io_uring_zcrx_offsets offsets;
-	__u64	__resv[4];
+	__u32	zcrx_id;
+	__u32	__resv2;
+	__u64	__resv[3];
 };
 
 #ifdef __cplusplus
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index d9d0cb827117..f030adc462ee 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -53,43 +53,70 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
 	__u64 scoped;
 };
 
-/*
- * sys_landlock_create_ruleset() flags:
+/**
+ * DOC: landlock_create_ruleset_flags
+ *
+ * **Flags**
  *
- * - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION: Get the highest supported Landlock ABI
- *   version.
- * - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA: Get a bitmask of fixed issues.
+ * %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION
+ *     Get the highest supported Landlock ABI version (starting at 1).
+ *
+ * %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA
+ *     Get a bitmask of fixed issues for the current Landlock ABI version.
  */
 /* clang-format off */
 #define LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION			(1U << 0)
 #define LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA			(1U << 1)
 /* clang-format on */
 
-/*
- * sys_landlock_restrict_self() flags:
- *
- * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF: Do not create any log related to the
- *   enforced restrictions.  This should only be set by tools launching unknown
- *   or untrusted programs (e.g. a sandbox tool, container runtime, system
- *   service manager).  Because programs sandboxing themselves should fix any
- *   denied access, they should not set this flag to be aware of potential
- *   issues reported by system's logs (i.e. audit).
- * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON: Explicitly ask to continue
- *   logging denied access requests even after an :manpage:`execve(2)` call.
- *   This flag should only be set if all the programs than can legitimately be
- *   executed will not try to request a denied access (which could spam audit
- *   logs).
- * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF: Do not create any log related
- *   to the enforced restrictions coming from future nested domains created by
- *   the caller or its descendants.  This should only be set according to a
- *   runtime configuration (i.e. not hardcoded) by programs launching other
- *   unknown or untrusted programs that may create their own Landlock domains
- *   and spam logs.  The main use case is for container runtimes to enable users
- *   to mute buggy sandboxed programs for a specific container image.  Other use
- *   cases include sandboxer tools and init systems.  Unlike
- *   %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF,
- *   %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF does not impact the requested
- *   restriction (if any) but only the future nested domains.
+/**
+ * DOC: landlock_restrict_self_flags
+ *
+ * **Flags**
+ *
+ * By default, denied accesses originating from programs that sandbox themselves
+ * are logged via the audit subsystem. Such events typically indicate unexpected
+ * behavior, such as bugs or exploitation attempts. However, to avoid excessive
+ * logging, access requests denied by a domain not created by the originating
+ * program are not logged by default. The rationale is that programs should know
+ * their own behavior, but not necessarily the behavior of other programs.  This
+ * default configuration is suitable for most programs that sandbox themselves.
+ * For specific use cases, the following flags allow programs to modify this
+ * default logging behavior.
+ *
+ * The %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF and
+ * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON flags apply to the newly created
+ * Landlock domain.
+ *
+ * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF
+ *     Disables logging of denied accesses originating from the thread creating
+ *     the Landlock domain, as well as its children, as long as they continue
+ *     running the same executable code (i.e., without an intervening
+ *     :manpage:`execve(2)` call). This is intended for programs that execute
+ *     unknown code without invoking :manpage:`execve(2)`, such as script
+ *     interpreters. Programs that only sandbox themselves should not set this
+ *     flag, so users can be notified of unauthorized access attempts via system
+ *     logs.
+ *
+ * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON
+ *     Enables logging of denied accesses after an :manpage:`execve(2)` call,
+ *     providing visibility into unauthorized access attempts by newly executed
+ *     programs within the created Landlock domain. This flag is recommended
+ *     only when all potential executables in the domain are expected to comply
+ *     with the access restrictions, as excessive audit log entries could make
+ *     it more difficult to identify critical events.
+ *
+ * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF
+ *     Disables logging of denied accesses originating from nested Landlock
+ *     domains created by the caller or its descendants. This flag should be set
+ *     according to runtime configuration, not hardcoded, to avoid suppressing
+ *     important security events. It is useful for container runtimes or
+ *     sandboxing tools that may launch programs which themselves create
+ *     Landlock domains and could otherwise generate excessive logs. Unlike
+ *     ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF``, this flag only affects
+ *     future nested domains, not the one being created. It can also be used
+ *     with a @ruleset_fd value of -1 to mute subdomain logs without creating a
+ *     domain.
  */
 /* clang-format off */
 #define LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF		(1U << 0)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h b/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h
index b95dd84eef2d..d4b3e2ae1314 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@
 
 /* Set current process as the (exclusive) owner of this file descriptor.  This
  * must be called before any other vhost command.  Further calls to
- * VHOST_OWNER_SET fail until VHOST_OWNER_RESET is called. */
+ * VHOST_SET_OWNER fail until VHOST_RESET_OWNER is called. */
 #define VHOST_SET_OWNER _IO(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x01)
 /* Give up ownership, and reset the device to default values.
- * Allows subsequent call to VHOST_OWNER_SET to succeed. */
+ * Allows subsequent call to VHOST_SET_OWNER to succeed. */
 #define VHOST_RESET_OWNER _IO(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x02)
 
 /* Set up/modify memory layout */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/virtio_pci.h b/include/uapi/linux/virtio_pci.h
index 8549d4571257..c691ac210ce2 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/virtio_pci.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/virtio_pci.h
@@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ struct virtio_pci_cfg_cap {
 #define VIRTIO_ADMIN_CMD_LIST_USE	0x1
 
 /* Admin command group type. */
+#define VIRTIO_ADMIN_GROUP_TYPE_SELF	0x0
 #define VIRTIO_ADMIN_GROUP_TYPE_SRIOV	0x1
 
 /* Transitional device admin command. */