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authorCássio Gabriel <cassiogabrielcontato@gmail.com>2026-06-03 20:57:54 +0300
committerMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>2026-06-10 14:06:35 +0300
commit8468dd79cfb2ffbdeaf7c353f63d64941cb8ba05 (patch)
tree35459254645d7b8ebbd218cbe85b2d6d246097eb /include/linux
parentfc10b96e964ee1a7e218720652efa4447f148649 (diff)
downloadlinux-8468dd79cfb2ffbdeaf7c353f63d64941cb8ba05.tar.xz
ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing
sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available. Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size. The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below. Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/CANiDSCsjR5NHqu_Ui5cOqWdJgFqmYsQ9WR8O7m0WOhngaYXFpw@mail.gmail.com/t/#m9b3be379221e79327cc13fd71009287368ef4f23 Fixes: 215e5fe75881 ("ASoC: SOF: topology: reject invalid vendor array size in token parser") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel <cassiogabrielcontato@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260603-sof-topology-array-size-signed-v1-1-84f97879a4ef@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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