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authorMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>2021-06-01 22:09:45 +0300
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>2021-06-01 22:09:45 +0300
commit5a25d8ceb8611c06797b74e22d04af2b9fefd130 (patch)
tree4dfb18c8666e1cb579f8380fa8846e2a25343308 /include/linux
parent49219d9b8785ba712575c40e48ce0f7461254626 (diff)
parented1b472fc15aeaa20ddeeb93fd25190014e50d17 (diff)
downloadlinux-5a25d8ceb8611c06797b74e22d04af2b9fefd130.tar.xz
Merge branch 'misc-evm-v7' into next-integrity
From cover letter: EVM portable signatures are particularly suitable for the protection of metadata of immutable files where metadata is signed by a software vendor. They can be used for example in conjunction with an IMA policy that appraises only executed and memory mapped files. However, until now portable signatures can be properly installed only if the EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES initialization flag is also set, which disables metadata verification until an HMAC key is loaded. This will cause metadata writes to be allowed even in the situations where they shouldn't (metadata protected by a portable signature is immutable). The main reason why setting the flag is necessary is that the operations necessary to install portable signatures and protected metadata would be otherwise denied, despite being legitimate, due to the fact that the decision logic has to avoid an unsafe recalculation of the HMAC that would make the unsuccessfully verified metadata valid. However, the decision logic is too coarse, and does not fully take into account all the possible situations where metadata operations could be allowed. For example, if the HMAC key is not loaded and it cannot be loaded in the future due the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE flag being set, it wouldn't be a problem to allow metadata operations, as they wouldn't result in an HMAC being recalculated. This patch set extends the decision logic and adds the necessary exceptions to use portable signatures without turning off metadata verification and deprecates the EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES flag. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210514152753.982958-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com/
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux')
-rw-r--r--include/linux/evm.h18
-rw-r--r--include/linux/integrity.h1
2 files changed, 15 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index 8302bc29bb35..31ef1dbbb3ac 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -23,18 +23,21 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint);
extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid);
-extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size);
extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value,
size_t xattr_value_len);
-extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
+extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name);
extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
const struct xattr *xattr_array,
struct xattr *evm);
+extern bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name);
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
extern int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname);
#else
@@ -71,7 +74,8 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
return;
}
-static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size)
{
return 0;
@@ -85,7 +89,8 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
return;
}
-static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name)
{
return 0;
@@ -104,5 +109,10 @@ static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
return 0;
}
+static inline bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_EVM */
#endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index 2271939c5c31..2ea0f2f65ab6 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ enum integrity_status {
INTEGRITY_PASS = 0,
INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE,
INTEGRITY_FAIL,
+ INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE,
INTEGRITY_NOLABEL,
INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS,
INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN,