diff options
author | Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> | 2016-02-09 21:20:39 +0300 |
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committer | Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> | 2016-02-09 21:20:39 +0300 |
commit | fcdcc79628a1919bde9acf239e364f65bab6327c (patch) | |
tree | 5499be387cf3028c90ac083b1cf866ebed7bf7e0 /fs/proc/base.c | |
parent | 7a8d44bc89e5cddcd5c0704a11a90484d36ba6ba (diff) | |
parent | a0a90718f18264dc904d34a580f332006f5561e9 (diff) | |
download | linux-fcdcc79628a1919bde9acf239e364f65bab6327c.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'topic/acpi' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi into spi-pxa2xx
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/base.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/base.c | 76 |
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index bd3e9e68125b..4f764c2ac1a5 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_cmdline_ops = { static int proc_pid_auxv(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) { - struct mm_struct *mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ); + struct mm_struct *mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); if (mm && !IS_ERR(mm)) { unsigned int nwords = 0; do { @@ -430,7 +430,8 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, wchan = get_wchan(task); - if (wchan && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) && !lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname)) + if (wchan && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS) + && !lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname)) seq_printf(m, "%s", symname); else seq_putc(m, '0'); @@ -444,7 +445,7 @@ static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task) int err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); if (err) return err; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)) { + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)) { mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); return -EPERM; } @@ -697,7 +698,7 @@ static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) */ task = get_proc_task(inode); if (task) { - allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ); + allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); put_task_struct(task); } return allowed; @@ -732,7 +733,7 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid, return true; if (in_group_p(pid->pid_gid)) return true; - return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ); + return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); } @@ -809,7 +810,7 @@ struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode) struct mm_struct *mm = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); if (task) { - mm = mm_access(task, mode); + mm = mm_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS); put_task_struct(task); if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) { @@ -952,6 +953,7 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, unsigned long src = *ppos; int ret = 0; struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data; + unsigned long env_start, env_end; if (!mm) return 0; @@ -963,19 +965,25 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, ret = 0; if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&mm->mm_users)) goto free; + + down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + env_start = mm->env_start; + env_end = mm->env_end; + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + while (count > 0) { size_t this_len, max_len; int retval; - if (src >= (mm->env_end - mm->env_start)) + if (src >= (env_end - env_start)) break; - this_len = mm->env_end - (mm->env_start + src); + this_len = env_end - (env_start + src); max_len = min_t(size_t, PAGE_SIZE, count); this_len = min(max_len, this_len); - retval = access_remote_vm(mm, (mm->env_start + src), + retval = access_remote_vm(mm, (env_start + src), page, this_len, 0); if (retval <= 0) { @@ -1564,12 +1572,16 @@ static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *exe_path) return -ENOENT; } -static const char *proc_pid_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cookie) +static const char *proc_pid_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, + struct inode *inode, + struct delayed_call *done) { - struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); struct path path; int error = -EACCES; + if (!dentry) + return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); + /* Are we allowed to snoop on the tasks file descriptors? */ if (!proc_fd_access_allowed(inode)) goto out; @@ -1630,7 +1642,7 @@ out: const struct inode_operations proc_pid_link_inode_operations = { .readlink = proc_pid_readlink, - .follow_link = proc_pid_follow_link, + .get_link = proc_pid_get_link, .setattr = proc_setattr, }; @@ -1856,7 +1868,7 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) if (!task) goto out_notask; - mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ); + mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) goto out; @@ -1895,7 +1907,7 @@ static const struct dentry_operations tid_map_files_dentry_operations = { .d_delete = pid_delete_dentry, }; -static int proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) +static int map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) { unsigned long vm_start, vm_end; struct vm_area_struct *vma; @@ -1945,20 +1957,22 @@ struct map_files_info { * path to the file in question. */ static const char * -proc_map_files_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cookie) +proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, + struct inode *inode, + struct delayed_call *done) { if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - return proc_pid_follow_link(dentry, NULL); + return proc_pid_get_link(dentry, inode, done); } /* - * Identical to proc_pid_link_inode_operations except for follow_link() + * Identical to proc_pid_link_inode_operations except for get_link() */ static const struct inode_operations proc_map_files_link_inode_operations = { .readlink = proc_pid_readlink, - .follow_link = proc_map_files_follow_link, + .get_link = proc_map_files_get_link, .setattr = proc_setattr, }; @@ -1975,7 +1989,7 @@ proc_map_files_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, return -ENOENT; ei = PROC_I(inode); - ei->op.proc_get_link = proc_map_files_get_link; + ei->op.proc_get_link = map_files_get_link; inode->i_op = &proc_map_files_link_inode_operations; inode->i_size = 64; @@ -2007,7 +2021,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir, goto out; result = -EACCES; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) goto out_put_task; result = -ENOENT; @@ -2060,7 +2074,7 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) goto out; ret = -EACCES; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) goto out_put_task; ret = 0; @@ -2359,7 +2373,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { struct inode * inode = file_inode(file); - char *page; + void *page; ssize_t length; struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode); @@ -2374,14 +2388,11 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, if (*ppos != 0) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - page = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY); - if (!page) + page = memdup_user(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) { + length = PTR_ERR(page); goto out; - - length = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count)) - goto out_free; + } /* Guard against adverse ptrace interaction */ length = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); @@ -2390,10 +2401,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, length = security_setprocattr(task, (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, - (void*)page, count); + page, count); mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); out_free: - free_page((unsigned long) page); + kfree(page); out: put_task_struct(task); out_no_task: @@ -2494,6 +2505,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_coredump_filter_write(struct file *file, mm = get_task_mm(task); if (!mm) goto out_no_mm; + ret = 0; for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < MMF_DUMP_FILTER_BITS; i++, mask <<= 1) { if (val & mask) @@ -2529,7 +2541,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh if (result) return result; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) { + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) { result = -EACCES; goto out_unlock; } |