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| author | Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> | 2020-02-10 21:02:31 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2020-02-28 19:22:17 +0300 |
| commit | 4113e08e75d3d3c6e326ab799d116f95e3685bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | 19fd22e6799a54f09a51f05d99a64e24809ecb23 /drivers/staging | |
| parent | de63cd8b5521cbcbd4caf677212e5c0667960777 (diff) | |
| download | linux-4113e08e75d3d3c6e326ab799d116f95e3685bb7.tar.xz | |
staging: rtl8723bs: Fix potential security hole
commit ac33597c0c0d1d819dccfe001bcd0acef7107e7c upstream.
In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed
to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is
never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel
heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is
specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size
of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory.
Fixes commit 554c0a3abf216 ("0taging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver").
Reported by: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes 554c0a3abf216 ("0taging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver").
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210180235.21691-3-Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/staging')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c index d1b199e3e5bd..82cc385358b4 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c @@ -4213,7 +4213,7 @@ static int rtw_hostapd_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct iw_point *p) /* if (p->length < sizeof(struct ieee_param) || !p->pointer) { */ - if (!p->pointer) { + if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(*param)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } |