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| author | Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> | 2021-01-02 16:59:09 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2021-01-12 22:18:17 +0300 |
| commit | 3f20005ab271c93b5c26736aa3fcf43aacddab39 (patch) | |
| tree | bc4c5e6d1bcb49fb64302d0f0f9aa8d496ce34a9 /crypto/asymmetric_keys | |
| parent | d55d15a332ec651ccb49c42a8a10c03447fdf418 (diff) | |
| download | linux-3f20005ab271c93b5c26736aa3fcf43aacddab39.tar.xz | |
crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set_secret()
commit 0aa171e9b267ce7c52d3a3df7bc9c1fc0203dec5 upstream.
Pavel reports that commit 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned
accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") fixes one problem but introduces another:
the unconditional memcpy() introduced by that commit may overflow the
target buffer if the source data is invalid, which could be the result of
intentional tampering.
So check params.key_size explicitly against the size of the target buffer
before validating the key further.
Fixes: 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()")
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/asymmetric_keys')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions