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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-03-12 06:07:52 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-03-12 06:07:52 +0300
commit555b68419000b4d406c2f3b62972e149ad780535 (patch)
treef4088aad8fc48a539fed2a0ecdedd50edf3728ab /arch
parent685d98211273f60e38a6d361b62d7016c545297e (diff)
parent82ace185017fbbe48342bf7d8a9fd795f9c711cd (diff)
downloadlinux-555b68419000b4d406c2f3b62972e149ad780535.tar.xz
Merge tag 'x86_mm_for_6.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 mm updates from Dave Hansen: - Add a warning when memory encryption conversions fail. These operations require VMM cooperation, even in CoCo environments where the VMM is untrusted. While it's _possible_ that memory pressure could trigger the new warning, the odds are that a guest would only see this from an attacking VMM. - Simplify page fault code by re-enabling interrupts unconditionally - Avoid truncation issues when pfns are passed in to pfn_to_kaddr() with small (<64-bit) types. * tag 'x86_mm_for_6.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm/cpa: Warn for set_memory_XXcrypted() VMM fails x86/mm: Get rid of conditional IF flag handling in page fault path x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/page.h6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/fault.c27
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c19
3 files changed, 32 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page.h
index d18e5c332cb9..1b93ff80b43b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page.h
@@ -66,10 +66,14 @@ static inline void copy_user_page(void *to, void *from, unsigned long vaddr,
* virt_addr_valid(kaddr) returns true.
*/
#define virt_to_page(kaddr) pfn_to_page(__pa(kaddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
-#define pfn_to_kaddr(pfn) __va((pfn) << PAGE_SHIFT)
extern bool __virt_addr_valid(unsigned long kaddr);
#define virt_addr_valid(kaddr) __virt_addr_valid((unsigned long) (kaddr))
+static __always_inline void *pfn_to_kaddr(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ return __va(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
static __always_inline u64 __canonical_address(u64 vaddr, u8 vaddr_bits)
{
return ((s64)vaddr << (64 - vaddr_bits)) >> (64 - vaddr_bits);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index cdb5045a0428..402e08f6b7ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1299,21 +1299,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
return;
}
- /*
- * It's safe to allow irq's after cr2 has been saved and the
- * vmalloc fault has been handled.
- *
- * User-mode registers count as a user access even for any
- * potential system fault or CPU buglet:
- */
- if (user_mode(regs)) {
- local_irq_enable();
- flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
- } else {
- if (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
- local_irq_enable();
+ /* Legacy check - remove this after verifying that it doesn't trigger */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF))) {
+ bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
+ return;
}
+ local_irq_enable();
+
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address);
/*
@@ -1329,6 +1322,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION;
+ /*
+ * We set FAULT_FLAG_USER based on the register state, not
+ * based on X86_PF_USER. User space accesses that cause
+ * system page faults are still user accesses.
+ */
+ if (user_mode(regs))
+ flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Faults in the vsyscall page might need emulation. The
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index 102880404046..e5b2985a7c51 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -2157,7 +2157,7 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
/* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */
if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc))
- return -EIO;
+ goto vmm_fail;
ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
@@ -2170,13 +2170,20 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
*/
cpa_flush(&cpa, 0);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
/* Notify hypervisor that we have successfully set/clr encryption attribute. */
- if (!ret) {
- if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr, numpages, enc))
- ret = -EIO;
- }
+ if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr, numpages, enc))
+ goto vmm_fail;
- return ret;
+ return 0;
+
+vmm_fail:
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "CPA VMM failure to convert memory (addr=%p, numpages=%d) to %s.\n",
+ (void *)addr, numpages, enc ? "private" : "shared");
+
+ return -EIO;
}
static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)